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Abstract
This thesis is composed of three essays that propose macroeconomic the-
ories to answer empirical questions and guide policy design. The focus is on
expectations formation, learning and optimal taxation.
In the first chapter I address the empirical finding that sovereign default his-
tory is a predictor of risk spreads even after controlling for pricing fundamentals.
I show that this fact can be reconciled with a model of creditors’ learning about
the default probability of a sovereign. Furthermore, I show that if creditors
learn about a group of countries, then clusters of default emerge as a side effect
of the beliefs formation process.
The second chapter documents that investment recovers sluggishly after re-
cessions and that consumption tends to lead the recoveries. I propose a model
to show that during recessions investors might be excessively pessimistic about
consumer demand and delay the implementation of projects. Taking this setting
to the design of countercyclical policy, I argue that corporate income taxation
can be a desirable instrument to use, as it is linked to the expected gains of firms,
while interest rate policy or investment subsidies affect the cost of investment.
In the third chapter, coauthored with Paweł Doligalski, we study how to
design the tax system in an economy featuring an informal labor market, by
extending the Mirrlees theory on optimal income taxation. We estimate the
key elements of this model on Colombian data and compute the optimal tax
schedule.
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Chapter 1
Learning in Sovereign Debt Markets
Abstract
A default episode is typically followed by 1) a raise in spreads and 2) a positive surplus for
the lenders. In this paper I show that this fact can be reconciled with a model of creditors
learning about the default probability of a sovereign. Existing sovereign debt models are instead
unable to accommodate these aspects of the data, as they portray mappings from economy
fundamentals to spreads which are not affected by default history. The theory also implies that
full repayment of debt can lead to a drop in spreads, providing the incentives to the sovereign
for higher debt exposure and consequently a negative surplus for the lenders. Furthermore, if
creditors learn about multiple countries, I show that clusters of default emerge as a side effect
of the beliefs formation process, and can occur even if there is no trade or capital market link
between countries.
1
1 INTRODUCTION
1 Introduction
Sovereign debt has historically been one of the largest classes of financial assets. In 1950 it accounted
for 22% of the market value of worldwide assets, and for 19% in 2010.1 It is also one of the main
instruments for governments to finance their expenditures. Therefore, it is relevant to understand
how the market prices these assets.
According to the Standard & Poor’s default criterion2, more than 240 sovereign defaults occurred
over the period 1824-2004. This makes of default a key element affecting the sovereign debt market,
and consequently the pricing of this asset. In fact, the probability of default has been proposed as
one of the main factors accounting for the interest rate premia that sovereign debt pays over a “risk
free” asset (commonly known as spreads).3
Empirical studies have found that the default history is informative about the variation of spreads.
This finding holds even after controlling for the variables that economic theory identifies as the
key determinants of default decisions, the so-called “fundamentals”. Two facts highlighted in this
literature are: a default episode is typically followed by 1) a raise in spreads and 2) a positive
surplus for the lenders. The main contribution of this paper is to provide a theory that can account
for both facts.
The first fact is documented in Cruces and Trebesch (2013), who, using a panel of countries for the
period 1970-2010, estimate that an increase of the haircut4 by one percentage point generates an
increase of 4-5 basis points in spreads 4 to 7 years after the settlement. This pattern has also been
found in other analyses on risk spreads and credit ratings (see Borensztein and Panizza (2009),
Cantor and Packer (1996), Afonso, Gomes, and Rother (2006) and Panizza, Sturzenegger, and
Zettelmeyer (2009)). The second fact is documented in Benczúr and Ilut (2016), where, using a
panel of countries for the period 1970-1982, the authors show that the raise in spreads after default
is higher than what is implied by country fundamentals, investors risk aversion and the objective
default probability.
These two facts are not accounted for by the existing models of sovereign debt. Sovereign debt
models are characterized by a rational expectations equilibrium (REE) where, for each possible
value of fundamentals and debt issuance, there is a corresponding spread that reflects the default
probabilities, such that creditors break even on average5. In most of these models the default
event is not informative and therefore spreads do not react to a default episode.6 The exceptions
1During the 19th Century, sovereign debt even reached a percentage higher than 70% of all assets traded in the
London Stock Exchange. See Tomz and Wright (2013).
2"...the failure to meet a principal or interest payment on the due date (or within the specified grace period)
contained in the original terms of a debt issue ... or tenders an exchange offer of new debt with less-favorable terms
than the original issue" (Beers and Cavanaugh, 2006) taken from Richmond and Dias (2008). See Borensztein and
Panizza (2009) for a discussion on others criteria to classify default.
3See the surveys presented in Tomz and Wright (2013) and Aguiar and Amador (2014). The quantitative sovereign
debt models in Aguiar and Gopinath (2006); Arellano (2008) are an example of this. The early theoretical contribution
of Grossman and Van Huyck (1988) lays out the theoretical the framework to link default and spreads in sovereign
debt markets.
4The percentage loss of the asset value for the creditor due to a renegotiation of the outstanding debt.
5This mapping is commonly named the ‘bond price menu’.
6See for example Arellano (2008); Yue (2010).
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are Bayesian REE, where a default decision can be informative and the spread may change after a
default episode, due to asymmetric information between creditors and government. Nevertheless, as
creditors still break even on average, these models cannot account for the emergence of a positive
surplus for creditors. I also question the assumption that creditors possess detailed and exact
knowledge about governments, which is imposed in these modeling choices.
I propose a sovereign debt model that can account for both facts through a minor deviation from
rational expectations. Creditors are endowed with a well-specified set of beliefs about the sovereign
decision to default. These beliefs might not coincide exactly with REE beliefs. Given those beliefs,
creditors participate in sovereign debt markets and behave rationally.7 This is the concept of
Internal Rationality proposed by Adam and Marcet (2011).
While the REE imposes a unique mapping from fundamentals to market outcomes, the belief system
of the creditors in this model allows for a joint probability distribution of market outcomes (default
or repayment) and fundamentals. This design accounts for the fact that agents might not have
perfect market knowledge, in particular that creditors have uncertainty about the sovereign and
about the political decision process that leads to repayment or default.8 The deviation from the
REE is minor, as the creditors’ system of beliefs is centered around the REE beliefs and can be set
arbitrarily close to it.
The key mechanism of this paper is: whenever creditors face a higher (lower) haircut than ex-
pected, they update their beliefs about default probabilities and, keeping fundamentals unchanged,
spreads rise (fall). Therefore, the spreads increase after a default and might do so beyond what
is implied by the ‘objective’ default probability, allowing for a positive surplus for creditors. The
updating algorithm implied by the belief system of the creditors is a variant of a fixed-gain learning
algorithm.9
Just as the model replicates the rise in spreads and a possible surplus after default, the learning
mechanism embeds a certain degree of symmetry and therefore repayment is also informative and
leads to lower spreads and a possible negative surplus for creditors. Altogether spreads fluctuate
around the REE case, in which the endogenous mean reversion mechanism is the decision of the
sovereign to default or repay and debt issuance. I further show that the learning mechanism can
account for clusters of default, when creditors attribute common features to a group of countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: first, I discuss the highlighted stylized facts and the
related literature, then I present the model, the extension and a discussion of the results and of
alternative theories. I conclude pointing out the insights and caveats of the paper.
7Taking their belief system as given they maximize the expected discount stream of payoffs and have dynamically
consistent plans.
8As opposed to the Bayesian RE creditors that knows perfectly all details of the decision making process of the
government but just cannot observe perfectly the values of some parameters that are part of the problem.
9See Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for a detailed exposition of learning algorithms.
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2 Reaction of spreads to default and related literature
It is well documented that the default history of a sovereign can partly account for the variation
in sovereign debt spreads across countries and time.10 The consensus in the literature is that
sovereigns with a record of defaults pay higher spreads than those who have not incurred in one
(see Tomz (2007), Flandreau and Zumer (2003), Cantor and Packer (1996), Afonso, Gomes, and
Rother (2006) and Panizza, Sturzenegger, and Zettelmeyer (2009)). Nevertheless, the overall effects
seem to be small and short lived. Borensztein and Panizza (2009) estimate a panel regression model
for 31 emerging markets for the sample 1997-2004 and find that spreads rise after a default but the
effects are short-lived. They control for a set of variables that are considered “fundamentals” of the
sovereign bond pricing, such as GDP growth, the level of debt and the current account.
On the other hand, Cruces and Trebesch (2013) find that the effects can be sizable and economically
significant at least seven seven years after the settlement is reached. The main difference in Cruces
and Trebesch (2013) with respect to previous literature is a more precise measurement of creditors
losses during a default. In particular, they explicitly take into account the maturity structure of
the defaulted debt and the newly issued debt included in the settlement11. Their sample spans over
a panel of 68 countries for the period 1970-2010; where 180 debt restructurings occurred. Their
main result is that defaults having a haircut one standard deviation higher than the average, are
associated spreads that are 120 basis points higher 4 to 7 years after the settlement.
Using a sample for 1970-1982 Benczúr and Ilut (2016) find that the raise in spreads after default
is higher than what can be explained by a higher risk aversion or the objective default probability.
They use the Error-in-Variables method (EVM) to recover a measure of the objective default
probability.12
The model I propose provides a formal framework to the concepts discussed in Tomz (2007) of
“surprising payers” and “expected defaulters”. In line with the evidence presented by Tomz (2007),
the model prescribes that if the country chooses a haircut smaller than the perceived default
probability, then creditors update their beliefs and spreads fall. If the country defaults and sets a
haircut equal to the perceived default probability, then spreads do not react.
A closely related notion are also the “unjustifiable” and the “excusable” haircuts presented in Gross-
man and Van Huyck (1988). The authors construct a reputational equilibrium where for each
contingency there is an expected haircut by the government, and this is properly accounted for
in the pricing of sovereign debt. The model I present here generalizes the idea of Grossman and
Van Huyck (1988). In their model, the after-default spreads are infinite in the case of an “unjusti-
fiable” haircut; and the spreads remain unchanged if the haircut is exactly equal to the excusable
(expected) level. In the model presented here there is a smoother relationship between the level
10See Tomz and Wright (2013) for a survey on the empirical research on sovereign debt markets.
11It is common that debt restructuring deals include new debt contracts
12The identification strategy consists in using realized repayment in the regression equation to have the expecta-
tional error as part of the error in the regression. Then, by a rational expectations argument they instrument the
regression with variables known before the repayment was realized.
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of the haircut and the spreads; the threshold of Grossman and Van Huyck (1988) represents the
particular case in which creditors discount past information quickly enough.
The incomplete markets models of sovereign debt as Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano
(2008)13 sustain debt in equilibrium by temporary exclusion from debt markets and lower real-
izations of the GDP during the default episode. In these models a key element of analysis is the
bond-price menu. The bond price menu is a mapping from the economy fundamentals, such as the
level of GDP and outstanding debt, to the spreads payable at each level of debt. This REE requires
this menu to reflect the exact default probabilities of each sovereign debt contract, and the menu
does not change after a default. Default history is not informative in this setup.
Alternatively, there are models that have considered information asymmetry between the country
and the creditors: see for example Alfaro and Kanczuk (2005) and Catão, Fostel, and Kapur
(2009). These models can generate a rise in spreads after default, as default can be informative
about the government or the income process of the country (as in Catão, Fostel, and Kapur (2009)).
Nevertheless, this approach cannot lead to a higher surplus for creditors after default, since the rise
in spreads objectively reflect the higher default probability conditional on observables. Furthermore
I will illustrate that the equilibrium concept adopted in this case demands the creditor to hold a
large amount of information about the problem of the government and about the beliefs of all other
creditors in the market.
Benczúr and Ilut (2016) interpret the higher surplus as evidence of a punishment by creditors on
defaulters, and to be suggestive of a relational contract between the bank and the sovereign. This
implies assumptions of either coordination or lock-in relationships between sovereigns and creditors.
Nevertheless, coordination and lock-in relationships are not common in sovereign debt markets.14
The analysis in this paper uses the Internal Rationality concept of Adam and Marcet (2011) to
study the pricing of sovereign debt. Adam, Marcet, and Nicolini (2016) have already exploited
this concept to explain stylized facts in the asset pricing literature by slightly modifying the basic
consumption based asset pricing model and relaxing the REE concept. They are able to generate,
among other moments, the volatility and persistence of the price-dividend ratio for stocks.
In the setup by Adam, Marcet, and Nicolini (2016), the investors can trade an asset that has an
exogenous stochastic process for dividends. In this case, a the rational expectations equilibrium
would impose a mapping from the history of dividends to the equilibrium price, and consequently
prices are not informative for the traders if they can observe dividends. They depart from rational
expectations by allowing for the possibility that market participants do not know this mapping and
form expectations with a system of beliefs that is characterized by a joint density of the history
of dividends and prices The key point of Adam, Marcet, and Nicolini (2016) (henceforth AMN) is
that if agents do not have perfect market knowledge, then expectations can be driven not only by
beliefs about fundamentals (dividends in their case) but also market outcomes (prices). I follow
13Also known as the quantitative models of sovereign debt (See Aguiar and Amador (2014)).
14See Wright (2005) for a discussion about the not credible menace of creditors to punish a defaulting country.
Also Kletzer and Wright (2000) presents the difficulties of imposing such penalties on sovereigns.
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this notion and creditors in sovereign debt markets react not only to the fundamentals (GDP of the
sovereign, level of debt, etc.) but also to market outcomes (default or repayment). The novelty of
the analysis I present is that the the decisions of the issuer of the asset are endogenous and depend
on the belief system of investors.15
3 Model
The model economy is populated by a government and international creditors. The government
is a benevolent planner of a small open economy, that collects taxes and issue bonds to finance
expenditures. International creditors are risk neutral investors that value bonds according to their
perceived default probability. In case of a default, the country is excluded from capital markets
until a settlement with the creditors is achieved.
3.1 The Government
The government maximizes the welfare of a small open economy through the provision of public
goods. The preferences of the representative household are given by:
∞∑
t=0
βtE {u(ct, gt)} (1)
where c is private consumption; g is the public provision of goods; β the discount factor and u is a
strictly concave and twice differentiable utility function.
At each period t the households receive an endowment yt that follows a Markov chain with possible
values Y = {y1, . . . , yN} that satisfy y1 < y2 < . . . < yN . The transition probabilities are given by
pi(y′ | y) for y′, y ∈ Y . The households do not save and consume the after tax income such that
ct = (1− τ)yt ; where τ is the tax rate.
Every period the government has to cover an operational cost et that is i.i.d with mass probability
function f(e) and domain E = {e1, e2, ..., eM}.16 Let bt be the amount of bonds issued in period t
that mature in period t + 1 and have face value equal to 1. Then, if the government fully repays
the outstanding debt the budget constrain is
gt + et − τyt ≤ qt(bt, yt)bt − bt−1
15On the other hand the analysis is greatly simplified by the assumption of risk neutral investors.
16Another possible interpretation is to consider that, at least partly, et captures some rent extraction of the
government from total resources. Along these lines, the government is not an ideal benevolent planner and we only
require that at least the resources not appropriated by politicians (and operational costs) are used to maximize social
welfare. I will not carry this interpretation along the paper because of the simple structure provided to the stochastic
process {et}.
Quantitatively the inclusion of {et} is done to replicate that fact found in Tomz and Wright (2007) that although
GDP is a strong predictor of default, the relation is weaker than what most models prescribe.
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where qt(bt, yt) is the market price of the bonds issued at time t. In general qt(b, y) is a time-varying
function of the amount of debt issued and income; commonly known in the literature as the bond-
price menu. The constraint establishes that the primary deficit has to be lower or equal than net
capital inflows.17
Default decision, exclusion and the settlement
If the sovereign decides to default at period t, it is excluded from capital markets and the households
suffer a (α) percentage loss in their income every period until a settlement with the creditors is
reached. The bargaining procedure for the settlement is as follows: every period, while the country
is in default, the government can exit default if it offers to the creditors a haircut equal to h¯; the
creditors reservation haircut level. The repayment can be done through immediate payments or
handing newly issued bonds that creditors value at the market price.18
Let V (bt−1, yt, et, qt(b, y)) denote the value function of a government that has the option to default
at t and has outstanding debt bt−1; income realization yt; expenditures et; and faces the bond price
menu qt(b, y). In addition, let V d (bt−1, yt, et, qt(bt, yt), y∗) be the value function of a government
in default where bt−1 is the outstanding debt and y∗ is the level of income at which the default
decision was initially taken. The inclusion of y∗ anticipates the fact that it partly determines the
evolution of the bond price menu qt(bt, yt) in equilibrium. Lastly, let dt be an indicator variable
that takes value 1 in case the country is in default at the end of time t.
Starting from the case where the sovereign is not in default in period t, the value functions have to
satisfy:
V (bt−1, yt, et, qt(b, y)) = max
(dt,gt,bt)∈C(bt−1,yt,et,qt(b,y))
(1− dt) (u(ct, gt) + βE {V (bt, yt+1, et+1, qt+1(b, y))}) . . .
+dt
(
u(ct, gt) + βE
{
V d ((1 + r)bt−1, yt+1, et+1, qt+1(b, y), yt)
})
(2)
where
ct = (1− τ) (yt − dt αyt)
and C(bt−1, yt, et, qt(b, y)) is the feasibility set. It is fully characterized by the constraints:
gt + et ≤ τ (yt − dt αyt) + (1− dt) (qt(bt, yt)bt − bt−1)
dt ∈ {0, 1}
17Most sovereign debt models attribute to the government the economy-wide resource constraint, assuming that
they can fully tax income with lump sum transfers. I generalize that setup and allow for the possibility of a government
that has a limited ability to raise tax revenues and which expenditures might not be perfectly substitutable with
private consumption. This approach allows me to have a more meaningfull notion of debt sustainability through a
lower flexibility of the government to adjust revenues and expenditures along the cycle. The standard framework
can be recovered by setting τ = 1 and assuming ct and gt are perfect substitutes.
18This is a simplified version of the bargaining protocols presented in Yue (2010); Bai and Zhang (2012). It could be
simply stated as a take-it-or-leave-it repayment offer with a lower bound. This is consistent with the view presented
in Panizza, Sturzenegger, and Zettelmeyer (2009) where the authors claim that “ [after the Brady bonds] Debt
restructurings took the form of a take-it-or-leave-it exchange offers, ...” (Panizza, Sturzenegger, and Zettelmeyer
(2009), page 671).
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Note that in case of default the face value of the outstanding debt is multiplied by the risk free
interest rate (1 + r). Therefore the debt takes into account the opportunity cost for creditors of the
delay in any payment. I follow this procedure to have that any partial repayment of the outstanding
debt correspond to a market value haircut and measures properly the losses incurred by creditors.
Now, considering the case where the government starts the period in default. Then we have that
the value functions satisfy:
V d(bt−1, yt, et, qt(b, y), y∗) = max
(dt,gt,bt)∈Cd(bt−1,yt,et,qt(b,y))
(1− dt) [u(ct, gt) + βE {V (bt, yt+1, et+1, qt+1(b, y))}] . . . (3)
+dt
[
u(ct, gt) + βE
{
V d ((1 + r)bt−1, yt+1, et+1, qt+1(b, y), y∗)
}]
where
ct = (1− τ) (yt − dt αyt)
and Cd(bt−1, yt, et, qt(b, y)) is the feasibility set in default. It is given by
gt + et + (1− dt)
(
(1− h¯)bt−1 − qt(bt, yt)bt
) ≤ τ (yt − dt αyt) (4)
qt(bt, yt)bt ≤ (1− h¯)bt−1 (5)
The constraint in equation (4) establishes that expenditures have to be lower or equal than tax
revenues. Note that the repayment of the settlement can be decomposed as follows
(1− h¯)bt−1 = qt(bt, yt)bt +
(
(1− h¯)bt−1 − qt(bt, yt)bt
)
where the first term on the right hand side is the amount of the repayment done with new bonds
and the second term is the immediate payment. The second constraint (5) establishes that while
in default, newly issued debt can only be used as part of the settlement.
Let st = (bt−1, yt, et, qt(b, y), y∗, , dt−1) be the vector of states for the decision at t. We note the
policy functions that solve the problem 3 of the government by d(st), g(st) and b(st).
Another definition that is going to prove useful is the following: Let %t be the market value of the
bonds maturing at t once the default decision is announced. If the government decides to fully
repay the bonds then the market value is equal to the face value and %t = 1. Otherwise, if the
government announces a default then %t = 1− h¯. Irrespectively of when the settlement is achieved,
the creditors know a haircut h¯ over the market value is going to be imposed and consequently
%t = 1− h¯.
Perceived Law of Motion of the Bond Price Menu
To solution of (2) and (3) requires to specify how the government forms expectations over yt+1,
et+1 and qt+1(b, y). I suppose the government knows the stochastic processes of yt and et. On the
other hand the expectations over the dynamics of the bond price menu are given by the perceived
law of motion:
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qt+1(b, y) = L (bt−1, yt, et, qt(b, y), dt, dt−1, y∗)
The selection of the arguments of the function L seems arbitrary so far. It is written in a general
way such that given the learning mechanism of the creditors it comprises rational expectations of
the government and also allows for potential deviations from it, e.g a misspecified model. To further
discuss the nature of L I introduce next the other agents in this economy: the creditors.
3.2 The Creditors and the equilibrium bond price menu
International creditors are risk neutral, competitive and have access to a risk free asset with gross
return 1 + r.
The system of beliefs of the creditor is given by a probability measure P that specifies the joint
distribution of {%t, yt, bt}∞t=0. P is given and a primitive of the analysis and does not necessarily
coincides with the distribution of {%t, yt, bt}∞t=0 in equilibrium. Taking P as given the creditors
maximize their utility, following the concept of Internal Rationality (Adam and Marcet (2011)).
Because of risk neutrality investors only take into account the expected return of the bond for their
trading decision. The creditors’ expected market value of the bonds bt issued when the country
income is yt corresponds to EPt {%t+1}, where EPt is the expectation operator with the probability
measure P and conditional on the history {%s, ys, bs}ts=0. The expected market value can be written
as:
EPt {%t+1} =
∑
y∈Y
EPt {%t+1 |yt+1 = y }PPt {yt+1 = y} (6)
where PPt {A} is the probability of event A with the probability measure P. Consequently the
expected return of the bond corresponds to
EPt {%t+1}
qt(bt, yt)
=
∑
y∈Y E
P
t {%t+1 |yt+1 = y }PPt {yt+1 = y}
qt(bt, yt)
and assuming all investors have the same system of beliefs P we have that the non-arbitrage
condition is:
qt(bt, yt) =
∑
y∈Y E
P
t {%t+1 |yt+1 = y }PPt {yt+1 = y}
1 + r
this equation characterizes the equilibrium bond price menu qt(bt, yt) at time t. The time varying
nature of qt(b, y) is inherited from EPt {%t+1 |yt+1 = y } and PPt {yt+1 = y}. Next we show what are
the constraints that the REE imposes on P and the deviation we propose to study sovereign debt
markets.
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Recursive Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE) spreads
First I describe the “Objective” expected value of repayment implied by the model. Let µt(st−1, yt)
be the mean of repayment at t conditional on t − 1 states st−1 and contemporaneous income yt.
Then, given government policy functions, the market value of bonds is
Et {%t+1} =
∑
y∈Y
µt+1(st, y)pi {y | yt}
where
µt+1(st, y) =
∑
e∈E
(
1− h¯ dt+1(st+1)
)
f(e)
where we are averaging over all the possible realizations of the expenditures shock e, with its
corresponding probability mass function f(e). Note that the previous system of equations average
over the two only exogenous stochastic processes in the model: income y and the expenditures e.
Now I can proceed to define the Recursive REE with a constant bond price menu.19
Recursive-REE A set of government policy functions for i) default d(s); ii) public goods provision
g(s); iii) debt issuance b(s); and iv) a bond price menu q(b, y) such that:
1. Taking as given the bond price menu, the government policy functions d(s), g(s), b(s) and
h(s) solve the government’s problem for every t.
2. The bond price menu q(b, y) satisfies the following condition
q(b, y) =
∑
y′∈Y µ(b, y
′)pi {y′ | y}
1 + r
where
µ(b, y) =
∑
e∈E
(
1− h¯ d(st+1)
)
f(e)
3. The probability measure P is equal to the distribution of {%t, yt, bt}∞t=0 implied by the policy
functions and the process for the exogenous variables yt and et.
The first condition refers to individual rationality given beliefs. The second condition guarantees
that creditors break even and the bond price menu reflects the repayment probabilities. Condition
3 establishes that the creditors beliefs are rational expectations.
Condition 3 can be relaxed and still sustain the same allocation. Note that the creditor de-
cision making depend on two sufficient statistics at any given period EPt {%t+1 |yt+1 = y } and
PPt {yt+1 = y}. Then the requirements on P to support the rational expectations allocation are
19This definition closely follows the equilibrium concept prevalent in this literature (see Arellano (2008))
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the following:
EPt {%t+1} = µ(bt, y)
PPt {yt+1 = y} = pi {y′ | y}
these constraints establish that subjective expected repayment has to coincide with average repay-
ment and the perceived transition probabilities of income coincide with the objective transition
probabilities. Next we explore a deviation of the first requirement and formulate a setup where
creditors learn about the repayment probabilities.
Subjective beliefs
The system of subjective beliefs is characterized by the following:
1. Creditors beliefs that the process for the market price of maturing bonds when outstanding
debt is b at the level of GDP y′ corresponds to:
%t(b, y
′) = mt(b, y′) + t (7)
mt(b, y
′) = mt−1(b, y′) + ut
where t ∼ N(0, σ) and ut ∼ N(0, σu) are independent from each other and also from
{%t, yt, bt}ts=0.
2. The subjective beliefs coincide with the objective transition probabilities
PPt {yt+1 = y} = pi {y′ | y}
The shocks t and ut are not specific to the contingency (b, y′) and consequently the creditors
extract information from a default situation about the whole bond price menu. In the appendix A
I consider the possibility of specific shocks for each contingency.20
The Recursive-REE can be recovered by imposing that m0(b, y′) = µ(b, y′) and setting the variance
of the shocks ut to zero. The deviation I consider from Rational Expectations is to allow σu > 0
and equal to a small fraction of the variance of t.
According to 7 equation 6 corresponds to
EPt {%t+1} =
∑
y∈Y
mˆt(bt, y)pi {y′ | y}
20This specification 7 is also found in Adam, Marcet, and Nicolini (2016) that propose it for the price dynamics of
the stock. Notice the difference here that it is specified for the whole bond price menu, i.e for all possible combinations
(b, y′).
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where mˆt(b, y) is the mean of the posterior beliefs of the creditor about mt(b, y). I set the prior of
the creditors to be a degenerate distribution on the REE bond price menu at period 0. The the
optimal updating of beliefs is the following fixed gain learning algorithm,
Learning Algorithm:
mˆt(b, y) =
mˆt−1(b, y) + κ (%t − mˆt−1(bt−1, yt)) if dt−1 = 0mˆt−1(b, y) else (8)
where κ = σσ+σu . The first case refers to the periods where bonds debt matures and the second
for when the country is in default. Consequently the bond price menu is updated as follows
qt(b, y) =
qt−1(b, y)− κ1+r (%t − µt−1(bt−1, yt)) if dt−1 = 0qt−1(b, y) else
The question that emerges at this point is if the government perceived dynamics of the bond price
menu law of motion of the bond price menu, given by qt+1 = Lg (bt−1, y∗, et, qt, dt, dt−1) coincides
with the actual updating process described in the previous equations. If the perceived dynamics
do coincide with the updating process then we have that reputational concerns of the government
will affect the debt issuance and repayment policies. We will study this in section 6 to evaluate if
it provides the incentives of an insurance contract and in section 7 to derive an empirical test for
it. In the next section this mechanism is not main driver of the points highlighted and I abstract
from it by having sovereigns that do not internalize the effects of their actions on the bond price
menu or equivalently having a perceived law of motion given by L(bt−1, y∗, et, qt, dt, 1) = qt.
4 Spreads after default
In this section I will illustrate the pattern of spreads implied by the bond price menu q(b, y) by
simulations of the model for specific functional forms and parameter values. The parametrization
is presented in table 1. The model is solved by value function iterations for each element of the
sequence of the bond price menu qt(b, y). One key assumption at this stage is that governments
have point expectations about the bond price menu in the future that are equal to the observed
bond price menu.
Figure 1 show the time series of one of the entries of the bond price menu. The price shown is for
the bond issued with a high level of debt and low y. The fixed point equilibrium is presented too
for comparison.
The bond price fluctuate around the fixed point equilibrium but the deviations can be persistent.
The “mean-reversion” property is endogenous in the model and generated by the optimal debt and
default decisions of the government. This element is easier to discuss if we think in terms of the risk
spreads (see figure 2) implied by the bond price. When spreads are low the government is willing
12
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Table 1: Parameter Values and functional forms
α 0.9
β 0.95
τ 0.2
y [1, 2.5]
P (y′ | y)
(
0.3 0.1
0.7 0.9
)
b [0.1, 0.2, 0.4]
e [−0.5, 0.17]
P (e) [0.7, 0.3]
h¯ 0.5
r 0.03
κ 0.2
γ 0.01
u(c, g)
(
c
θ−1
θ + g
θ−1
θ
) θ
θ−1 θ2
θ 0.7
θ2 0.5
Figure 1: Bond prices and default q(b, y)
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Figure 2: Risk spreads and default
to issue large amounts of debt and be more exposed to an expenditures shock that might lead to
default because the increase in the current level of resources is high enough to compensate for the
additional risk. On the other hand, for high spreads the country default become less likely, despite
the reduced ability to roll over debt, because the government decides to “gamble” less. In other
words, default is the correction mechanism when spreads are low and repayment when spreads are
high.
We can observe how after a sequence of defaults spreads rise and can lead to s surplus for the
creditors by reacting beyond the objective default probability. In a REE spreads would be constant
at the presented level reflecting exactly the default probability of the sovereign for that bond price
menu.
One of the challenges of the sovereign debt literature is to construct models that are able to generate
realistic levels of debt to GDP. The models tend to support only low levels of debt compared to
what we observe in reality. In our case, when the bond prices are close to the REE the debt levels
tend to be low. It is when the economy has lower spreads that the REE spreads that high debt and
the subsequent default emerge naturally. These cycles of sovereign spreads opens the possibility
that if those cycles are somehow coordinate among a group of countries then clusters of default can
emerge as is explored in the next section.
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Figure 3: Clusters of default
Taken from:Panizza, Sturzenegger, and Zettelmeyer (2009)
5 Clusters of default
Now that we have a model that captures the movements in spreads after default, we can move to
study other dimensions of the sovereign debt market and evaluate what can we extract from the
proposed mechanism. In this section I use the model to study one of the main features of this market:
defaults tend to happen in clusters, and as mentioned in Panizza, Sturzenegger, and Zettelmeyer
(2009) “typically following the end of a period of rapid credit expansion to the borrowing countries”.
figure 3 presents the frequency of defaults in the last two centuries.
To study the possibility of clusters of default with our model we extend the analysis to a pool of
five equal countries. The system of beliefs of the creditor is modified to allow for the possibility of
a common component in the default risk of this group of countries. Creditors system of beliefs for
the repayment decision of country i in period t is characterized by
%it(b, y
′) = µit(b, y
′) +Ωt(b, y′) + it (9)
µit(b, y
′) = µit−1(b, y
′) + uit
Ωt(b, y
′) = Ωt(b, y′) + νt (10)
where Ωt(b, y′) is a common component for all the countries i ∈ {1, . . . , 5} and µit(b, y′) is the
idiosyncratic components. The shocks it, uit are idiosyncratic and independent across countries.
Therefore the only common shock is νt.
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As in the original model the REE can be recovered as a particular case of these setup. By having
the variance of the shocks uit and νt to be zero and
µ(b, y′) = µit(b, y
′) +Ωt(b, y′)
such that the bond menu is the same for all countries, does not change across time and is equal to
the REE value.
In this case the creditors update their perceived default probabilities of country i taking into account
not only the repayment outcome of country i but potentially also the repayment outcomes in the
other countries. The optimal updating algorithm in this scenario is the following:
µit(b, y) = µ
i
t−1(b, y) + κ
i
(
Rit(b
i
t−1, y
i
t)− µit−1(bit−1, yit)
)
+ κo
∑
j 6=i
(
Rjt (b
j
t−1, y
j
t )− µjt−1(bjt−1, yjt )
)
(11)
where κi is the gain factor for repayment about the same country and κo for all the other sovereigns.
These gain factor satisfy κ
o
κi ∼ σ(u
i
t)
σ(νt)
, the reaction of spreads to information from another country
depends on how large the creditor perceive common factors are responsible for the variance of the
country outcomes.
First consider the case where the variance of νt is zero. In this scenario repayment of country j
is not informative about country i. In this case creditors learn about each country independently.
The figure 4 shows the number of defaults in a rolling window of 10 periods, and the average risk
spread for high debt. In this case clusters can happen just by chance and we see that there is only
one episode where 4 countries defaulted.
Cross country learning
Now we consider the case where the common component has positive variance and therefore cred-
itors perceive there is a common factor that drives countries default decision. I maintain the
assumption that the idiosyncratic shock is more volatile than the aggregate shock and therefore
κi > κ0.
The figure 5 show the number of defaults in a rolling window of 10 periods and the average risk
spread for high debt. Clusters occur now more frequently and they tend to be preceded by periods
of increasing bond prices for high debt and low levels of defaults.
The default clusters are not simply driven by a sudden burst of pessimism (in creditors) and
contagion after one country defaults. In fact, what leads them to default contemporaneously is the
coordination in high debt exposure. Note that when creditors observe few or no defaults (like the
first part of the sample) over a long period of time they tend to become too “optimistic”. This can be
seen in the positive trend of the bond prices, that leads to an increase of all governments willingness
to issue more debt. The increase in debt increases their exposure and when a bad shocks occurs
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Figure 4: Clusters without cross-country learning
the government defaults. So, the arrival of bad shocks and the effect of the subsequent defaults in
the cost of roll over the debt is the final element that generates the cluster.
The previous graphs focus on the relation between the bond price menu and defaults or clusters
of defaults, and the highlighted mechanism is that when the entries of bond price menu increase
(specially those associated with high debt) the governments decide to issue more debt and are more
exposed to a negative expenditures shock or a fall in GDP. Empirical evidence has shown that in
fact spreads rise before defaults as the countries face more risk and/or issue more debt, this is
coherent with the mechanism proposed here because the empirical evidence points out to realized
spreads rather to the bond price menu. figure 6 shows how the realized spreads do increase before
the cluster of defaults and that effectively the mechanism proposed is driving the results as we can
see the high debt exposure that countries face before the clusters of defaults. What this paper
is pointing out is something that cannot be extracted that easily from the data and that is the
underlined dynamics of the bond price menu rather than those of the realized bond prices, where
the literature so far has focused assuming a fixed and constant bond price menu.
6 Discussion of Results, caveats and alternative theories
The first of the two stylized facts discussed (the raise in spreads after default) is a pattern that has
been extensively studied and for which Cruces and Trebesch (2013) provide precise evidence for the
period 1970-2010. On the other hand the second stylized fact has not brought as much attention
17
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Figure 5: Clusters with cross-country learning
Figure 6: Total debt issued and the realized spreads (HP filtered)
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and Alfaro and Kanczuk (2005) find it with a limited sample 1970-1982 where most of the lending
was done by syndicated bank loans. An extension of their analysis with the sample used by Cruces
and Trebesch (2013) would allow to identify if the results are robust to periods where most of the
lending was done using sovereign bonds, as the theory I propose suggests, or if it is something
particular of syndicated bank loans and an outcome of relational contracts as Alfaro and Kanczuk
(2005) suggests. The fact that despite the different methodologies and samples in both studies the
authors find very similar responses of spreads to default could indicate that indeed it is a robust
finding.
The paper provides a theory that is based on a belief system of the creditors in sovereign debt
markets. The model ability to replicate the stylized facts proposed is shown with simulations, but
a better understanding of the mechanism and its interaction with the government behavior demands
a more complete characterization of equilibrium outcomes.
Compared to Adam, Marcet, and Nicolini (2016) the use of the Internal Rationality concept in this
setup is extremely simplified by the assumptions of risk neutrality and the implied “deep pockets”
creditors. These conditions render the problem of the creditors basically static and it is only beliefs
that are carried from one period to the other. Furthermore, uncertainty about the repayment plays
no role in the creditors decisions and what matters is only the expected repayment. It is an open
question if the model can generate quantitatively reasonable levels of spreads as it is.
An evaluation to assess if creditors’ beliefs system are not rejected by the model’s simulated data
or the empirical behavior of spreads is a necessary test to assess the consistency and empirical
relevance of the modelling procedure. The fact that the bond price menu is potentially changing
every period could in principle sustain a process for default probabilities that could resemble the
unit root imposed on the belief system, although a formal test in this dimension could shed light
on the validity of the belief system.
The default clusters that have appeared historically have also coincided in many cases with large
common shocks to the defaulting sovereigns. A test of the existence of such channel as cross country
learning nevertheless could explain the excess comovement in the spreads of emerging markets that
is not accounted for global factors; as local conditions have shown to be a weak explanatory variable
in this dimension because of the weak correlation of output.
Extensions of the analysis that are ongoing work are: i) whether the implied learning algorithm
implements an allocation that resembles the optimal insurance contract with asymmetric informa-
tion. ii) The analysis of multi-period bonds and test whether sovereign’s reputation considerations
hold in the data.
7 Conclusions
Creditors in international markets price sovereign debt contracts with great uncertainty about the
conditions under which repayment is going to be done, and about the likelihood of each of those
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conditions. The sources of uncertainty range from the structure of the economy to the political
decision making process. This complicated and demanding endeavor of pricing sovereign debt has
a simple and direct source of information, the past behavior of the country and similar countries.
Which debt contracts were paid and which others were not is a direct measure of the relevant
statistic that concerns creditors: the default probability.
With a model where creditors learn about the default probabilities of debt contracts directly from
the past behavior of a country, I showed that the pattern of spreads after default can be the outcome
of the creditors’ updating of beliefs. This channel can be seen as the reputation cost of the default
decision.
The model replicates the fact that spreads tend to increase after defaults and also the possible
emergence of a surplus for creditors. The mechanism proposed implies a certain degree of symmetry
that prescribes that after long periods where creditors have experienced full repayment spreads can
fall and generate a negative surplus for creditors. This provides a rationale for the view that debt
clusters come as a result of periods of credit expansions where risk spreads do not reflect the default
probability and the high debt positions of countries.
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A System of beliefs with uncorrelated shocks
Subjective beliefs
The system of subjective beliefs is given by the following equations: For a given outstanding debt
b at the level of GDP y′ the creditor beliefs that the haircut in that situation is given by:
Rt(b, y
′) = 1− µt(b, y′) + t (12)
µt(b, y
′) = µt−1(b, y′) + ut
for each possible debt level b ∈ B and GDP level y′ ∈ Y . Where  and ut have mean zero.
Therefore, the creditors assign a random walk for the average payoff of each possible repayment
situation characterized by a level of GDP y′ and debt b. Note that this belief system collapses to
the Rational expectations case if we set θt(b, y′) = µ(b, y′) and the variance of the shocks ut is zero.
This specification leads to a joint distribution of the next period GDP y′ and the expected repayment
for each contract Et {Rt+1(b, y′)}. If the variance of shock shock ut is set to zero then the expected
repayment for each contract has a degenerate distribution that assign all the mass to the point
µ(b, y′).
From the beliefs system 12 it follows that the relevant information for the creditor to update his
beliefs is the repayment outcomes R(b, y) for the corresponding contingency (b, y). To be specific
about the information contained in R(b, y) I characterize this mapping, when the country is not in
default, as follows:
• Rt(bt−1, yt) = 1 in case of full repayment.
• Rt(bt−1, yt) = 0 if the government decide to default at t.
On the other hand, if the country starts the period in default and the settlement is achieved with
the haircut level h we have
• Rt+s(bt−1, yt) = 1− h, where t is the period the country entered in default and s the number
of periods before the settlement was achieved.
Given their beliefs system 12 and the available information creditors optimally update their beliefs
with a fixed gain algorithm as follows:
At period t the debt level bt−1 matures; the realization of GDP is given by yt; and the repayment
decision of the government is Rt(bt−1, yt). Then the expected haircut for each contingency (b, y) is
evolve as
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µt(b, y) =

µt−1(b, y) + κ (Rt(bt−1, yt)− µt−1(bt−1, yt)) if (b, y′) = (bt−1, yt) ∧ dt−1 = 0
µt−1(b, y)− κRt(bt−1, yt) if (b, y′) = (bt−1, yt) ∧ dt−1 = 1
µt−1(b, y′) else
(13)
the first two cases refer to the periods where an observation of repayment related to the debt contract
(b, y) was realized, and the last case to when no new information about this contract arrived. The
first case is the learning rule when the country is not in default (dt−1 = 0) and κ is the gain factor.
The second case incorporates the new information that comes from the settlement, and is multiplied
by −κ to avoid "double counting" the default episode, if we consider the whole default episode as a
single event the updating rule is equivalent to µt+s(b, y) = µt(b, y)+κ (h− µt(bt−1, yt)), a standard
fixed gain rule.
The fact that µ(b, y) is updated twice during a default episode, i.e. in the period default is chosen
and in the period the settlement is achieved, instead of only once (say, at the end of the default
episode) implies the distinctive feature that bonds that are included in the settlement are valued
less than the same type of bond (equal y and b) after the settlement is achieved and the country
return to international debt markets.
There is one shortcoming of the updating rule (13), every period almost all the contracts will lie
in the third case and will not be updated; only the observed contract repaid is updated. The
learning approach in this paper seeks to stress the idea that creditors might not know perfectly the
problem the government solves to decide repayment, nevertheless the fact that the creditor do not
use the outcome in one particular contract to learn about other, possibly similar, contracts seems
to strong. Therefore I propose a simple and intuitive inference rule for the creditor that allow him
to link contracts, in particular to link the expected haircut for different levels of outstanding debt
and GDP,
Rule for inference: If b ≥ b˜ and y ≤ y˜ then µ(b, y) ≥ µ(b˜, y˜).
This rule models the idea that more debt and lower GDP are associated with higher risk of default.
I incorporate this rule in the learning mechanism of the creditors using a two steps procedure where
the first step is just the same as (13) and the second step adjust the beliefs of the contingencies
that were not updated in the first step such that the rule for inference is satisfied. The procedure
is described formally as follows:
Taking as given the beliefs at t − 1 as µt−1 the steps for updating once the information at time t
is revealed is:
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1. Update the prior using the repayment decision
µˆt(b, y) =

µt−1(b, y) + κ (Rt(b, y)− µt(b, y)) if (b, y′) = (bt−1, yt) ∧ dt−1 = 0
µt−1(b, y)− κRt(b, y) if (b, y′) = (bt−1, yt) ∧ dt−1 = 1
µt−1(b, y′) else
2. Update the beliefs for such contingencies such that µˆt(b, y) = µt−1(b, y′) to satisfy the rule
for inference
µt(b, y) =

max
{
µˆt(b, y), µˆt(b˜, y˜)
}
if b ≥ b˜ ∧ y ≤ y˜
min
{
µˆt(b, y), µˆt(b˜, y˜)
}
if b < b˜ ∧ y ≥ y˜
µˆt(b, y) else
where (b˜, y˜) is the duple of debt and GDP such that µˆt(b, y) = µt−1(b, y′) (the updated
contingency).
This procedure allows to keep the updating rule (13) and satisfy the rule for inference with the
minimum possible change in beliefs.
A.1 Perceived law of motion L
I suppose governments have rational expectations about qt and therefore the perceived law of motion
of qt coincides with the objective or "true" law of motion.
Recall that L is a mapping from the space of the states (bt−1, yt, et, qt, dt, dt−1) to the space B ×
Y × R+. I define L(b,y) as the image of L with the two first entries fixed at (b, y) such that we
have qt+1(b, y) = L(b,y) (bt−1, yt, et, qt, dt, dt−1). Using the setup of the creditor the law of motion
of qt(b, y) can be characterized as follows (check the appendix for details):
• Case 1: The government starts the period t not in default i.e dt−1 = 0
qt(b, y) = L (bt−1, yt, et, qt, dt, dt−1(= 0))
= qt−1(b, y) + κΓt (bt−1, yt, et, qt, dt, dt−1(= 0))− κ (dt) pit(yt | y)
1 + r
where Γ ≥ 0 and measure the gain in bond prices for repayment. For example if only two
realizations of y can occur it corresponds to:
Γ =
pit(y
∗ | y)
1 + r
(1 + r)
[
qt(b
∗, y′)− qt(b∗, y∗) pit(y
′|y′)
pit(y′|y∗)
]
−
(
1− pit(y′|y′)pit(y′|y∗)
)
[
pit(y′|y′)
pit(y′|y∗)pit(y
∗ | y∗)− pit(y∗ | y′)
]
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and the term κ (dt)
pit(yt|y)
1+r measures the loss in bond prices in case a default is decided.
• Case 2: The government starts the period in default. In case of no settlement
qt(b, y) = L (bt−1, yt, et, qt, dt(= 1), dt−1(= 1))
= qt−1(b, y)
and if a settlement is achieved
qt(b, y) = L (bt−1, yt, et, qt, dt(= 0), dt−1(= 1))
= qt−1(b, y) +
pit(y
∗ | y)κ(1− h)
1 + r
the last term at the right hand side measures the gain in the bond price menu of the settlement,
note that it is decreasing with the haircut.
The main qualitative results of this paper can also be shown with alternative specifications. The ap-
pendix replicates the graphs of the paper with the perceived law of motion L(bt−1, y∗, et, qt, dt, 1) =
qt. This case is an opposite extreme of the rational expectations case. With rational expectations
the government is completely aware of the effect of its decisions on the bond price menu and in the
other case it erronously believes its actions will not affect in any way the menu. This difference
implies that the optimal policies vary among cases because the government with rational expecta-
tions will include "reputational" considerations when deciding the level of debt, repayment and the
settlement. This mechanism is not the main driver of the points highlighted in this paper so I will
not study it in depth. See Rojas 2013 for an analysis of this mechanism and its implications for
the default episodes outcomes and its empirical support.
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Chapter 2
Expectations Formation and Investment During Recessions
Abstract
A standard assumption in macroeconomic modeling is that economic agents may have
limited information but perfect market knowledge. I relax this assumption and study an
environment where firms do not have perfect market knowledge and therefore form expectations
with a simplified model of the economy. I study the investment decision of firms at the extensive
margin along the business cycle, I show that during recessions firms tend to delay investment
due to "pessimism": their subjective beliefs underestimate the potential gains of the investment
project. The mechanism proposed helps to explain a stylized fact highlighted in this paper:
After recessions, investment is slower in recovering than GDP. Since the pessimism induces
an inefficient delay of investment I study the potential gains of an investment subsidy and a
counter-cyclical corporate tax policy. If the government cannot distinguish between a lack of
investment driven by pessimism and one by high technological risk, a counter-cyclical corporate
tax policy can screen pessimistic firms and provide incentives to invest. On the other hand, an
investment subsidy would push firms to invest in both cases, leading to excessive risk taking.
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1 Introduction
From a Schumpeterian perspective, an economic crisis serves the purpose of accelerating the creative
destruction process. Lower demand and lack of resources generate harsh competition for market
shares. Many firms fail and jobs are destroyed. Once the economy starts to recover, the creative
process should peak: as demand increases, new firms enter and the surviving incumbents grow.
Nevertheless, I document that investment tends to recover sluggishly after a recession and takes
more time to reach pre-recession levels than consumption does.
The great recession in the US is a clear example of the pattern of investment and GDP that I
document. Figure 1 plots the levels of quarterly real investment and GDP from 2006 to 2015
standardized at 1 for Q4 of 2007. It takes about 2-3 years for GDP to regain the pre-recession peak
levels. On the other hand, investment is already falling before GDP decreased and we observe a
sluggish recovery in investment. It stays low even when GDP is already recovering and it takes
more time to regain previous levels.
Figure 1: USA Recession. Sluggish recovery of investment.
In this paper I argue that during recessions investors can become overly pessimistic about the
profitability of projects and postpone their investment decisions. We define pessimism as a situation
in which the subjective beliefs of the investor assign to a project an expected profitability which is
lower than the one given by the objective distribution of outcomes.
I assume that firms have imperfect knowledge of the structure of the economy and use a simplified
model to form their expectations about future dynamics. Firms behave rationally, as the predictions
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of the model they use are actually confirmed by what is observed along the equilibrium path; in
other words, firms do not commit systematic mistakes that contradict their reference model1.
The equilibrium notion behind this reasoning is the Self-Confirming equilibrium, as proposed by
Fudenberg and Levine (1993) and Sargent (2001). Importantly for this setup, beliefs are disciplined
solely by what is observed along the equilibrium path 2.
Since during recessions firms tend to invest less, and consequently rarely observe the outcome of the
available projects, we can expect firms’ beliefs about profitability of projects during recessions to be
potentially biased. The possible bias is necessarily pessimistic, since an optimistic bias would induce
investment and thus reveal the misbelief. In conclusion, this setup allows for firms to consistently
hold excessively pessimistic beliefs about the off-equilibrium payoffs that investing during recessions
would yield.
In a rational expectations equilibrium pessimism cannot arise by definition. Firms have subjective
beliefs that correspond to the objective beliefs conditional on their information set. Even beliefs
about the payoff of actions that in equilibrium are never taken have to satisfy this "consistency"
requirement. This imposes a rich knowledge of the firm about the structure of the economy, even
beyond what could be through experience. Furthermore, the economic models that are evaluated at
the rational expectations equilibrium have the robust prescription that investment recovers faster
than GDP. This goes from RBC models as in King and Rebelo (2000) to models with financial
frictions and credit shocks such as in Khan and Thomas (2013). The sluggish pattern of investment
calls for additional mechanisms that explain why investors do not react with higher investment as
strong as what would be prescribed by the technological growth and the financial constraints.
The analysis in the paper has a simple event at its core: during a recession a firm decides to delay
the investment to develop a new good because it expects low demand. These expectations are
pessimistic. If it had invested it would have faced a higher demand. Once time passes and the firm
eventually decides to invest, it faces a demand that is consistent with its expectations. Therefore,
the pessimism during the recession is not revealed to the firm. I present a general equilibrium
model and evaluate under which circumstances this event occurs.
The model consists of an economy where firms competing monopolistically can invest to produce a
higher quality version of their differentiated product. The demand side is formed by consumers that
have a valuation of quality that is increasing in the level of consumption. In this setup, changes
in the income distribution affect the aggregate demand for different quality levels and therefore
the profitability of investments in the development of a new good. The model is an extension
of Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman (2011) to a dynamic model with capital and subjective
beliefs.
Firms hold a model of the economy that consists in a simple forecasting scheme: a linear mapping
from their available information to the profitability of launching a new quality level. Firms’ model
1For example, their model of the economy predicts a correlation coefficient between current GDP and future
demand of 0.3, and this is what they will effectively observe along the equilibrium path.
2One could describe this type of belief formation as a deductive process in which firms face a class of possible
models of the economy and select the one that best explains observed outcomes. The selected model is then used to
predict future outcomes for every possible situation the firm may face.
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satisfies a consistency requirement: the moments implied by the model are satisfied in equilibrium.
I draw on the work by Anderson and Sonnenschein (1985) on the model-consistent equilibrium
concept and Sargent (2001) on Self-Confirming Equilibria.
In this novel theoretical setup, I illustrate how recessions that are accompanied by changes in
the income distribution can generate inefficient delays in investment due to pessimistic beliefs.
This feature is stronger for goods at the highest and lowest quality levels; meaning goods mostly
consumed by the tails of the income distribution.
The intuition for the emergence of pessimism is as follows: the demand for a given quality level is
the aggregation over consumers that are heterogeneous in their wealth and tastes. Therefore, At a
given quality level, the observed demand does not reveal how many of these consumers are willing
to pay more for an increase in quality. On average, along the equilibrium path, the firm knows how
changes in the relative demands of various quality levels map in the potential demand of a new
good. But when there are also changes in the income distribution this mapping might be biased
and generate pessimistic beliefs.
On the policy side, I propose that if the government cannot distinguish between pessimism and
high technological risk a counter-cyclical corporate tax can screen pessimistic firms and provide
incentives to invest while an investment subsidy would push firms to invest in both cases implying
excessive risk taking.
The paper is organized as follows: In section II, I document the sluggish recovery of investment
after recessions and in section III I discuss the related literature. Section IV presents a simplified 2-
period version of the model that illustrates how pessimism can emerge and the equilibrium concept.
Section IV extends the simple model to a T period case to highlight the timing and potential delay
of investment generated by the mechanism. In section V the full model with capital accumulation
and innovation at multiple quality levels is presented and the technological and financial recessions
characterized. Section V I contains the policy analysis and finally section V II concludes.
2 Investment Recovery After a Recession
The pattern shown in Figure 1 is not a distinctive feature of the great recession in the US. In this
section I provide evidence that investment does tend to recover slower than consumption and even
slower than GDP using data from the US, UK and France.
I define the starting date of a recession the first quarter in which real GDP growth is negative after
2 years with positive quarterly growth rates. Following this criteria I identify 5 recessions in the UK
and 8 recessions in the US and France. Figure 2 shows the time line with the identified recessions.
3 plots the number of quarters it took for GDP and investment to reach at least the levels each
had one quarter before the starting date of the recession. The dark continuous line is the 45 degree
line. Every point above this line represent a recession where investment recovery was slower than
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Figure 2: Timing of the Starting Points of Recessions
Country Quarter the recessions started
US Q2 1953; Q3 1969; Q2 1973; Q1 1980; Q3 1990; Q4 2000; Q4 2007; Q4 2013
UK Q2 1973; Q1 1984; Q2 1990; Q1 2008; Q3 2011
France Q3 1958; Q1 1963; Q2 1968; Q4 1974; Q2 1980; Q4 1990; Q4 2001; Q2 2008
GDP. We see that most of the observations lay in this region. Investment does not tend to lead the
recoveries after a crisis.3
The fact I document impose a challenge to our models of the economy. Most of the literature
focuses on highlighting the higher volatility of investment relative to consumption or GDP. King
and Rebelo (2000) for instance, show that for the US investment is three times as volatile as GDP.
The notion of high volatility should not be confused with fast adjustments before and after the
recessions. High volatility can also come from prolonged and persistent deviations from the mean.
In fact King and Rebelo (2000) also find that the HP-detrended investment is as persistent as
GDP.4
3 Related Literature
Within the rational expectations equilibrium approach Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2006),
and more recently Fajgelbaum, Schaal, and Taschereau-Dumouchel (2014), propose that leaning
3Note that for the case of GDP the reference level is, by construction, the highest GDP level over the last two
years before the crisis. For investment this is not the case. Typically, investment is already at lower levels than the
maximum reached over the years previous to the recession. We want to emphasize that this election should push
the results in favor of a faster computed recovery of investment relative to output; that has the reference level at the
previous maximum.
4King and Rebelo (2000) present an RBC model that is able to reproduce US data with small technological shocks
introducing capital utilization in the model. With capital utilization they do not have to resort to large technological
shocks, that potentially generate technological regress. The prescription of their model is standard in the business
cycles literature, Investment and GDP recover contemporaneously. The stylized fact we document is partly "cleaned
out" of their data as they use Hodrick-Prescott detrended series for all variables. The sluggish recovery of investment
we document is partly absorbed by the trend obtained using the HP filter.
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Figure 3: Length of the Recovery Spell for GDP and Investment
asymmetries during the business cycle partly explain the asymmetry observed in the behavior of
GDP. In their model agents have to learn about productivity and during recessions there is less
information available to update beliefs due to lower economic activity. This feature generate a slower
but still, contemporary, recovery of GDP and investment. In my analysis a similar intuition goes
through, there is less information about the assessment of investment projects during recessions.
The main departing points of my approach with respect to Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp
(2006) are that expectations are formed about potential demand, and investment is also decided
at the extensive margin. Some firms do not invest and consequently do not observe demand, this
differences allow for the existence of a self-confirming equilibrium where there can be inefficient
delays in investment driven by expectations.
Bloom (2009) on the other hand studies delays in investment motivated by "uncertainty" shocks.
As the volatility of fundamentals increase, the firms expand their inaction region and decide not
to invest in a wider set of situations. At the edge of the recession the uncertainty can be high and
investment delayed, but once the economy starts to recover investment spikes and lead the recovery.
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Departing from Bloom (2009), the mechanism I propose generates further delays in investment even
when uncertainty has decreased and can sustain a slow recovery of investment during recoveries
with low measured volatility.
A contrasting analysis to mine that relates pessimism by firms and low investment is Kiyotaki
(1988). Although he does not focus on fluctuations, it is shown that there could be multiple equi-
libria where firms expectations of demand affect their investment decision and eventually demand
itself. Pessimist firms decide to have a low level of investment. Opposite to the concept of pes-
simism considered here, firms are right about expecting low demand as in equilibrium they face
effectively low demand. The equilibrium is self-fulfilled and the outcome of the investment project
is always observed. With the notion of pessimism I propose a firm in a self-fulfilled equilibrium is
not pessimistic, as its beliefs coincide with the objective expectations.
The difference between a self-fulfilled recession and a self-confirmed seems subtle but can have
important policy implications. The self-fulfilled recession is a problem of coordination while the
self-confirmed case can be framed as a problem of lack of knowledge or experimentation. The
policy implications to solve each recession are consequently different. Kiyotaki (1988) proposes an
investment subsidy to coordinate firms in the high investment equilibria. On the other hand, I
argue that in the context of a self-confirming equilibrium where only some firms are not investing
out of pessimistic beliefs and the rest because of technological risk such policy can lead to excessive
risk taking. A policy that screens the potentially pessimistic firms can be superior by inducing
experimentation rather than coordination.
I build on the idea of a self-confirming equilibrium in a competitive economy or as Gaballo and
Marimon (2015) define it a Strong self-confirming equilibrium and focus on subjective beliefs about
market outcomes by firms. Gaballo and Marimon (2015) propose how a self confirmed equilibrium
can sustain a crisis. In their setup the banks have subjective beliefs about the investment pos-
sibilities of firms and consequently the type of projects firms will choose to implement if a loan
is conceded. Pessimistic banks expect firms to take risky projects and therefore raise the interest
rate. The only profitable project for firms with the high interest rate is indeed a risky one. The
unobserved counterfactual is that if a single bank offers a low interest rate the firm will optimally
select a safe investment, something the bank subjectively beliefs will not happen.
Gaballo and Marimon (2015) beliefs are formed about the technological frontier of projects. In this
paper I focus on beliefs about market outcomes rather than the technological possibilities. We think
this type of uncertainty is important during a crisis like the great recession where the behavior of
demand might entail a greater increase in uncertainty than the technological process itself.
On the policy side Gaballo and Marimon (2015) show how a credit easing policy can be an optimal
policy to exit the crisis. Just as mentioned for the policy suggested by Kiyotaki (1988) this could
lead to excessive risk taking in the economy I analyze. The reason is that both, investment subsidies
and credit easing are aimed at reducing the cost of investment. This will affect both firms that
would not invest because of technological risk or low expectations about demand. The solution I
propose is to provide the incentives to invest from the income side by changing the corporate income
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tax. Change in the corporate income tax affects different firms depending on their expected profits
and the likelihood to succeed innovating. This way a lower tax for low profits will push pessimistic
firms to invest while it might not induce firms firms with high technological risk to invest.
4 The Basic Model
In this section I use a simple 2-period model to illustrate and explain the key elements of the
analysis: The innovating firms and their expectations formation; the consumers with a taste for
quality; and the equilibrium concept. Then I extend the basic setup to a T-period economy to show
the timing and potential delay of investment.
4.1 Setup
The model is a dynamic version of Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman (2011) with subjective
beliefs. The economy lasts for two periods and is populated by firms and consumers. There are
two types of goods, a basic good and a differentiated good. The basic good is an homogenous good
produced by a competitive firm with constant returns to scale. The differentiated good has many
versions, as each firm in this sector owns a differentiated variety that can be produced at multiple
quality levels. The firms start period one with two quality levels variety; compete monopolistically;
and decide whether to develop a higher quality version of its variety to be sold in the second period.
Households consume only one unit of the differentiated good and their decision is to select which
version to buy. There are two sources of heterogeneity in the population: the preferences over the
differentiated good and labor productivity. Both are random and are drawn at the beginning of the
first period. The distribution of skills in the population is also random and drawn in period one.
Then there are idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks.
The Basic Good Producer
There is a representative firm that produces the basic good using effective labor as the only input.
Let yi denote worker i productivity, then the production function of the firm is
Y =
ˆ
Ψ
yidh
where Ψ is the set of workers hired by the firm where each worker supplies one unit of labor. The
firm has constant returns to scale and is competitive in the goods market and in the labor market.
Taking the basic good as the numeraire in our economy we have that in equilibrium the wage is
equal to 1 and consequently the income of worker i is equal to yi.
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Taste for Quality Preferences
The specification of preferences is based on Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman (2011). The
utility level of an individual i that consumes a level z of the basic good and the differentiated
variety j with quality level q is
ui(z, j, q) = zq + εij,q
where εij,q is the idiosyncratic valuation of variety j, at quality level q, by household i. Let εi be the
vector containing all the idiosyncratic taste components of household h. The preferences impose
complementarity between the quality of the differentiated good and the quantity consumed of the
basic good. This implies that there is a higher valuation of quality by those that consume higher
amounts of the homogenous good z.
Following Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman (2011) we take the probability distribution of εh
to be given by a generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution. The distribution is given by:
Gε(ε) = exp
−∑
q∈Q
∑
j∈Jq
e−εj,q/θq
θq
 (1)
where Q is the set of all quality levels available, Jq is the set of varieties available at quality level q
and θq ∈ [0, 1] for all q ∈ Q is the dissimilarity parameter. The higher θq the less correlated are the
shocks at quality level q, and consequently a higher monopoly power at quality level q. Note that
the shocks for the same variety j at it’s different quality levels are not correlated.5 I also suppose
that the shocks are i.i.d across households.
Household Decision and Heterogeneity
There is a continuum of households i ∈ [0, 1] of mass one. Household i’s income yi, is used to buy
the basic good and one unit of the differentiated good. The budget constraint is then
yi = z +
∑
q∈Q
∑
j∈Jq
Iij,qpj,q

where pj,q is the price of variety j at quality level q; and Ihj,q is the indicator function that takes
the value of one only if the variety consumed by household i is j at quality level q. Households
cannot save and therefore the two period household problem is in essence two consecutive static
5This property greatly simplifies the optimal pricing strategy of firms. We discuss the role of this assumption in
the section (4.1)
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problems.6 The household problem at each t = 1, 2 is to solve
max
z,{Ij,q}j∈J,q∈Q
uh(z, j, q) (2)
s.t yh = z +
∑
q∈Q
∑
j∈Jq
Ihj,qpj,q

Let H(y) be the cumulative distribution of yi. H(y) is random and drawn in period one from
the distribution P (H(y)). The realization of the income distribution is the only “shock” that this
economy faces.
Aggregate Demand
We denote zh({pjq,t}i∈J,q∈Qj,t , yh) to be the demand of household h for the basic good at time t.
This demand is the solution of the household problem (2) and is consequently a function of the
prices of the available differentiated good versions pt = {pjq,t}i∈J,q∈Qj,t and the household income
yh. Aggregate households demand for z is then
Z
(
{pjq,t}i∈J,q∈Qj,t , H(y)
)
=
ˆ 1
0
zh({pjq,t}i∈J,q∈Qj,t , yh) ∂H(y)
For the differentiated good, as Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman (2011) show, the aggregate
demand system is a nested logit. Let p be the vector whose entries are all the prices of the
available versions of the differentiated good; and ρyj,q
(
p, {Jq}q∈Q
)
be the fraction of households
with productivity y that buy variety j at quality level q. Then aggregate demand corresponds to
the aggregation of ρyj,q
(
p, {Jq}q∈Q
)
over the income levels as follows
Dj,q
(
p, H(y), {Jq}q∈Q
)
=
ˆ
ρyj,q
(
p, {Jq}q∈Q
)
∂H(y) (3)
each fraction is weighted by the density of population at each income level.7
The fraction ρy(j, q) is determined by the prices of all versions (variety-quality duple) of the differ-
entiated good and the parameters that describe preferences as follows
ρyj,q
(
p, {Jq}q∈Q
)
= φj|q(p, Jq) λq
(
y,p, {Jq}q∈Q
)
(4)
where
φj|q(p, Jq) =
e−pjq/θq∑
l∈Jq e
−qpl/θq (5)
6I impose this assumption to focus on the expectation formation of firms, note anyway that it is not highly
restrictive given the fact that households do not face income uncertainty as the level of productivity for the two
periods is the same.
7Recall that there is a unit mass of households and they demand only a one unit of the differentiated good and
therefore we only need the fraction ρy(j, q) and the distribution of agents over y to compute aggregate demand.
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is the fraction of consumers who buy variety j out of those who choose quality level q, and
λq
(
y,p, {Jq}q∈Q
)
=
[∑
j∈Jq e
(y−pj)q/θq
]
∑
ω∈Q
[∑
j∈Jq e
(y−pj)ω/θω
]θω (6)
is the fraction of agents with income y that choose quality level q. Note that θq, the dissimilarity
parameter, determines the price elasticity of aggregate demand. The higher θq the lower is the
effect on aggregate demand of a change in the price, i.e higher market power for the firm.
Firms’ Structure and Pricing
There are J firms in the economy owned by risk neutral investors. Denote Qj,t the set of quality
levels available for firm j at time t. Each firm is born with two quality levels Qj,1 = {qL, qM}, where
qL < qM , and a corresponding unit production cost {cqL , cqM }. At the end of the first period the
firm can develop a new quality level qH that satisfies qH > qM , the cost of the innovation project
is fq units of the basic good. Once the quality level q is developed it can be produced at the unit
cost cqH .
Firms seek to maximize their discounted stream of profits and are not credit constrained. I suppose
that firms know the elasticity of demand as this elasticity is constant for all possible productiv-
ity/income distributions H(y). Then it follows that the optimal pricing strategy of firms is in
essence a static problem: taking as given the quality levels available Qj,t at t the firm chooses
prices to maximize profits at t.8 The problem corresponds to
max
{pjq}
q∈Qj,t
∑
q∈Qj,t
Ej
{
Dj,q
(
pt+1, H(y), {Jq}q∈Qt+1
)} [
pjq − cq
]
Ej{Dj,q(.)} denotes firm j expectations of demand for variety j at quality level q.
With a large number of firms J and using the fact that the idiosyncratic taste shocks are not
correlated at the firm level, we have that the effect of a change in the price of the quality level q
(pjq) has a negligible effect on the demand for the good with quality q′. Therefore, the previous
problem can be split into many independent pricing problems, one for each quality level of the firm
as follows ∑
q∈Qj,t
(
max
pjq
Ej{Dj,q(.)}
[
pjq − cq
])
we can focus then on the pricing problem for a given variety j and quality level q to fully characterize
the whole pricing problem. The problem is simply stated then as
max
pjq
Ej{Dt(j, q)}
[
pjq − cq
]
(7)
8Firms have no incentives to use prices to extract information about the aggregate demand structure as the
constants elasticity implies that changes in prices do not convey any additional information.
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The optimal price is a markup over the marginal cost that depends on the elasticity of demand.
The price that solves (7) is
pq = cq +
θq
q
(8)
where the markup (θq/q) is fixed, constant and only depends on the quality level but not on demand.
We see how a greater value of the dissimilarity parameter θq increases the mark-up. We also obtain
then that for the markup to increase with quality it is necessary that θq increases with quality.
Innovation decision
The expected discounted profits the firm obtains if it develops the quality level qH for its variety
are given by
Ej
{
piqHj
}
=
1
R
[
Ej
{
Dj,qH
(
pt+1, H(y), {Jq}q∈Qt+1
)}
(pqH − cqH )− fqH
]
(9)
where pqH is given by equation (8) and Ej [] represents the subjective beliefs of firm j. Then, if the
expected net gain of the investment Ej
{
piqHj
}
is positive it is optimal for the firm j to invest in
the new quality. The source of uncertainty for the investment decision is the future demand for the
not yet developed quality.
The firms forms expectations about future demand based on their sales during the first period and
the aggregate economic activity measured by the total production of the basic good in the economy.
Formally we set subjective expectations as
Ej
{
Dj,qH
(
pt+1, H(y), {Jq}q∈Qt+1
)
| Xj
}
= M(Xj ;βj) (10)
whereM(Xj ;βj) is a function of vectorXj and parametrized by βj . the vectorXj contains the total
output Y and the first period sales of firm j. Note that with the general formulation of M(Xj ;βj)
we have not discarded the possibility that the subjective expectations coincide with the rational
expectations. In section 4.4 we take an specific measure P over the distribution for endowments
H(y) for which, even in the case of full information, Xj are sufficient statistics to form the rational
expectations.
Replacing 10 in 9 we have that the firm will invest to innovate and produce a new quality level if
M(Xj ;βj)(pqH − cqH )− fqH ≥ 0
this is the optimal investment strategy for firm j.
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Market clearing
Let lj be the firm j demand for inputs. It is equal to the unit cost of the versions they sell cq times
the amount produced of each each variety; therefore we have
lj =
∑
q∈Qj,t
cqDt(j, q)
and aggregating for all firms j ∈ J we get the aggregate demand for inputs L that is equal to
L =
∑
j∈J
lj
The total production of the basic good in the economy is given by Y =
´ 1
0
yhH(y). Then, the
resource constraint is
Y = Z + L+ Π (11)
where Π is the aggregate level of profits and is given by
Π =
∑
j∈J
pij =
∑
q∈Qj,t
Dj,q(.)
[
θq
q
]
we see that profits are in the basic good units. They can be used to finance the investment on
innovation or to pay dividends.
4.2 Equilibrium definitions
In this section I define the equilibrium with subjective beliefs and the rational expectations equi-
librium. Then I present how subjective beliefs are disciplined and discuss how it corresponds to
known equilibrium concepts. Finally I proposed an equilibrium concept that seeks to explicitly
differentiate between potential biases along the equilibrium path and outside the equilibrium path.
Equilibrium with subjective beliefs
For each possible realization of the endowment distributionH(y) with positive probability according
to P an equilibrium is a vector of available qualities {Qj,t}j∈J,t=1,2; a vector of prices of the differen-
tiated good {pjq,t}i∈J,q∈Qj,t,t=1,2; an allocation of the differentiated good {Ihj,q,t}j∈J,q∈Qj,t,t=1,2, h∈(0,1)
and consumption of the basic good
{
zh
}
h∈(0,1); a vector of aggregate demands {Dj,q}j∈Jq,q∈Q; such
that given a realization of the taste shocks ε, and the functions {M(Xj ;βj)}j∈J satisfy:
1. Qj,1 = {qL, qM} for all j ∈ J and Qj,2 = {qL, qM , qh} if and only if M(Xj ;βj) ≥ fqHpqH−cqH ,
otherwise Qj,2 = {qL, qM}.
2. The prices {pjq,t}i∈J,q∈Qj,t,t=1,2 are set accordingly to (8).
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3. The indicators {Ihj,q,t}j∈J,q∈Qj,t,t=1,2, and consumption zh solve the problem (2) for each
h ∈ [0, 1].
4. The demands {Dj,q}j∈Jq,q∈Q are given by 3, 4, 5 and 6.
5. The resource constraint (11) holds.
Rational expectations equilibrium (REE)
The REE has to satisfy the additional condition
6. The subjective expectations M(Xj ;βj) coincide with the conditional expected value
EP {Dj,q | Xj}
The condition requires that the subjective expectations coincide with the objective expected value.
Note that this has to hold even for firms that do not decide to invest and therefore outside the
equilibrium path. We will refer from now on to EP {Dj,q | Xj} as the objective beliefs.
4.3 Subjective Beliefs
The definition of the equilibrium with subjective beliefs poses no constraint on M(Xj ;βj) and up
to this point it could be set completely arbitrary. I now proceed to give structure to such beliefs
to discipline how the agents form expectations.The expectations M(Xj ;βj) could in principle nest
the rational expectations beliefs. Given the functional form of M(Xj ;βj) each value of the vector
β determine a different forecast function. We define two types of beliefs according to two criteria
to select β.
Parametrized Expectations
Given the distribution P (H(y)) over the possible distributions H(y) these expectations are con-
structed with βˆ such that it solves
βˆ = arg min
β
EP (H(y))L (M(Xj ;βj), EP {Dj,q | Xj})
where L is a loss function that measures the distance between the subjective and objective beliefs.
Note that any differences, as defined by L, between M(Xj ;βj) and EP {Dj,q | Xj} are minimized
according to the measure P . If M(Xj ;βj) nests EP {Dj,q | Xj} then, if L is the euclidean distance,
for all distributions H(y) with positive density they will coincide. If M(Xj ;βj) does not nest
EP {Dj,q | Xj} then the differences between the subjective and objective beliefs are the result of
misspecification.9
9den Haan and Marcet (1990) early contribution show how parametrized expectations can approximate the
rational expectations and study the approximation errors.
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Self-Confirming Expectations
This expectations minimize the difference between objective and subjective beliefs but only using
those events that belong to the equilibrium path and consequently are potentially observable. Since
firms are forming expectations about demand, and is only observed if they decide to invest, then
we fit the subjective expectations to the situations were firms do invest.
Formally, βˆ is selected accordingly with
βˆ = arg minEP (H(y)|H(y)∈S(M(ν,Y ;βˆ))L (M(Xj ;βj), E {Dj,q | Xj})
where S(M(ν, Y ;β)) = {H(y) ∈ P (H(y));M(Xj ;β) ≥M∗} and M∗ is the threshold to invest in
the project. Therefore, the loss function is only evaluated at those events that are potentially
observable when the firm invests and not otherwise. Note the self-referential definition of βˆ. It
is such that it minimizes the loss function over the probability space characterized by itself. This
comes from the fact that the selection of βˆ affects itself which outcomes are potentially observable.
We could write it as the fixed point of the mapping
F(β∗) = arg min
β
EP (H(y)|H(y)∈S(M(Xj ;β∗))L (M(Xj ;βj), E {Dj,q | Xj})
such that βˆ is the vector that satisfies
βˆ = F(βˆ) (12)
Agents in this case do inference about the remaining events using the functional form M and the
parameters βˆ. This expectations could be obtained as the limit of learning from experience by
agents that can only used their observed outcomes.
Here on top of the misspecification bias, if there is one, the agents expectations are affected by
the “sample” selection bias. Even though misspecification might be negligible we emphasize that
once it interacts with the fact that agents learn from a selected sample its implications can become
relevant. Furthermore, even in the absence of misspecification, for a rich enough statistical model
there could be multiple solutions to 12 and therefore potential disagreements in beliefs for non
observed events.
Self-confirming equilibrium (SCE)
The subjective expectations equilibrium with the Self-Confirming expectations is what Sargent
(2001) defines as a Self-Confirming equilibrium. If we take the loss function L to be a quadratic
loss function (euclidean distance), then the firms beliefs satisfy the following orthogonality condition
EP (H(y)|H(y)∈S(M(ν,Y ;β∗))
{[
Dj,q −M(Xj ; βˆj)
]
M(Xj ; βˆj)
}
= 0
If we set the beliefs to be a linear mapping of Xj of the form M(Xj ;βj) = βjXj , the orthogonality
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conditions corresponds to
EP (H(y)|H(y)∈S(M(ν,Y ;β∗))
{[
Dj,q − βˆjXj
]
X ′j
}
= 0
in this case the firm identifies the correlation between the variables in their information set and
future demand.
In a Self-Confirming equilibrium, even along the equilibrium path we could have that
M(Xj ; βˆj) 6= E {Dj,q | Xj}
as long as the orthogonality conditions are satisfied. Contrastingly in Fudenberg and Levine (1993)
definition of a SCE this two objects have to be equal along the equilibrium path and can only be
potentially different outside the equilibrium path. To relate the two definitions in my analysis I
define a measure to evaluate how close are the subjective expectations to the objective expectations
and state a weaker version of the Fudenberg and Levine (1993) definition.
Let the function RΩ(d) be defined as follows
RΩ(d) = Pr {L (M(Xj ;βj), E {D2 | Xj}) < d | H(y) ∈ Ω}
where Pr(A) stand for the probability of event A. The function RΩ(d) measures the set for which
the distance between the objective and the subjective expectations is smaller than d, conditional
on the fact that the productivity distribution lies within the set Ω. Note that RΩ(0) = 1 means
that within the set Ω the subjective beliefs coincide with the rational expectations.
In our case a SCE according to the Fudenberg and Levine (1993) definition happens if RΩ(0) ≤ 1
and RΥ (0) = 1 for Υ =
{
(H(y) | H(y) ∈ S(M(Xj ;β∗j ))
}
. Therefore we have that subjective beliefs
coincide with the objective beliefs along the equilibrium path but might not coincide in a positive
measure set outside the equilibrium path.
−Self-Confirming Equilibrium
Fudenberg and Levine (1993) refer to the notion of an −consistent SCE. In this setup beliefs will be
within some  distance of the equilibrium outcomes.10 In my setup it is also possible to characterize
if the believes are within an  distance from the equilibrium outcomes. Define an -Self-Confirming
equilibrium an equilibrium with subjective beliefs M(Xj ;β∗j ) such that there exists an  > 0 that
satisfies RΥ() = 1, for Υ =
{
(H(y) | H(y) ∈ S(M(Xj ;β∗j ))
}
. Throughout the paper I am going to
focus on the Sargent (2001) definition and check ex-post the minimum  such that the equilibrium
found is also −Self-Confirming.11
10This concept is obtained by having the beliefs of a player correspond to a game where there is a fraction  of
"crazy" types. Where crazy types deviate from the equilibrium strategies.
11At this point, the reader familiar with Krusell, Smith, and Jr. (1998) might have spotted the parallelism with
the approach followed here. In Krusell, Smith, and Jr. (1998) households have to make expectations about future
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To emphasize the role of beliefs out of the equilibrium path and have a measure of the potential
deviations of beliefs from the objective expectations I propose the notion of an , δ−Self-Confirming
equilibrium.
, δ−Self-Confirming Equilibrium
An , δ−Self-Confirming Equilibrium is a subjective beliefs equilibrium for which RΥ () = 1 and
RΩ(δ) < 1 where  ≤ δ.
Just as in an −Self-Confirming equilibrium deviations along the equilibrium path (Υ ) are at most
. The novelty is that in this definition is required that the distance between the subjective and
objective beliefs is not bounded above by  outside the equilibrium path, and in fact out of the
equilibrium path the deviation is greater than δ. The self-confirming equilibria I discuss in the next
sections satisfy the requirements for a , δ−Self-Confirming Equilibria.12
4.4 Equilibrium Objective and Subjective Beliefs with a Simple Class of
Income Distributions P (H(y)).
To illustrate how a SCE that generates a lack of investment can emerge and be different from
the rational expectations equilibrium, I focus on a specific measure over the possible endowment
distributions H(y) and define the subjective beliefs M(Xj ;βj) as a linear mapping.
Let H(y;Y, σ) be the distribution of a discrete random variable y with parameters Y and σ that
determine the average productivity and the standard deviation. Specifically, we suppose that half
of the population gets an endowment equal to yL and the other half equal to yH that are given by
yL = Y − σ
yH = Y + σ
Now we can proceed to characterize P (H(y)) with a joint probability distribution for σ and Y .
This assumption greatly simplifies the analysis because aggregation is straightforward while we still
keep the two dimensions we want to explore: Total income Y and inequality σ.
prices that is itself a function of the distribution of capital along the population. Just as the firms in my model have
to form beliefs about demand that depend also on the whole income distribution. Krusell, Smith, and Jr. (1998)
propose a simple forecasting function for households and compute an -Self-confirming equilibrium where  is close
to zero as shown by an R2 of the regressions of their model in beliefs almost equal to 1.
In our case the R2 of the beliefs to forecast demand is also close to 1 for the simple 2-period and above 0.9 in the
full version of the model. Nevertheless, this paper illustrates that characterizing beliefs about equilibrium outcomes
leaves out a key element that can determine agents decisions: "wrong" beliefs out of the equilibrium path. In
particular, how those beliefs tend to be pessimistic and determine the decisions of households along the equilibrium
path.
Krusell, Smith, and Jr. (1998) refer to the −Self-Confirming equilibrium in their model as an approximate
equilibrium. This reflects the notion that the equilibrium approximates the rational expectations equilibrium. I
illustrate that this does not hold in general and there can be substantial differences between both.
12A stronger version of the definition would be that there exists a δ such that RΥ () = 1 and
EΩ/Υ {L (M(ν, Y ;β), E {D2 | ν, Y })} > δ. In this definition the deviation of expectations is bounded below by
δ outside the equilibrium path.
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Figure 4: Optimal investment rule with objective expectations
With this parametrization we proceed to the characterization of the objective and the subjective
beliefs.
4.5 Objective beliefs
Figure (4) shows the regions on the σ, Y plane where the firms decide to invest in the REE. The
investment region is at the top right, meaning that high aggregate endowment Y and inequality
σ make more profitable investments to produce the high quality goods. This follows from the fact
that the innovation is done at the highest quality level and therefore the potential consumers are
mostly the top of the income distribution. So higher mass at high levels of income makes more
profitable the production of a high quality good.
4.6 Subjective Beliefs
Subjective beliefs of firm j are a linear function of observed demand (Dj,qL , Dj,qM ) and the aggregate
production of the basic good Y as follows
M j(Dj,qL , Dj,qM , Y ;β) = β0 + β1Dj,qL + β2Dj,qM + β3Y (13)
where β = (β0, β1, β2, β3) are parameters. The subjective expectations are a function of the same
two variables as the rational expectations, the only difference comes from the functional form.
44
4.6 Subjective Beliefs 4 THE BASIC MODEL
Expectations based only on Y
To illustrate the nature of the misspecification we start with case where we set β1 = β2 = 0 and
select β0,β3 following the Self-Confirming expectations criteria. In this case the forecast function
of demand is of the form
M j(Y ;β) = β0 + β3Y
and therefore the optimal investment strategy is characterized by a threshold Y¯ such that
pi(j, qH) = 0
the optimal investment rule depends on the sign of βˆ3. If βˆ3 > 0 then expected demand increases
with Y , and it is optimal to invest if Y > Y¯ . Since we have that demand (Dj,qL , Dj,qM ) itself
depends on Y , it is not obvious from the RE solution which value corresponds to β3 in the Self-
Confirming expectations. The correlation of Y with demand depends on the joint distribution of
(Y, σ). To illustrate the type of investment strategy that emerges with the subjective beliefs, let
P (Y, σ) be such that Y and σ are independent and have a uniform distribution for Y and σ.
The subject expectation (SE) threshold Y¯ is found and the corresponding parameter values. For
the parametrization of H we have that β2 > 0, the optimal investment strategy is to invest if
Y > Yˆ . In figure 5 we plot the threshold for the subjective expectations SE and for the REE. We
see that there are two regions where the investment strategies do not coincide A and B. In region
A it is optimal to invest but the firms with the subjective expectations do not do it. On the other
hand, in region B with the REE it is not optimal to invest but firms with subjective expectations
do decide to invest and therefore face negative profits.
Self-Confirming Equilibrium M(Xj ; βˆj)
Now we go back to the original specification (13) and compute the value β that correspond to the
Self-Confirming expectations. Compared to the previous case the disagreement regions are smaller
and in both cases we have the type A. The SE threshold is above the RE threshold and therefore
in the gray region firms with subjective beliefs do not invest while along the RE equilibrium they
would do it. The disagreement is minor and happens both at high GDP and low inequality and at
low GDP and high inequality. Note that the two lines are almost identical for the centered values
of Y and σ, those values are just the most likely according to H(Y, σ) and just reflects the nature
of how the β is selected.
In Figure 7 the deviation between the objective beliefs and the subjective beliefs is presented for two
cases. Case 1 refers to the parameterized expectations and simply captures the difference induced
by the misspecification of beliefs. Case 2 refers to the SCE case. The positive levels represent
pessimistic beliefs for a given level of Y . Misspecification induces pessimism at high and low levels
of Y (case 1) but in the SCE (case 2) the fact that beliefs satisfy the orthogonality conditions only
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Figure 5: Subjective expectations based only in Y
Figure 6: Self-Confirming Equilibrium expectations M(Xj , β∗j )
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Figure 7: Deviation from the REE equilibrium
Case 1: Parametrized Expectations
Case 2: Self-Confirming Expectations
along the equilibrium path induces a low deviation at high levels of Y and a high deviation for low
levels, when firms do not tend to invest.
4.7 Extension to a T-Periods Economy
Here I extend the model to T periods to investigate the joint dynamics of Y and investment in
the production of new qualities. The stochastic process for Y, σ is given by a vector autoregression
specification. The economy starts with a lower level of average productivity with respect to the
mean and I focus on the growth period during the convergent path.
In this version of the model firms are heterogenous on the innovation costs. These costs are
calibrated to allow for a smooth entry of firms in the top quality level as the economy grows and
converges to the long run mean of average productivity. Households have the same structure as
before.
The path the economy follows when there are no shocks is shown in Figure 8. The Figure shows
the path of GDP and investment at the REE and the SCE. Investment grows with GDP as firms
invest to develop new goods. At the end of the time window shown GDP is already converging to
the steady state level and investment slows down.
In this economy, I focus on the time span between periods 5 and 20 and allow shocks to the
productivity distribution to change the path of the economy. Firms have to form expectations
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Figure 8: Benchmark Scenario: Convergence to the steady state
about demand during this time span to decide if they invest to produce the high quality level
qh of their variety or not. I compute in this situation the rational expectations solution and the
subjective beliefs of the SCE.
Impulse Response: A Short Lived Recession.
Figure 9 presents the impulse response of a negative shock to labor productivity Y that is accom-
panied with an increase in the dispersion of productivity σ. The shock hits the economy at period
11 and we see that Y recovers pre-recession levels after one period. We could consider it a recession
that lasts 2 years.
Investment in the REE has a fast recovery and the year after the recession is at peak levels. On
the other hand, in Figure 9 it can be seen that in the subjective beliefs case (SCE) the recovery
of investment is delayed. The reason for this delay is pessimism by investors. In Figure 10 the
subjective expectations at the SCE are presented and compared to the objective expectations.
The expectations plotted are those of the firm j that decided to invest in the REE but delayed
investment in the SCE.
First note that the period the shock hits (11) the economy we see a wedge on expectations. The
subjective expectations are above the objective expectations on the impact, nevertheless this dif-
ference does not affect the equilibrium outcomes as in both cases firms optimal decision is not to
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Figure 9: Impulse response: A negative productivity shock with an increase in inequality
invest. The subsequent period on the other hand, we have that pessimism arises and despite the
wedge is smaller this time the equilibrium outcome is different. Some firms decide to invest in the
REE and develop new goods while that decision is delayed in the SCE. In period 13 when the firm
decides to invest the expectations are again aligned and close to each other. This is what I refer by
saying that pessimism that the excess in pessimism is not revealed.
Impulse Response: A Short Lived Expansion.
Consider the case of shocks of the same magnitude but with opposite direction. Figure 11 shows
the analogue graph for the case just discussed. In this case there is no major difference between the
timing and level of the reaction of investment. If anything, there is a minor delay in investment a
few periods after the shock with the subjective expectations.
This result should come at no surprise. Firms forecasting scheme is quite precise during expansions
as in this situations is when firms tend to invest and observe the outcomes or projects. Pessimism
can be sustained along the equilibrium path during recessions while "optimism" is not a feature
that the mechanism proposed generates during expansions. The intuition is simple as its the key
argument in my analysis. Optimism is likely to be discovered because induces firms to invest while
pessimism might be sustained as it is not confronted with observed outcomes. This difference
is highlighted in Fudenberg and Levine (2009). The authors associate optimism with the Lucas
critique; wrong beliefs that induce to take an action that reveals the mistake. The opposite case is
pessimism and the SCE were wrong beliefs are not confronted with experience as the payoff is not
observed.
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Figure 10: Comparison Between Subjective and Objective Expectations
Figure 11: Impulse response: A positive productivity shock with a decrease in inequality
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5 Full Model
The delay in investment is inefficient and only generated by the imperfect market knowledge that
firms have. This open the following questions: 1) In which type of markets is it more likely to
find a pessimistic delay? 2) For which type of recessions? and 3) How can policy be designed
to ameliorate the welfare losses? The simple model has features that does not allow us to study
these questions as innovation is only possible at the highest quality and the income process and
the opportunity cost of investment are exogenous. Next, I extend the model to be able to address
these questions.
5.1 Setup
The extension of the model is done in three dimensions
1. Firms can invest to innovate in three different quality levels: low quality; medium quality;
and high quality.
2. Households decide savings and there is a continuous distribution of labor productivity.
3. The basic good is produced with capital and labor. Capital is held by the differentiated goods
firms or the households.
As before I focus on the transition path of the economy to an steady state with no growth and
allow for shocks to arrive during the transition. The shocks considered in this setup are a produc-
tivity shock and a financial shock. The productivity shock is a change in the distribution of labor
productivity and the financial shock is an increase in the cost of funding for the firms.
Households
Households supply inelastically one unit of labor. The household decides how much to buy of the
asset (bt), expenditures X, and which differentiated good to buy on the market. The income sources
are labor income, the return on asset holding and the dividends payed by the differentiated good
firms.
The households have to decide the level of expenditures at period t before the taste shocks are
realized. This way all households with the same productivity and assets will decide the same level
of expenditures although they might decide to buy a different bundle. The problem of the household
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is to
max E
{∑
t
βui(z, j, q)
}
s.t ui(z, j, q) = zq + εij,q
X = wai + (rt + pt)bt−1 − ptbt + divit
X ≥ z + pj,q (14)
where divit are the dividends payed to household i, w is the wage, ai is the productivity and rt is
the net return on the asset holdings bt−1 and pt is the price of the asset at t. Expenditures are
spend on the basic good z (numeraire) and the unit of the differentiated good, payed at price pj,q.
Constraint 14 is similar to the constraints used in the cash in advance literature. The household
has to decide in the "morning" how much resources to take to the goods market that opens in the
"afternoon". The taste shock is realized upon arrival to the goods market.
First I have to characterize the expected instantaneous utility of expenditures X. Following Ver-
boven (1996) we have that the expected utility of a level of expenditures X is given by:
E
{
ui(z, j, q) | X} = ln ∑
ω∈Q
∑
j∈Jω
e(X−pj)ω/θω
θω
then the expected marginal utility is
∂E
{
ui(z, j, q) | X}
∂X
=
∑
ω∈Q ω
[∑
j∈Jω e
(X−pj)ω/θω
]θω
∑
ω∈Q
[∑
j∈Jω e
(X−pj)ω/θω
]θω
and the corresponding Euler equation corresponds to
∂Et{uit(z,j,q)|X}
∂X
E
{
∂Et+1{uit(z,j,q)|X}
∂X (pt+1 + rt+1)
} = β
pt
For simplicity and tractability I impose that the agent has a policy function that determines savings
that is linear mapping of time, previous asset held and labor productivity. The mapping is selected
such as the savings decision minimizes the deviations from the Euler equation.
A More General Endowment Distribution
At any point in time the skills distribution is characterized by a Beta distribution for the lowest 85%
of the productivity distribution and a Pareto distribution for the upper tail. Absent of shocks labor
productivity grows during the transition period. Growth is modeled by an increase in the limits
52
5.1 Setup 5 FULL MODEL
Figure 12: Skills distribution over time
of the support of the Beta distribution. Without shocks the productivity distribution follows the
path in Figure 12. Along the transition and also when we allow for shocks the ordering of agents
along the distribution productivity is not altered. This means that we allow for aggregate and
idiosyncratic income risk but not for any shift in the order of agents with respect to productivity.
Multiple Quality Levels
Each firm in the differentiated goods market has two quality level of their variety in the market
and the investment decision resides on the possibility to develop a higher quality level. Compared
to the basic model the key modification I introduce here is that not all firms have the same two
outstanding qualities. In total there are 5 possible quality levels in the economy {q0, q1, qL, qM , qH).
The firms are divided into three sets:
1. Low quality firms: firms with outstanding qualities q0 and q1 that can innovate to generate
qL.
2. Medium quality firms: firms with outstanding qualities q1 and qL that can innovate to generate
qM .
3. High quality firms: firms with outstanding qualities qL and qM that can innovate to generate
qH .
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Differentiated goods firms
Firms have Self-confirming expectations with a forecasting function of profits M(Xj ;βj). Firms
also face technological risk: There is a probability pf that if the firm invests there the new good is
not successfully developed.
The firm can finance the investment to develop a new quality with retained earnings rej,t or with
a loan going short on the asset b in the economy. The opportunity cost of retained earnings is
the return on the asset b given by (pt+1+rt+1)pt . On the other hand, if the firm decides to use a
loan it has to pay a premia given by %t. Since there is no default in this setup and all firms can
eventually repay the debt we have that %t reflects a real cost on the reallocation of resources in the
economy. I set this cost to be 0 if no shocks hit the economy. The financial shock will affect this
term, increasing the cost on the reallocation of resources.
The optimal investment rule of the firm is
M(Xj , t;βj)(1− pf ) ≥ Et
{
f¯q,t
(pt+1 + rt+1)
pt
+ (f¯q − rej,t)%1t
}
where the left hand side has the expected profits and the right hand side the cost. Expectations
about the interest rate are the same for the whole economy and all agents have the same expecta-
tions. Note that (f¯q − rej,t)%t represents the premia paid on borrowed resources.
The optimal pricing is given by:
pq = cq +
θq
q
and the profits of the differentiated goods firms correspond to:
pij =
∑
q∈Qj,t
(
Dj,q(.)
[
pjq − cq
]− fq)
where fq is the fixed cost of variety q. I suppose that firms pay as dividends a fix fraction d of their
total income after investment as given by:
divj,t = d ((pit − χj,t) + (rt + pt) rej,t−1)
and the top 15% households are the owners of the firms. Consequently the assets of the firm evolve
as follows:
rej,t = (1− d)
(
(pit − χj,t) + (rt + pt) rej,t−1
pt
)
where χj,t is the investment of firm j at period t in the development of a new good.
Mutual Fund
Similar to Gornemann, Kuester, and Nakajima (2012) households and firms save and borrow using
a single asset b. This asset correspond to a share in a mutual fund that owns the capital of the
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economy. This fund also decides how much capital to rent in order to maximize the return on its
portfolio. Therefore, the fund set the capital utilization ut to maximize the payments on capital.
Depreciation is suppose to depend on the level of utilization as follows
δ(ut) = δ0 + δ1(ut − 1) + δ2
2
(ut − 1)2
The fund behaves competitively and does not internalize the effect of its decision on ut on the price
of capital. Therefore the optimal utilization level solves
ut =
Rt/pt − δ1
δ2
+ 1
where Rt is the rental rate of capital payed by firms. The price of an asset at the mutual fund is
pt that is equal to the price of capital. The dividend payed for each unit of capital to the asset
holders of the mutual fund is given by
rt = Rt − δ(ut)− %2t
where %2t is a real cost on the allocation of resources. In this case the lending of capital. At the
steady state %2t = 0; this is the other source of financial shocks.
Basic Sector z Firms
The representative firm hires all the labor and produces with the production function
Yt = A
1−α
t K
α
t
where At =
´
i
ai∂H(ai).
The problem of the firm is
max
At,Kt
A1−αt K
α
t − ωAt −RtKt
the firm has constant returns to scale and therefore the scale is not determined. The equilibrium
prices of inputs are given by
ωt = (1− α) Yt
At
Rt = α
Yt
Kt
so output is demand driven and it determines wages and the rental rate of capital.
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Figure 13: Firms Entry to each quality level
The Productivity Shocks and the Financial Shock
The productivity shocks are two: A shock to the β of the Beta distribution of productivity and
a shock to the upper limit of the support of the Beta distribution. Both shocks follow an auto-
regressive process. The financial shock is constituted by an increase of %1t and %2t . Both terms
generate a real cost in the allocation of resources. %1t increases the cost of funding for the firms in
the differentiated goods sector. Analogously %2t increases the cost of resources for the basic goods
firms. Both shocks follow an auto-regressive stationary process as well.
5.2 Equilibrium Dynamics and Impulse Responses
The fix cost for the development of a new quality level are calibrated to have a smooth entry of firms
in the absence of shocks. Figure 13 shows the number of firms at each level that have developed
the corresponding quality level for their variety at each period. This is the case where the economy
faces no shocks. The Lorenz curve once the economy converges to the steady state is presented in
Figure 14.
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Figure 14: Lorenz Curve
5.2.1 Productivity Shock
The shock affects the distribution of skills, It is a shock that reduces aggregate skills and at the
same time reduces the dispersion of skills. The evolution of the productivity distribution with the
shock hitting the economy in period 15 is shown in Figure 15.13
The dimension I will focus to assess the delay in investment is the number of firms that develop
the new version of their differentiated variety. I compare the number of firms at each of the 3 sets
of firms (Low, medium and high quality) that have invested to develop the higher quality in the
SCE and compare it with the case with objective expectations.
Figure 16 shows the number of firms at each quality level of innovation. We see that in the three
cases subsequent to the shock, the number of firms that develop the new quality is below the
counterfactual with objective beliefs (dashed line). This pattern shows to be more persistent for
the high quality good case although it is also clearly seen at the low level of quality.
13Depending how inequality is measured it can increase or reduce inequality. If it is measured by the variance of
skills it is reduced. The shock increases the β of the beta distribution and reduces the upper limit of the support of
the Beta distribution. The tail given by the Pareto distribution is shifted by the distribution stays the same and has
the same mass of workers in all periods.
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Figure 15: Productivity Shock
5.2.2 Financial shock
The financial shock is an increase in %1t and %2t that vanishes with time. In this case the cost for
financing the investment is increased. The shock generates a wedge between the interest rate paid
by credit and the return to asset holders; it is a real cost to the reallocation of resources. Figure
17 shows the number of firms at the three levels of innovation. Pessimism emerges primarily again
for the high quality version of the goods.
The main difference to highlight with the productivity shock is the delay in the emergence of
pessimism. The shock arrives also at period 15 and pessimism arises many periods afterwards even
when the shock has vanished. The mechanism behind this result is that is not the increase in the
cost of resources itself what drives pessimism. It is the induced change in the income distribution
that is an outcome of the financial shock what changes the relative demands for goods in a way
that is not fully acknowledged by the firms expectations.
The fact that pessimism emerges with a delay does not mean that the shock has not immediate
consequences in the investment decisions. The investment decisions are indeed affected by the
shock, just that both objective and subjective beliefs are aligned. This is because the shock is over
the cost of investment and not over the structure of demand, the main source of uncertainty of
firms when they decide if to innovate or not.
Finally in Figure 18 the GDP for the three cases is presented. The economy with no shocks, with
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Figure 16: Firms Entry, Labor Productivity Shock.
Solid line: Entry at the Self-Confirmed Equilibrium
Dashed line: Entry with objective Expectations
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Figure 17: Firms Entry, Financial Shock
Solid line: Entry at the Self-Confirmed Equilibrium
Dashed line: Entry with objective Expectations
the productivity shock and with the financial shock. The productivity shock generates a strong
response in GDP with an immediate fall. On the other hand, the financial shock has a smaller
effect but the recovery is slower and the convergence to slower. I now discuss policy alternatives to
avoid a delay in investment and generate a faster recovery after the recession.
6 Policy interventions
In this section I analyze the role of policy to incentivize investment and overcome the pessimistic
delay. First, I argue that a policy based on a countercyclical corporate income tax can be more
effective to screen and target firms with pessimism vis-a-vis firms that do not invest because of high
technological risk. Second I show the welfare gains of such a policy across the population when
investment at different quality levels is targeted.
6.1 Corporate Income Tax and the screening of pessimism.
This section provides a preview on how policy can undo the pessimistic delay. The focus is how to
provide incentives for the firm to carry on the investment. Going back to the optimal investment
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Figure 18: GDP for the three cases: No shocks, Productivity shock and Financial shock.
decision of the firm, we have that a firm invests if
M(Xj , t;βj)(1− pf ) ≥ f¯q,tEt
{
(pt+1 + rt+1)
pt
}
+ (f¯q − rej,t)%1t
consider the case where the firm is pessimist, i.e the following condition is satisfied
M(Xj , t;βj) < E {Dj,q(.) | Xj}
such that subjective beliefs are lower than objective. Furthermore, take the case where the firm
does not invest because of pessimism, the case we are interested is where
M(Xj , t;βj)(1− pf ) < f¯q,tEt
{
(pt+1 + rt+1)
pt
}
+ (f¯q − rej,t)%1t < E {Dj,q(.) | Xj} (1− pf ) (15)
The first inequality in 15 establishes that the firm will not invest and the second inequality that
it is optimal to invest given the information available. This is the particular case we would like to
avoid with policy.
I will consider two policy interventions that can potentially provide the incentives for the firm to
invest.
1. Provide subsidies to investment. Subsidize a fraction of the cost f¯q,t.
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2. Corporate income taxation. Lower the tax on profits by T (pit).
If the policies can be targeted at the investing firm these two possibilities can induce the pessimist
firm to invest. The first by lowering the cost of investment and the second by increasing the
expected profits. Nevertheless, to implement this policy we suppose the government knows if the
firm is being pessimistic or not. This imposes that the government has a greater deal of information
and can fully spot when pessimism arises.
A firm might delay investment even if it is not pessimistic but because it faces a temporary increase
in pf : the probability the new good is not developed. This is a delay in investment generated by an
increase in technological risk. There is a lower expected profits but this is an objective assessment of
risk. I suppose that the government cannot observe ρf so it is observationally equivalent pessimism
to technological risk, recall that for the expected profits both enter in the same way. In particular,
the two recessions we considered could be accompanied by an increase in technological risk. First,
A shock to productivity could also affect the technology of innovations. Second, the increase in the
cost of funds could also be the result of higher risk in investments rather than a financial shock.
Consider two firms that have the same expected profit of investment. Firm j is pessimistic about
demand and has low technological risk (pjf ) while firmm is not pessimistic but has high technological
risk (pmf ). Since both have the same expected gain form the investment we have
M(Xj , t;βj)(1− pjf ) = M(Xm, t;βm)(1− pmf )
and
M(Xj , t;βj) < M(Xm, t;βm) = E {Dj,q(.) | Xj}
pjf < p
m
f
Note that an investment subsidy that makes it optimal for the firm j to invest also makes it optimal
for m to invest. Despite the fact that the benefit for j investment is greater than that of m because
of the lower risk. On the other hand, a lower marginal tax on profits that makes the firm j indifferent
to invest or not assures that
(1− pjf )T (M(Xj , t;βj)) +M(Xj , t;βj)(1− pf ) = f¯q,tEt
{
(pt+1 + rt+1)
pt
}
+ (f¯q − rej,t)%1t
where (1 − pjf )T (M(Xj , t;βj)) is the expected tax deduction. Note the effect is given by the tax
discount multiplied by (1 − pjf ). For the firm m the tax incentive is diminished by the higher
technological risk (lower (1− pjf )) and as long as the discount does not grow with profits the firm
m will not invest.
The corporate income tax can allow the planner to screen firms between technological risks and ex-
pectations about demand. Next we evaluate the welfare gains of the alternative policy interventions
for the two sources of investment delay; technological risk or pessimism.
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6.2 Comparison of policies
Now I proceed to compute the welfare gains of the two types of policies: An investment subsidy
and a lower corporate income tax. For both policies I set the scale of the intervention to be the
minimum possible that provides incentives for an additional firm to invest and develop a new good.
The policy is targeted at a given quality level and I consider the three cases at hand: low quality,
medium quality and high quality firms.
I will focus on the recession driven by the technological shock as presented in section 5.2.1. In this
case we have a delay in investment driven by pessimism at the three quality levels. For each quality
level I evaluate the welfare gains along the population of the two policies and decompose it into its
key drivers.
Investment Subsidy
The investment subsidy corresponds to a lump-sum transfer given by the government to the firm
that invests to produce a new quality. It is a fraction ζt of the investment cost f¯q,t and is targeted
to a particular quality level.
This policy affects directly the cost of the investment for the firm. The size of ζt is set to the
minimum level necessary to have that the firm that an additional firm invests in period t. Formally,
following from the optimal condition for investment, it follows that ζt is given by the solution to:
M(Xj∗ , t;βj∗)(1− pf ) = (1− ζt) f¯q,tEt
{
(pt+1 + rt+1)
pt
}
+
(
(1− ζt) f¯q − rej∗,t
)
%1t
this equation just states that with the investment subsidy the firm j∗ is indifferent between investing
or not. The firm j∗ is set to be the firm that requires the smallest subsidy to engage in investment.
The purpose of setting the intervention at this level is to measure the welfare gains of pushing an
additional firm to invest using policy. Taking into account that any resource allocated to such firm
has to be collected with taxes and also that it has the corresponding general equilibrium effects. It
is somehow the “marginal” effect of policy evaluated at a situation with no policy.
Corporate Income Tax
The corporate income tax policy intervention consists on a lower corporate tax to (1− τ ct ) for the
next periods after the policy is announced. The deductions continue up to when a maximum level
of total subsidy S¯t in present value is reached. Therefore, the firm that is benefited with the policy
can expect the tax deduction as long as the total subsidy cap S¯t is not reached.
The profits subsidy is granted only for the new created quality and targeted again at the “marginal”
firm. Just as the investment subsidy. Therefore, if a firm invests to develop a new good but the
investment fails then the firm cannot claim the tax discount as there are no profits coming from
the production of the new good.
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S¯t is set to the minimum level that provides the necessary incentives for an additional firm to invest
in period t. Formally it is given by the solution to:
(
M(Xj∗ , t;βj∗) + S¯t
)
(1− pf ) = f¯q,tEt
{
(pt+1 + rt+1)
pt
}
+
(
f¯q − rej∗,t
)
%1t
Note the key difference between the two policies, that was already highlighted in the previous
section. While the investment subsidy depends on the productM(Xj∗ , t;βj∗)(1−pf ), the corporate
tax policy is affected differently by each component. The Technological risk and the expectations
of future profits have a different effect on the scale needed to push an additional firm to invest.
The corporate income tax allows to screen firms by their technological risk. Therefore, the policy
can be set to be effective up to a maximum level of technological risk ρf and set S¯t accordingly. If
the firms have a higher technological risk then the policy will not provide enough incentives for the
firms to invest.
Financing and Timing of Policies
The government follows a balanced budget every period and therefore every subsidy is backed with
taxes on labor. Taxes are collected with a flat rate τw,t at each period t depending on the needs
of the government that period to cover the cost of the subsidies. The policies to break the delay
of investment are implemented the first period after the economy presents positive growth after a
recession (negative growth rates). It a simple rule to time the beginning of the recovery.
Welfare effects decomposition
The policy interventions described affect the households of the economy through different channels.
I decompose the total welfare effect of the policy into four components as follows:
1. Variety expansion: When a firm develops a new good the varieties available for consumers
expand and consequently the utility level they can reach with a given level of income.
2. Wage change: The wage is valued in units of the numeraire good: the basic good. Once
resources are devoted to the production of a new variety this implies a lower investment to
accumulate capital in the basic sector and therefore has effects on wages.
3. Labor Tax change: The burden of the policy intervention lies on the workers. This channel
measures the cost of the tax change on the welfare of each household.
4. Capital Income change: The decision to invest by a firm affects the level of capital accumu-
lated in the basic good sector (The alternative investment opportunity) and also the dividends
payed by the firm that invests and all of its competitors. The capital income change measures
the change in the return of capital in the basic good sector and the change in dividends payed
in the differentiated goods sector.
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The policy interventions that induce an additional firm to invest have a unambiguous positive effect
on the first component and negative on the second and the third. The fourth component can go
both ways depending on the portfolio of the household. Households gain by the higher return
on capital on the basic sector and might be worse off by the change in dividends payed in the
differentiated sector.
Notice that while for a single firm the decision to invest is optimal and maximizes the present
discounted value of distributed dividends, the firm does not take into account the lower profits that
it generates for its competitors. So it is the higher competition that might marginally reduce overall
profits, what can generate that households that mostly held the differentiated firms assets can be
negatively affected by the policy. This should come as no surprise as the government is subsidizing
entry to a monopolistic market and this reducing monopolistic rents.
6.3 Results for the Recession Caused by the Productivity Shock
Figures 19, 20 and 21 show the decomposition of the welfare gains for the corporate income tax
policy for the recession generated by a productivity shock. The decomposition is done for each
household in the economy, were the index of the household i ∈ [0, 1] corresponds to its ranking in
the productivity distribution.
Each of the graphs present the welfare gains for the policy targeted at the three quality levels. Figure
19 shows the welfare gains when the policy is targeted to the low quality firms. We can see that
the expansion in varieties mostly benefits the households with low productivity and corresponding
low income.
In all cases the greatest losses come for the wealthiest households, the reason is the lower distributed
dividends. Also, the poorest households tend to be worse of if the policy is targeted at higher quality
levels: low productivity households do not consume the newly created goods but suffer the loss in
wages and raise in taxes (see Figure 21).
There is one additional effect of policy that can emerge in this setup. The policy to incentivize an
additional firm to invest at a given quality level will itself affect the demand for the other firms and
potentially their decisions in the following periods. This can generate a “Domino” effect that can
amplify the effects of policy as well as lower investment at the quality levels not targeted by the
policy. A case where both of this situations take place is when the policy is targeted at the high
quality level as represented in Figure 21. The expanded variety effect on welfare is positive and
high for high productivity households, partly driven by subsequent entrants into the high quality
fringe over the following periods after the policy is implemented. On the other hand, the poorer
households face a negative sign on the effect of the expanded variety factor. This comes from the
marginally lower entry at low quality levels triggered by the policy targeting the high quality goods.
The high quality case is qualitatively and quantitatively different to the other cases because of two
reasons. First, the size of the investment is higher at that level and consequently implies a higher
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Figure 19: Welfare Gains: Lower Corporate Income Tax Policy targeted at a “Low quality” firm.
reallocation of resources. Second, There are less firms competing at that quality level and therefore
entry of an additional firm has a higher effect of profits and relative demands.
Overall, for an utilitarian planner the policy would be optimal in all three cases. Furthermore, if
the planner can observe the individual productivities then a system of transfers allows the policy
to be Pareto improving. This since the total gains by the households that are better off with the
policy, measured in units of the basic good, are greater than the losses of the household that are
worse off with the policy.
These figures are almost identical if the policy implemented is the investment subsidy and the
same conclusions go through. Nevertheless, if we have that the source of the delay in investment is
technological risk the corporate income tax policy has no effect on the economy while the investment
subsidy still provides incentives for an additional firm to invest. In the next section I show that in
that case such an intervention might not be welfare improving.
6.4 Delay in Investment Driven by Technological Risk
If the source of the delay in investment is technological risk (an increase in (pf )) rather than
pessimism then the delay is not inefficient. In this case a policy that induces additional investment
might not be welfare improving with a utilitarian social welfare function.
For the technological risk case I focus on the investment subsidy policy. Figures 22, 23 and 24
present the welfare gains for the policy targeted at the three quality levels.
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Figure 20: Welfare Gains: Lower Corporate Income Tax Policy targeted at a “Medium quality”
firm.
Figure 21: Welfare Gains: Lower Corporate Income Tax Policy targeted at a “High quality” firm.
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The level of technological risk (pf ) is set to be observationally equivalent to the pessimism case
that was studied in the previous section. We observe a large decline in the welfare gains of the
policy when the source of delay is technological risk. Furthermore, there is no system of transfers
that would make the policy Pareto optimal in this situation.
The government is subsidizing an investment with high risk and generates excessive risk taking by
firms in this economy. The risk is excessive given that the expected gains of the project are not
large enough to compensate for the costs the economy is bearing by accumulating less capital and
having lower wages. The higher probability of wasted resources by a failed investment project,
where a firm does not fully internalize the costs of it, is the driver for the bad performance of this
policy.
Therefore, if the government is uncertain about the source of the delay in investment a robust policy
that would not trigger excessive risk taking would be to use corporate income taxation instead of
investment subsidies. This prescription comes with a caveat, we focused on the recession driven by a
shock to the productivity distribution. In the recession driven by the financial shock an investment
subsidy has the additional advantage of relaxing the need of the firm for external funding.
Figure 22: Welfare Gains of Policy.
Technological risk case, investment subsidy policy.
Policy targeted at a “Low quality” firm.
68
6.4 Delay in Investment Driven by Technological Risk 6 POLICY INTERVENTIONS
Figure 23: Welfare Gains of Policy.
Technological risk case, investment subsidy policy.
Policy targeted at a “Medium quality” firm.
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Figure 24: Welfare Gains of Policy.
Technological risk case, investment subsidy policy.
Policy targeted at a “High quality” firm.
7 Conclusions and Caveats
A stark prediction of macroeconomic models that study the business cycle is that after a recession
investment tends to recover faster than GDP. In particular, during a recession, firms are able to
identify emerging investment opportunities and thus investment leads the recovery. Contrary to
this I have documented that investment recovers sluggishly after recessions and that GDP tends to
lead the recoveries. I have put forward the idea that investors’ pessimistic beliefs contribute to this
pattern.
The channel I propose is not suitable to be studied when the only equilibrium concept considered is
the rational expectations equilibrium, as this restricts subjective beliefs to coincide with objective
beliefs and thus discards pessimism. An alternative approach is therefore presented here. I study
an economy where firms’ beliefs are simple forecasting schemes. Expectations are rational in the
sense that the forecasting schemes are consistent with the probability distribution of equilibrium
outcomes.
I have shown that during recessions investors might be excessively pessimistic about consumer
demand and delay the implementation of projects. Furthermore, once they decide to invest, their
excess in pessimism is not revealed and a SCE is obtained. Importantly, cyclical movements of
the income distribution can affect the demand structures for the different goods available in the
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economy and consequently the firms’ investment. Economic models that maintain the assumption
of homothetic preferences miss this dimension of variability, which in this paper is shown to have
an important role to generate the delay in investment.
Taking this setting to the design of countercyclical policy, the policymaker faces the challenge of
detecting the emergence of pessimism. I therefore study policy design when the government has
uncertainty about the source of the delay in investment. Corporate income taxation might be a
desirable instrument to use, as it is linked to the expected gains of firms, while interest rate policy
or investment subsidies affect the cost of investment.
The theory needs further development in several dimensions. First, the stylized fact proposed needs
to be further characterized, decomposing investment into the extensive and the intensive margin,
also on the role of intangible assets. Second, how robust are the findings to the parameter values
chosen and the assumption that firms model is linear. Third, the model assumes an extreme case
where firms do not use the outcomes of competitors in their belief system. Finally an assessment
of the quantitative relevance of the mechanism proposed.
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Chapter 3
Optimal Redistribution with a Shadow Economy
[Joint work with Pawe l Doligalski]
Abstract
We examine the constrained e cient allocations in the Mirrlees (1971) model with an informal
sector. There are two labor markets: formal and informal. The planner observes only income
from the formal market. We show that the shadow economy can be welfare improving through
two channels. It can be used as a shelter against tax distortions, raising the e ciency of
labor supply, and as a screening device, benefiting redistribution. We calibrate the model
to Colombia, where 58% of workers are employed informally. The optimal share of shadow
workers is close to 22% for the Rawlsian planner and less than 1% for the Utilitarian planner.
The optimal tax schedule is very di↵erent then the one implied by the Mirrlees (1971) model
without the informal sector.
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1 Introduction
Informal activity, defined broadly as any endeavor which is not necessarily illegal but evades taxa-
tion, accounts for a large fraction of economic activity in both developing and developed economies.
According to Jutting, Laiglesia, et al. (2009) more then half of the jobs in the non-agricultural sec-
tor worldwide can be considered informal. Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro (2011) estimate the
share of informal production in the GDP of high income OECD countries in the years 1999-2007
as 13.5%. Given this evidence, the informal sector should be considered in the design of fiscal
policy. This paper extends the theory of the optimal redistributive taxation by Mirrlees (1971) to
the economies with an informal labor market.
The ability of the state to redistribute income depends on how responsive to taxes individuals
are. When incomes are very elastic, di↵erential taxation of di↵erent individuals is hard, because
workers adjust their earnings to minimize the tax burden.1 The shadow economy allows workers to
earn additional income which is unobserved by the government. Without shadow economy, workers
respond to taxes only by changing their total labor supply. With the shadow economy, they can
additionally shift labor between the formal and the informal sector, which increases the elasticity
of their formal income. As incomes in the formal economy become more elastic, redistribution
becomes more di cult.
We show that the government can exploit di↵erences in informal productivity between workers
to improve redistribution. Suppose there are two types of workers: skilled and unskilled. The
responsiveness of the skilled workers determines the taxes they pay and the transfers the unskilled
receive. In the world without the shadow economy, this responsiveness depends on how easy it is for
the skilled to reduce income to the level of the unskilled worker. If that happens, the government
cannot tax di↵erentially the two types of individuals. In the world with the shadow economy, the
government can improve redistribution in the following way. By increasing taxes at low levels of
formal income, the unskilled workers are pushed to informality. If the unskilled workers can easily
find a good informal job, this transition will not hurt them much. Now the skilled workers can
avoid taxes only if they too move to the shadow economy. Hence, the responsiveness of the skilled
workers depends on their informal productivity. If the skilled workers su↵er a large productivity
loss by moving to the other sector, the government can tax them more in the formal sector and
provide higher transfers to the unskilled informal workers. In the opposite case, however, when the
skilled can easily move between sectors while the unskilled cannot, the government cannot use the
shadow economy to discourage the skilled workers from reducing formal income. In such a case,
redistribution will be reduced.
The shadow economy also a↵ects the e ciency of labor allocation by sheltering workers from tax
distortions.2 The labor supply of formal workers is determined jointly by their formal productivity
1Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001) expressed the optimal tax rates in the Mirrlees model with elasticities. The
higher is the elasticity of labor supply, the lower is the optimal marginal tax rate at this level of income.
2This e↵ect corresponds to what La Porta and Shleifer (2008) call the romantic view on the shadow economy.
In this view, associated with the works of Hernando de Soto (de Soto (1990, 2000)), the informal sector protects
productive firms from harmful regulation and taxes.
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and a marginal tax rate they face. In contrast, the labor supply of informal workers depends only
on their informal production opportunity and is una↵ected by tax distortions. When their informal
productivity is not much lower than the formal one, informal workers will produce more than if
they stayed in the formal sector. In this way the shadow economy improves the allocation of labor
and raises e ciency.
Whether the shadow economy is harmful or beneficial from the social welfare perspective depends
on its joint impact on redistribution and e ciency. The informal sector improves redistribution if
the workers that pay high taxes cannot easily move to the shadow economy. It benefits e ciency if
informal workers have similar productivities in formal and informal sector. As a rule of a thumb,
we can say that the shadow economy raises welfare if it allows poor workers who collect transfers to
earn some additional money, but does not tempt the rich taxpayers to reduce their formal income.
We derive the formula for the optimal tax with a shadow economy. The informal sector imposes an
upper bound on the marginal tax rate, which depends on the distribution of formal and informal
productivities. The optimal tax rate at each formal income level is given by either the usual
Diamond (1998) formula or the upper bound, if the Diamond formula prescribes rates that are
too high. In contrast to the standard Mirrlees (1971) model, in the model with shadow economy
di↵erent types of workers are likely to be bunched at the single level of formal income. Specifically,
all agents that supply shadow labor are subject to bunching. We develop the optimal bunching
condition which complements the Diamond formula.3
The model is calibrated to Colombia, where 58% of workers are employed informally. We derive the
joint distribution of formal and shadow productivity from a household survey. The main di culty
is that most individuals work only in one sector at a time. We infer their productivity in the
other sector by estimating a factor: a linear combination of workers’ and jobs’ characteristics that
explains most of the variability of shadow and formal productivities. The factor allows us to match
similar individuals and infer their missing productivities. When we apply the actual tax schedule
to the calibrated economy, the model replicates well the actual size of the informal sector.
We find that the optimal share of shadow workers in the total workforce is close to 22% under the
Rawlsian planner and less than 1% under the Utilitarian planner. This means that the optimal
shadow economy is much smaller than than 58%, the actual share of shadow workers in Colombia.
In comparison the Colombian income tax at the time, the optimal tax schedule has lower marginal
rates at the bottom and higher rates elsewhere. Lower tax rates at the bottom displace less workers
to the shadow economy, while higher tax rates above raise more revenue from high earners, yielding
large welfare gains. The optimal tax rates are generally lower then the ones implied by the Mirrlees
(1971) model without the informal sector. The application of the Mirrlees (1971) income tax would
displace an excessive number of workers to the shadow economy.
3In the Mirrlees (1971) model without wealth e↵ects the optimal allocation is described by the Diamond formula
if and only if the resulting income schedule is non-decreasing, which is usually verified ex post. If the Diamond
formula implies the income schedule that is decreasing at some type, our optimal bunching condition recovers the
optimum.
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Related literature. Tax evasion has been studied at least since Allingham and Sandmo (1972).
For us, the most relevant paper from this literature is Kopczuk (2001). He shows that tax evasion
can be welfare improving if and only if individuals are heterogeneous with respect to both produc-
tivity and tax evasion ability.4 We explore this result by decomposing the welfare gain from tax
evasion into the e ciency and redistribution components. Furthermore, Kopczuk (2001) derives
the optimal linear income tax with tax evasion. We focus on the optimal non-linear income tax
and provide a sharp characterization of the optimal shadow economy. The impact of income taxes
on informal activity has been studied empirically as well. Fr´ıas, Kumler, and Verhoogen (2013)
show that underreporting of wages decreases, once reported income is linked to pension benefits.
Waseem (2013) documents that an increase of taxes of partnerships in Pakistan led to a massive
shift to other business forms as well as a large spike in income underreporting.
Our model is focused on the workers’ heterogeneity with respect to formal and informal produc-
tivities. A similar approach was taken by Albrecht, Navarro, and Vroman (2009), who study the
impact of labor market institutions in a model with the formal and informal labor markets and a
search friction. There is a complementary approach to modeling the shadow economy, which focuses
on firms’ rather than workers’ heterogeneity. In Rauch (1991) managers with varying skills decide
in which sector to open a business. He finds that less productive managers choose informal sector
in order to avoid costly regulation. Meghir, Narita, and Robin (2015) consider heterogeneous firms
that decide in which sector to operate and who are randomly matched with homogeneous workers.
They find that policies aimed at reduction of the shadow economy increase competition for workers
in the formal labor market and improve welfare. Amaral and Quintin (2006) to the best of our
knowledge provide the only framework with the shadow economy where heterogeneity of both firms
and workers is present. They extend the Rauch (1991) model by allowing for physical and human
capital accumulation. Due to complementarity between the two types of capital, educated workers
tend to stay in the more capital intensive formal sector.
The following two papers derive the optimal policy in related environments. Gomes, Lozachmeur,
and Pavan (2014) study the optimal sector-specific income taxation when individuals can work in
one of the two sectors of the economy. In our setting there are also two sectors, but the government
can impose tax only on one of them. Moreover, we allow agents to work in the two sectors si-
multaneously. Alvarez-Parra and Sa´nchez (2009) study the optimal unemployment insurance with
the moral hazard in search e↵ort and an informal labor market. It is another environment with
information frictions in which the informal employment is utilized in the optimal allocation.
Structure of the paper. In the next section we use a simple model of two types to show how the
shadow economy can emerge in the optimum and what are the welfare consequences. In Section 3
we derive the optimal tax schedule with a large number of types and general social preferences. In
Section 4 we introduce our methodology of extracting shadow productivities from the micro data
4Kopczuk (2001) describes his framework as a model of tax avoidance. In our view his results are applicable also
in studying tax evasion, which is the focus of our paper.
76
and apply it to Colombia. We derive the optimal Colombian tax schedule in Section 5. The last
section concludes.
2 Simple model
Imagine an economy inhabited by people that share preferences but di↵er in productivity. There
are two types of individuals, indexed by letters L and H, with strictly positive population shares
µL and µH . They all care about consumption c and labor supply n according to the utility function
U (c, n) = c  v (n) . (1)
We assume that v is increasing, strictly convex, twice di↵erentiable and satisfies v0 (0) = 0. The
inverse function of v0 is denoted by g.
There are two labor markets and, correspondingly, each agent is equipped with two linear production
technologies. An agent of type i 2 {L,H} produces with productivity wfi in a formal labor market,
and with productivity wsi in an informal labor market. Type H is more productive in the formal
market than type L: wfH > w
f
L. Moreover, in this section we assume that each type’s informal
productivity is lower than formal productivity: 8i wfi > wsi . We relax this assumption when we
consider the full model.
Any agent may work formally, informally, or in both markets simultaneously. An agent of type i
works ni hours in total, which is the sum of n
f
i hours at the formal job and n
s
i hours in the shadow
economy. The formal and the informal income, denoted by yfi and y
s
i respectively, is a product of
the relevant productivity and the relevant labor supply. The allocation of resources may involve
transfers across types, so one’s consumption may be di↵erent than the sum of formal and informal
income. In order to capture these flows of resources, we introduce a tax Ti, equal to the gap between
total income and consumption
Ti ⌘ yfi + ysi   ci. (2)
A negative tax is called a transfer, and we are going to use these terms interchangeably.
The social planner follows John Rawls’ theory of justice and wants to improve the well-being of the
least well-o↵ agents,5 but is limited by imperfect knowledge. The planner knows the structure and
parameters of the economy, but, as in the standard Mirrlees model, does not observe the type of
any individual. In addition, shadow income and labor are unobserved by the planner as well. The
only variables at the individual level the planner sees and can directly verify are the formal income
yfi and the tax Ti. We can think about y
f
i and y
f
i   Ti as a pre-tax and an after-tax reported
income. Although shadow labor cannot be controlled directly, it is influenced by the choice of
formal labor. Formal labor a↵ects the marginal disutility from labor and hence changes the agent’s
5We pick this particular point of the Pareto frontier because it allows us to show the interesting features of
the model with relatively easy derivations. At the end of this section we discuss how other constrained e cient
allocations look like.
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optimal choice of shadow hours. Two types of labor are related according to the following function,
implied by the agent’s first order condition
nsi
 
nf
 
= max
 
g (wsi )  nf , 0
 
. (3)
When the agent works a su cient number of hours in the formal sector, the marginal disutility
from labor is too high to work additionally in the shadows. However, if the formal hours fall short
of g (wsi ) , the resulting gap is filled with shadow labor.
The planner maximizes the Rawlsian social welfare function, given by a utility level of the worst-o↵
agent
max
{(nfi ,Ti)2R+⇥R}i2{L,H}
min {U (cL, nL) , U (cH , nH)} , (4)
subject to the relation between formal and shadow labor
nsi
 
nf
 
= max
 
g (wsi )  nf , 0
 
, (5)
the accounting equations
8i2{L,H} ci = wfi nfi + wsinsi
⇣
nfi
⌘
  Ti, (6)
8i2{L,H} ni = nfi + nsi
⇣
nfi
⌘
, (7)
a resource constraint X
i2{L,H}
µiTi   0, (8)
and incentive-compatibility constraints
8i2{L,H} U (ci, ni)   U
 
wf in
f
 i + w
s
in
s
i
 
wf i
wfi
nf i
!
  T i,
wf i
wfi
nf i + n
s
i
 
wf i
wfi
nf i
!!
. (9)
We denote the generic incentive constraint by ICi, i. It means that an agent i cannot be better o↵
by earning the formal income of the other type and simultaneously adjusting informal labor.
2.1 First-best
What if the planner is omniscient and directly observes all variables? The planner knows types and
can choose the shadow labor supply directly. The optimal allocation is a solution to the welfare
maximization problem (4) where planner chooses both formal and shadow labor and a tax of each
type subject only to the accounting equations (6) and (7) and the resource constraint (8). All
types are more productive in the formal sector than in the shadow economy, so no agent will work
informally. Each agent will supply the formal labor e ciently, equalizing the marginal social cost
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and benefit of working. Moreover, the planner redistributes income from H to L in order to achieve
the equality of well-being.
Proposition 1. In the first-best both types work only formally and supply an e cient amount of
labor: 8iv0 (ni) = wfi . Utility levels of the two types are equal: U (cL, nL) = U (cH , nH) .
We can slightly restrict the amount of information available to the planner without a↵ecting the
optimal allocation. Suppose that the planner still observes the formal productivity, but shadow
labor and income are hidden. The optimal allocation is a solution to (4) subject to the relation
between shadow and formal labor (5), the accounting equations (6) and (7) and the resource
constraint (8).
Proposition 2. If the planner knows types, but does not observe shadow labor and income, the
planner can achieve the first-best.
When the types are known, the planner can use the lump-sum taxation and implement the first-best.
Without additional frictions, the hidden shadow economy does not constrain the social planner.
2.2 Second-best
Let’s consider the problem in which neither type nor informal activity is observed. The planner
solves (4) subject to all the constraints (5) - (9). We call the solution to this problem the second-best
or simply the optimum.
Proposition 3. The optimum is not the first-best. ICH,L is binding, while ICL,H is slack.
In the first-best, both types work only on the formal market and their utilities are equal. If H
could mimic the other type, higher formal productivity would allow H to increase utility. Hence,
the first-best does not satisfy ICH,L and this constraint limits the welfare at the optimum. On the
other hand, ICL,H never binds at the optimum. It would require the redistribution of resources
from type L to H, which is clearly suboptimal.
2.2.1 Optimal shadow economy
The standard Mirrlees model typically involves labor distortions, since they can relax the binding
incentive constraints. If type i is tempted to pretend to be of the type  i, distorting number of
hours of  i will discourage the deviation. Agents di↵er in labor productivity, so if i is more (less)
productive than the other type, decreasing (increasing) number of hours worked by  i will make
the deviation less attractive. Proposition 3 tells us that no agent wants to mimic type H, hence
the planner has no reason to distort the labor choice of these agents. Moreover, according to (5)
shadow labor is supplied only if formal labor is su ciently distorted. Hence, the classic result of
no distortions at the top implies here that H will work only formally.
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Corollary 1. Type H faces no distortions and never works in the shadow economy.
On the other hand, the planner can improve social welfare by distorting the formal labor supply
of type L. Stronger distortions relax the binding incentive constraint and allow the planner to
redistribute more. If distortions are strong enough, type L will end up supplying shadow labor.
Optimality of doing so depends on whether and by how much increasing shadow labor of type L
relaxes the binding incentive constraint. As Proposition 4 demonstrates, a comparative advantage
of type L in shadow labor plays a crucial role. In the proof we use the optimality condition derived
in the Appendix 2 (see Lemma A.1). In order to make sure that this condition is well behaved, we
require that v00 is nondecreasing.6
Proposition 4. Suppose that v00 is nondecreasing. Type L may optimally work in the shadow
economy only if  
wsL
wfL
  w
s
H
wfH
!
µH   w
f
L   wsL
wfL
µL. (10)
Condition (10) is also a su cient condition for type L to optimally work in the shadow economy if
wfH
wfL
g (wsH)   g (wsL). Otherwise, the su cient (but not necessary) condition is0B@wsL
wfL
 
v0
⇣
wfL
wfH
g (wsL)
⌘
wfH
1CAµH   wfL   wsL
wfL
µL. (11)
Inequality (10) provides a necessary condition for the optimal shadow economy by comparing the
marginal benefit and cost of increasing shadow labor of type L. The left hand side is the comparative
advantage of type L over type H in the shadow labor, multiplied by the share of type H. This
advantage has to be positive for type L to optimally work in the shadow economy. Otherwise,
increasing shadow labor of this type does not relax the binding incentive constraint. Since the
shadow economy does not facilitate screening of types, there are no benefits from the productivity-
inferior shadow sector. The welfare gains from the relaxed incentive constraint are proportional to
the share of type h, as the planner obtains more resources for redistribution by imposing a higher
tax on this type. On the right hand side, the cost of increasing shadow labor is given by the
productivity loss from using the inferior shadow production, multiplied by the share of types that
supply shadow labor.
Condition (10) is also a su cient condition for type L to work in the shadow economy if the shadow
productivity of type H is not much lower than the shadow productivity of type L. If that is not
the case, the optimality condition derived in Lemma A.1 is not su cient and we have to impose a
stronger su ciency condition (11).
Figure 1 illustrates the proposition on the diagram of the parameter space (wsH , w
s
L). Along the
diagonal no type has the comparative advantage, since ratios of shadow and formal productivity of
6In the canonical case of isoelastic utility, it means that the elasticity of the labor supply is not greater than 1.
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the two types are equal. The optimal shadow economy requires that type L has the comparative
advantage in shadow labor, so the interesting action happens above the diagonal. The shadow econ-
omy is never optimal for pairs of shadow productivities which violate inequality (10). Depending
on whether
wfH
wfL
g (wsH) is greater than g(w
s
L), the inequality (10) is also a su cient condition for the
optimal shadow economy, or we use (11) instead. Note that the lower frontier of the necessity region
crosses the vertical axis at the value µLw
f
L. As the proportion of type L decreases toward zero, the
region where shadow economy is optimal increases, in the limit encompassing all the points where
type L has the comparative advantage over H in shadow labor.
Figure 1: The optimal shadow economy
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Sufficient condition for the optimal shadow economy
Necessary condition for the optimal shadow economy
We know when type L optimally works in the shadow economy. Proposition 5 tells us, how much
shadow labor should type L supply in this case.
Proposition 5. Suppose that type L optimally works in the shadow economy. Type L works only
in the shadow economy if wsH   wsL. Type L works in both sectors simultaneously if wsH < wsL.
When type L is more productive in the shadows than H and works only in the shadow economy,
then by ICH,L the utility of type L will be greater than the utility of H. Since the planner is
Rawlsian, the utility levels of both types will be equalized by making type L work partly in the
formal economy. On the other hand, when type H is more productive informally, ICH,L means
that the utility of type L will be always lower. Then if the shadow economy benefits type L, the
planner will use it as much as possible.
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2.2.2 Shadow economy and welfare
In order to examine the welfare implications of the shadow economy, we compare social welfare of
the two allocations. The first one, noted with a superscript M , is the optimum of the standard
Mirrlees model. We can think about the standard Mirrlees model as a special case of our model, in
which both wsL and w
s
H are equal 0. The second allocation, noted with a superscript
SE , involves
type L working only in the shadow economy and the planner transferring resources from type H
to type L up to the point when the incentive constraint ICH,L binds. The allocation SE is not
necessarily the optimum of the shadow economy model. We use it, nevertheless, to illuminate the
channels through which the shadow economy influences social welfare. We measure social welfare
with the utility of type L. The welfare di↵erence between the two allocations can be decomposed
in the following way
U
 
cSEL , n
SE
L
   U  cML , nML  | {z } = U  wsLnSEL , nSEL    U ⇣wfLnML , nML ⌘| {z } + TML   TSEL| {z } .
total welfare gain e ciency gain redistribution gain
(12)
The e ciency gain measures the di↵erence in distortions imposed on type L, while the redistribu-
tion gain describes the change in the level of transfer type L receives. Thanks to the quasilinear
preferences, we can decompose these two e↵ects additively.
E ciency gain. The distortion imposed on type L in the shadow economy arise from the pro-
ductivity loss wfL wsL. By varying wsL, this distortion can be made arbitrarily small. On the other
hand, the distortion of the standard Mirrlees model is implied by the marginal tax rate on formal
income. Given redistributive social preferences, it is always optimal to impose a positive tax rate
on type l. The e ciency gain, which captures the di↵erence in distortions between two regimes, is
strictly increasing in wsL. Intuitively, the positive e ciency gain means that the shadow economy
raises social welfare by sheltering the workers from tax distortions.
Redistribution gain. The shadow economy improves redistribution if the planner is able to give
higher transfer to type L (or equivalently raise higher tax from type H). The di↵erence in transfers
can be expressed as
TML   TSEL = µH
 
U
 
wfLn
M
L ,
wfL
wfH
nML
!
  U  wsHnSEH , nSEH  
!
. (13)
What determines the magnitude of redistribution is the possibility of production of type H after
misreporting. In the standard Mirrlees model deviating type H uses formal productivity and can
produce only as much output as type l. In the allocation where type L works only informally, type
H cannot supply any formal labor, but is unconstrained in supplying informal labor. Hence, the
redistribution gain is strictly decreasing in wsH . Intuitively, a positive redistribution gain means
that the shadow economy is used as a screening device, helping the planner to tell the types apart.
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Proposition 6 uses the decomposition into the e ciency and redistribution gains in order to derive
threshold values for shadow productivity of each type. Depending on which side of the thresholds
the productivities are, the existence of the shadow economy improves or deteriorates social welfare
in comparison to the standard Mirrlees model.
Proposition 6. Define an increasing function H (ws) = U (wsg (ws) , g (ws)) and the following
threshold values
w¯sL = H
 1
⇣
U
⇣
wfLn
M
L , n
M
L
⌘⌘
2
⇣
0, wfL
⌘
, w¯sH = H
 1
⇣
U
⇣
wfLn
M
L ,
wfL
wfH
nML
⌘⌘
2
⇣
0, wfH
⌘
.
(14)
If wsL   w¯sL and wsH  w¯sH , where at least one of these inequalities is strict, the existence of the
shadow economy improves welfare in comparison to the standard Mirrlees model.
If wsL  w¯sL and wsH   w¯sH , where at least one of these inequalities is strict, the existence of the
shadow economy deteriorates welfare in comparison to the standard Mirrlees model.
The proposition is illustrated on the Figure 2. When the shadow productivity of type L is above
w¯sL, the e ciency gain is positive. When the shadow productivity of type H is above w¯
s
H , the
redistribution gain is negative. Obviously, when both gains are positive (negative), the shadow
economy benefits (hurts) welfare. However, the shadow economy does not have to strengthen both
redistribution and e ciency simultaneously to be welfare improving. Particularly interesting is the
region where the redistribution gain is negative, but the e ciency gain is su ciently high such that
the welfare is higher with the shadow economy. In this case the optimum of the shadow economy
model Pareto dominates the optimum of the Mirrlees model. Type L gains, since the welfare is
higher with the shadow economy. Type H benefits as well, as the negative redistribution gain
implies a lower tax of this type.
2.2.3 General social preferences
In this short section we will derive some properties of the whole Pareto frontier of the two-types
model. We consider the planner that maximizes the general utilitarian social welfare function
 LµLU (cL, nL) +  HµHU (cH , nH) , (15)
where the two Pareto weights are non-negative and sum up to 1. The maximization is subject to
the constraints (5) - (9).
From the Rawlsian case we know that the comparative advantage of type L in shadow labor is
necessary for this type to work in the shadows. Proposition 7 generalizes this observation.
Proposition 7. Type i 2 {L,H} may optimally work in the shadow economy only if wsi
wfi
>
ws i
wf i
and  i >   i.
In order to optimally work in the shadow economy, any type i 2 {L,H} has to satisfy two re-
quirements. First, type i needs to have the comparative advantage in the shadow labor over the
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Figure 2: Shadow economy and welfare
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other type. Otherwise, shifting labor from formal to shadow sector does not relax the incentive
constraints. Second, the planner has to be willing to redistribute resources to type i - the Pareto
weight of this type has to be greater than the weight of the other type. The shadow economy can
be beneficial only when it relaxes the binding incentive constraints, and the incentive constraint
IC i,i binds if  i >   i. Intuitively, if the planner prefers to tax rather than support some agents,
it is suboptimal to let them evade taxation.
When will type i optimally work in the shadow economy? Let’s compare the welfare of two allo-
cations. In the first allocation (denoted by superscript SE) type i works exclusively in the shadow
economy. It provides the lower bound on welfare when type i is employed informally. The second
allocation (denoted by M ) is the optimum of the standard Mirrlees model, or equivalently the op-
timum of the shadow economy model where wsi = w
s i = 0. It is the upper bound on welfare when
type i is employed only in the formal sector. We can decompose the welfare di↵erence between
these two allocations in the familiar way
WSE  WM| {z } = µi i ⇣U  wsinSEi , nSEi    U ⇣wfi nMi , nMi ⌘⌘| {z } + µi ( i     i)  TMi   TSEi  | {z } .
total welfare gain e ciency gain redistribution gain
(16)
The welfare di↵erence can be decomposed into the di↵erence in e↵ective distortions imposed on
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type i and the di↵erence in transfers received by this type. The only essential change in comparison
to the simpler Rawlsian case given by (12) comes from the Pareto weights. The more the planner
cares about type  i, the less valuable are gains in redistribution in comparison to the gains in
e ciency.
Proposition 8. Suppose that  i >   i for some i 2 {L,H}. Define the following thresholds
w¯si = H 1
⇣
U
⇣
wfi n
M
i , n
M
i
⌘⌘
2
⇣
0, wfi
⌘
, w¯s i = H 1
✓
U
✓
wfi n
M
i ,
wfi
wf i
nMi
◆◆
2
⇣
0, wf i
⌘
.
(17)
If wsi   w¯si and ws i  w¯s i, where at least one of these inequalities is strict, then type i optimally
works in the shadow economy and the optimum welfare is strictly higher than in the standard
Mirrlees model.
Proposition 8 generalizes the thresholds from Proposition 6. Interestingly, when the planner cares
more about the more productive formally type H, these agents may end up working in the shadow
economy. It may be surprising, since in the standard Mirrlees model the formal labor supply of this
type is optimally either undistorted, or distorted upwards, while supplying shadow labor requires a
downwards distortion. Nevertheless, if shadow economy magnifies productivity di↵erences between
types, it may be in the best interest of type H to supply only informal labor and enjoy higher
transfer financed by the other type. The shadow economy in such allocation works as a tax haven,
accessible only to the privileged.
3 Full model
In this section we describe the optimal tax schedule in the economy with a large number of types.
Below we introduce a general taxation problem. Then we examine the requirements of incentive
compatibility, which will involve the standard monotonicity condition. We proceed to characterize
the optimal income tax. First we derive optimality conditions (which we call the interior optimality
conditions) under the assumption that the monotonicity condition holds. It is a common practice
in the literature on Mirrleesian taxation to stop here and verify the monotonicity numerically ex
post. It is justified, since in the standard Mirrlees model the violation of the monotonicity requires
rather unusual assumptions. On the other hand, the shadow economy provides an environment
where the monotonicity condition is much more likely to be violated. We discuss in detail why it
is the case and carry on to the optimality conditions when the monotonicity constraint is binding.
The optimal allocation in this case involves bunching, i.e. some types are pooled together at the
kinks of the tax schedule. We derive the optimal bunching condition with an intuitive variational
method.7 In the last subsection we summarize the main results from the full model.
7Ebert (1992) relies on the optimal control theory to derive the optimal tax when the monotonicity condition is
binding. We use the more transparent variational method and develop the optimal bunching condition in the spirit
of the Diamond (1998) tax formula.
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3.1 The planner’s problem
Workers are distributed on the type interval [0, 1] according to a density µi and a cumulative density
Mi. The density µi is atomless. We assume that formal and informal productivities (w
f
i and w
s
i )
are di↵erentiable with respect to type and denote these derivatives by w˙fi and w˙
s
i . It will be useful
to denote the growth rates of productivities by ⇢xi =
w˙xi
wxi
, x 2 {f, s} . Types are sorted such that
the formal productivity is increasing: w˙fi > 0. We will use the dot notation to write derivatives
with respect to type of other variables as well. For instance, y˙fi stands for the derivative of formal
income with respect to type, evaluated at some type i.
We focus on preferences without wealth e↵ects. Agents’ utility function is U (c, n) = c v (n) , where
v is increasing, strictly convex and twice di↵erentiable function. We denote the inverse function of
the marginal disutility from labor v0 by g and the elasticity of labor supply of type i by ⇣i.8 Let
Vi
 
yf , T
 
be the indirect utility function of an agent of type i whose reported formal income is yf
and who pays a tax T :
Vi
 
yf , T
  ⌘ max
ns 0
yf + wsin
s   T   v
 
yf
wfi
+ ns
!
. (18)
In addition to earning the formal income, the agent is optimally choosing the amount of informal
labor. Due to concavity of the problem, the choice of ns is pinned down by the familiar first order
condition, modified to allow for the corner solution
min
(
v0
 
yf
wfi
+ ns
!
  wsi , nsi
)
= 0. (19)
Whenever the formal income yf is su ciently high, no shadow labor is supplied. Conversely,
su ciently low formal income leads to informal employment.
The planner chooses a formal income schedule yf and a tax schedule T in order to maximize a
general social welfare function
max
(yfi ,Ti)i2[0,1]
ˆ 1
0
 iG
⇣
Vi
⇣
yfi , Ti
⌘⌘
dµi, (20)
where G is an increasing and di↵erentiable function and the Pareto weights   2 [0, 1] ! R+
integrate to 1.9 The budget constraint is the following
ˆ 1
0
Tidµi   E, (21)
8Since we abstract from wealth e↵ects, the compensated and uncompensated elasticities coincide. Note that the
elasticity is in general an endogenous object, as it depends on labor supply: ⇣i =
v0(ni)
niv00(ni) .
9It’s easy to relax the assumption of a finite Pareto weight on each type and we are going to do it in the quantitative
section, where we consider, among others, the Rawlsian planner.
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where the net tax revenue needs to cover some fixed expenditures E. Moreover, the tax schedule
has to satisfy incentive compatibility
8i,j2[0,1]Vi
⇣
yfi , Ti
⌘
  Vi
⇣
yfj , Tj
⌘
, (22)
which means that no agent can gain by mimicking any other type. The allocation which solves (20)
subject to (21) and (22) is called the second-best or the optimum.
We will describe the optimum by specifying the marginal tax rate of each type. The marginal tax
rate is given by the ratio of slopes of the total tax schedule and the formal income schedule
ti =
T˙i
y˙fi
. (23)
Intuitively, it describes the fraction of a marginal formal income increase that is claimed by the
planner.
3.2 Incentive-compatibility
The single crossing property allows the planner in the standard Mirrlees model to focus only on local
incentive compatibility constraints. Intuitively, the single-crossing means that, given a constant tax
rate, a higher type is willing to earn more than a lower type. The single-crossing in our model means
that, holding the tax rate constant, the higher type is willing to earn formally more than the lower
type.
Assumption 1. A comparative advantage in shadow labor is decreasing with type: ddi
⇣
wsi
wfi
⌘
< 0.
Lemma 1. Under Assumption 1, the indirect utility function V has the single crossing property.
The single-crossing holds when the agents with lower formal productivity have a comparative ad-
vantage in working in the informal sector. The single-crossing allows us to replace the general
incentive compatibility condition (22) with two simpler requirements.
Proposition 9. Under Assumption 1, the allocation
⇣
yfi , Ti
⌘
i2[0,1]
is incentive-compatible if and
only if the two conditions are satisfied:
1. yfi is non-decreasing in type.
2. If y˙fi exists, then the local incentive-compatibility condition holds:
d
djVi
⇣
yfj , Tj
⌘   
j=i
= 0.
The utility schedule Vi
⇣
yfi , Ti
⌘
of an incentive compatible allocation is continuous everywhere,
di↵erentiable almost everywhere and for any i < 1 can be expressed as
Vi
⇣
yfi , Ti
⌘
= V0
⇣
yf0 , T0
⌘
+
ˆ i
0
V˙j
⇣
yfj , Tj
⌘
dj, (24)
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where
V˙j
⇣
yfj , Tj
⌘
⌘
⇣
⇢fj n
f
j + ⇢
s
jn
s
j
⌘
v0 (nj) . (25)
The single crossing implies that for any tax schedule the level of formal income chosen by a worker
is weakly increasing in the worker’s type. Hence, assigning a lower income to a higher type would
violate incentive compatibility. It is enough to focus just on local deviations: no agent should be able
to improve utility by marginally changing the formal earnings. This local incentive-compatibility
constraint is equivalent to the familiar condition for the optimal choice of the formal income given
the marginal tax rate ti, allowing for the corner solution
min
(
v0
 
yfi
wfi
+ nsi
!
  (1  ti)wfi , yfi
)
= 0. (26)
Note that the formal income may be, and sometimes will be, discontinuous in type. Nevertheless,
the indirect utility function preserves some smoothness and can be expressed as an integral of its
marginal increments.
Let’s call V˙i
⇣
yfi , Ti
⌘
the marginal information rent of type i. It describes how the utility level
changes with type. The higher the average rate of productivity growth, weighted by the labor
inputs in two sectors, the faster utility increases with type. We will use perturbations in the
marginal information rent to derive the optimal tax schedule.
In what follows we will economize on notation of the utility schedule and its slope by supressing
the arguments: Vi ⌘ Vi
⇣
yfi , Ti
⌘
and V˙i ⌘ V˙i
⇣
yfi , Ti
⌘
.
3.3 Optimality conditions
First, we solve for the optimum under assumption that the resulting formal income schedule is
non-decreasing. Second, we examine when this assumption is justified and show that the existence
of the shadow economy make it’s violation more likely. Finally, we derive the optimality conditions
in the general case.
3.3.1 Interior optimality conditions
We obtain the interior optimality conditions by making sure that the social welfare cannot be
improved by perturbing the marginal information rent of any type.10 A marginal information rent
is a slope of the utility schedule at some type i. It can be reduced by increasing tax distortions
of this type, which is costly for the budget. On the other hand, by (24) such perturbation shifts
downwards the entire utility schedule above type i (see Figure 3). This shift is a uniform increase
of a non-distortionary tax of all types above i. The interior optimality conditions balance the
10To the best of our knowledge, Brendon (2013) was the first to use this approach in the Mirrlees model. He also
inspired us to express the optimality conditions with endogenous cost terms, although our notation di↵ers from his.
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Figure 3: Decreasing the marginal information rent of type i
cost of distortions with gains from e cient taxation for each type. Below we present terms that
capture the marginal costs and benefits of such perturbations. We derive them in detail in the
proof of Theorem 1. The shadow economy enters the picture by a↵ecting the cost of increasing tax
distortions.
The benefit of shifting the utility schedule of type j without a↵ecting its slope is given by the
standard expression
Nj ⌘ (1  !j)µj , where !j =  j
⌘
G0 (Vj) . (27)
A marginal increase of non-distortionary taxation of type j leads to one-to-one increase of tax
revenue. On the other hand, it reduces the social welfare, since the utility of type j falls. Following
Piketty and Saez (2013) we call this welfare impact the marginal welfare weight and denote it by
!j . Note that welfare impact is normalized by the Lagrange multiplier of the resource constraint ⌘.
It allows us to express changes in welfare in the unit of resources. We multiply the whole expression
by the density of type j in order to include all agents of this type. We assumed that there are no
wealth e↵ects, so the non-distortionary tax does not a↵ect the labor choice of agents. Consequently,
the term Nj does not depend on whether type j works informally.
The cost of decreasing some agent’s marginal information rent depends on the involvement of this
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agent in the shadow activity. Types can be grouped into three sets:
formal workers: F ⌘
n
i 2 [0, 1] : v0
⇣
nfi
⌘
> wsi
o
,
marginal workers: M ⌘
n
i 2 [0, 1] : v0
⇣
nfi
⌘
= wsi
o
,
shadow workers: S ⌘
n
i 2 [0, 1] : v0
⇣
nfi
⌘
< wsi
o
.
The formal workers supply only formal labor: their marginal disutility from working is strictly
greater than their shadow productivity. The marginal workers also supply only formal labor, but
their marginal disutility from work is exactly equal to their shadow productivity. A small reduction
of formal labor supply of these agents would make them work in the informal sector. Finally, the
shadow workers are employed informally, although they can also supply some formal labor.
The formal workers act exactly like agents in the standard Mirrlees model. By increasing distortions,
the planner is reducing their total labor supply. The cost of increasing distortions is given by
Dfi ⌘
ti
1  ti
✓
⇢fi
✓
1 +
1
⇣i
◆◆ 1
µi. (28)
The cost depends positively on the marginal tax rate. The marginal tax rate tell us how strongly
a reduction of the formal income influences the tax revenue. Moreover, the cost increases with
the elasticity of labor supply ⇣i and is proportional to the density of the distorted type. D
f
i is
endogenous, as it depends on the marginal tax rate.
The perturbation of the marginal information rent works di↵erently for the shadow workers. They
supply shadow labor in the quantity that satisfies v0
⇣
nfi + n
s
i
⌘
= wsi , which means that their total
labor supply ni is constant. By distorting the formal income, the planner simply shift their labor
from the formal to the informal sector. As a result, the cost of increasing distortions does not
depend on the elasticity of labor supply, but rather on the sectoral productivity di↵erences,
Dsi ⌘
wfi   wsi
wsi
⇣
⇢fi   ⇢si
⌘ 1
µi. (29)
The first term is the relative productivity di↵erence between formal and informal sector. Actually,
it’s also equal to ti1 ti , since the marginal tax rate of these types equalizes the return to labor in
both sectors: (1  ti)wfi = wsi . Hence, as in the case of formal workers, the first term corresponds
to the direct tax revenue cost of reduced formal labor supply. The second term describes how
e↵ectively the planner can manipulate the agent’s marginal information rent by discouraging the
formal labor. By the single-crossing assumption, this term is always positive. Again, the density µi
aggregates the expression to include all agents of type i. Note that Dsi is exogenous, as it depends
only on the fundamentals of the economy.
The marginal workers are walking a tightrope between their formal and shadow colleagues. If the
planner marginally reduces their income, they become the shadow workers. If the planner lifts
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distortions, they join the formal workers. The cost of changing distortions of these types depends
on the direction of perturbation and is equal to either Dfi or D
s
i .
Having all the cost and benefit terms ready, we can derive the interior optimality conditions. Recall,
that by varying the distortions imposed on some type, the planner changes a non-distortionary
tax of all types above. In the optimum, the planner cannot increase the social welfare by such
perturbations. For the formal workers, this means that
8i2F Dfi =
ˆ 1
i
Njdj. (30)
It is a standard optimality condition from the Mirrlees model, derived first in the quasilinear case
by Diamond (1998). The shadow economy does not a↵ect the marginal tax rate of formal agents
directly. It may influence them only indirectly, by changing the marginal welfare weights of types
above.
For the marginal workers it must be the case that increasing tax distortions is beneficial as long as
they work only formally, but it is too costly when they start to supply the shadow labor.
8i2M Dsi  
ˆ 1
i
Njdj   Dfi and yfi = wfi g (wsi ) . (31)
The marginal workers do not supply informal labor, but in their case the shadow economy con-
stitutes a binding constraint for the planner. Absent the shadow economy, the marginal tax rates
would be set at a higher level. In our model the planner is not willing to do it, because it would push
the marginal workers to informal jobs, which is too costly. Formal labor supply of the marginal
workers is fixed at the lowest level that leaves them no incentives to work informally.
Recall that the cost of distorting the shadow worker is fixed by the parameters of the economy.
Moreover, the benefit of distorting one particular worker, given by (27), is fixed as well, since the
perturbation of the marginal information rent of i has an infinitesimal e↵ect on the utility of types
above. If the planner finds it optimal to decrease the formal income of agent i so much that i starts
supplying informal labor, it will be optimal to decrease the formal income all the way to zero, when
i works only in the shadow economy:
8i2S
ˆ 1
i
Njdj > D
s
i and y
f
i = 0. (32)
Note that according to this condition all shadow workers are bunched together at zero formal
income.11
11Notice that we could replace the strict inequality with a weak one in (32), and conversely regarding the left
inequality in (31). In words, when the cost of distorting some marginal worker is exactly equal to the benefit, then
this worker could equally well be a shadow worker, with no change in the social welfare. It means that whenever the
curves Dsi and
´ 1
i Njdj cross, the optimum is not unique, since we could vary allocation of the type at the intersection.
Since such a crossing is unlikely to happen more than a few times, we do not consider this as an important issue.
We sidestep it by assuming that the planner introduces distortions only when there are strictly positive gains from
doing so. Consequently, our notion of uniqueness of optimum should be understood with this reservation.
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The optimality conditions (30)-(32) determine the slope of the utility schedule at each type. What
is left is finding the optimal level. Suppose that the planner varies the tax paid by the lowest
type, while keeping all the marginal rates fixed. Optimum requires that such perturbation cannot
improve welfare: ˆ 1
0
Njdj = 0. (33)
Definition. The conditions (30)-(33) are called the interior optimality conditions. The allocation 
yf , T
 
consistent with the interior optimality conditions is called the interior allocation. Specifi-
cally, yf is called the interior formal income schedule.
The interior conditions are necessary for the optimum as long as they don’t imply a formal income
schedule which is locally decreasing. They become su cient, if they pin down a unique allocation.
This happens when the cost of distortions is increasing in the amount of distortions imposed.
When that is the case, the planner’s problem with respect to each type becomes concave. Theorem
1 provides regularity conditions which guarantee it.
Assumption 2. (i) The elasticity of labor supply v
0(n)
nv00(n) is non-increasing in n. (ii) The ratio of
sectoral growth rates is bounded below 8i ⇢
s
i
⇢fi
>  ⇣ 1i .
Theorem 1. Under Assumption 1, if all interior formal income schedules are non-decreasing, the
interior optimality conditions are necessary for the optimum. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, there is
a unique interior formal income schedule. If it is non-decreasing, the interior optimality conditions
are both necessary and su cient for the optimum.
3.3.2 When do the interior conditions fail?
The interior allocation is incentive-compatible and optimal if it leads to formal income that is non-
decreasing in type. In the standard Mirrlees model formal income is decreasing if the marginal tax
rate increases too quickly with type. However, in virtually all applications of the standard Mirrlees
model this is not a problem, as the conditions under which the interior tax rate increases that fast
are rather unusual.12 The shadow economy gives rise to another reason for non-monotone interior
formal income. In the interior allocation all shadow workers have zero formal income. Hence, if
there is any worker with positive formal income with a type lower than some shadow worker, the
formal income schedule will be locally decreasing. It turns out that this second reason makes the
failure of the interior allocation much more likely. In Proposition 10 below we provide the su cient
conditions for the formal income to be non-decreasing. Then we discuss the two cases in which the
shadow economy leads to the failure of the interior optimality conditions.
Assumption 3. (i) The social welfare function is such that G (V ) = V,  i is non-decreasing in
type for i > 0. (ii) The ratio 1
⇢fi
µi
1 Mi is non-decreasing in type. (iii) The elasticity of labor supply
is constant: 8i⇣i = ⇣. (iv) The ratio of sectoral growth rates ⇢
s
i
⇢fi
is non-decreasing in type.
12Probably simplest way to construct an example of locally decreasing formal income schedule is to assume a
bimodal productivity distribution, with very low density between the modes.
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Proposition 10. Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, the unique interior formal income schedule is
non-decreasing.
First, notice that we make sure that the interior formal income schedule is unique (Assumption
2). Simultaneously, it implies that the formal income of the marginal workers is non-decreasing.
Assumptions 3(i) - 3(iii) make sure that the marginal tax rate of formal workers is non-increasing
in type, which in turn implies that the formal income of these workers is non-decreasing. These
conditions are familiar from the standard Mirrlees model. Assumption 3(i) is satisfied by the
utilitarian or Rawlsian social welfare function, while Assumption 3(ii) is a weaker counterpart of
the usual monotone hazard ratio requirement.13
Finally, we have to make sure that all shadow workers, if there are any, are at the bottom of the type
space. By (32) it means that the marginal cost of distorting the shadow worker Dsi can cross the
marginal benefit
´ 1
i Njdj at most once and from below. It is guaranteed jointly by conditions 3(i),
3(ii) and the new requirement 3(iv) which says that the ratio of sectoral productivity growth rates
is non-decreasing. In addition to assuring the optimality of the interior allocation, Assumption 3
imply also that sets S,M and F , if non-empty, can be ordered: the bottom types are the shadow
workers, above them are the marginal workers, and the top types are formal.
Assumption 2 makes sure that the Dsi curve crosses the
´ 1
i Njdj curve at most once. Let’s see how
the relaxation of some of its elements make these curves cross more than once. In Example 1 we
relax the assumpion on the social welfare function and in Example 2 we allow the non-monotone
ratio of sectoral growth rates.
Example 1. (i) The social welfare function is such that G (V ) = V, the Pareto weights  i are
continuous in type and satisfy  0 > 2. (ii) The distribution of types is uniform. (iii) The elasticity
of labor supply is constant: 8i⇣i = ⇣ and v0 (0) = 0. (iv) The ratio of sectoral growth rates ⇢
s
i
⇢fi
is
fixed. (v) Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied.
Lemma 2. In Example 1 there is a threshold w¯s0 2
⇣
0, wf0
⌘
such that if wf0 > w
s
0 > w¯
s
0 the interior
formal income schedule is not non-decreasing.
Example 1 violates Assumption 3 (i), which allows the
´ 1
i Njdj term to be initially increasing in
type.14 Both terms Dsi and
´ 1
i Njdj are increasing at 0, but
´ 1
i Njdj term increases faster. If
wf0 > w
s
0, then the distortion cost at type 0 is greater than the benefit and the bottom type works
formally. If the gap between wf0 and w
s
0 is su ciently small (smaller than w
f
0   w¯s0 > 0), Dsi curve
will cross the benefit curve at some positive type (see Figure 4). Consequently, the agents above
the intersection will work in the shadow economy. Since these agents have no formal income, the
formal income schedule is locally decreasing.
13We can express the distribution of types as a function of formal productivity rather than type. Then the
density is µ¯
⇣
wfi
⌘
= µi
w˙fi
and cumulative density is M¯
⇣
wfi
⌘
=Mi. Hence, assumption 3(ii) means that
wf µ¯
⇣
wf
⌘
1 M¯(wf ) is
non-decreasing. For instance, any Pareto distribution of formal productivity satisfies this assumption.
14The Pareto weights integrate to 1 over the type space, so they have to be lower than or equal to 1 for some types
above 0. Since these weights are continuous and  0 > 2, they will be decreasing for some type above 0, violating
3(i).
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Figure 4: A failure of the interior allocation due to increasing benefit of distortions
´ 1
i Njdj (Ex-
ample 1).
(a) (b)
Example 2. (i) The social welfare function is Rawlsian: 8i>0 i = 0. (ii) The distribution of types
is uniform. (iii) The elasticity of labor supply is constant: 8i⇣i = ⇣. (iv) The growth rate of formal
productivity is fixed, while the growth rate of shadow productivity is decreasing for some types.
(v) Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied.
Example 2 satisfies all the requirements of Proposition 10 apart from the non-decreasing sectoral
growth rates ratio assumption. In panel (a) of Figure 5 we can see that the growth rate of shadow
productivity decreases around the middle type and then bounces back. It is reflected in the marginal
cost of distorting shadow workers Dsi (panel (b)). We chose the parameters such that the fall is
substantial, making the Dsi curve cross the
´ 1
i Njdj curve three times. Consequently, the formal
income first increases, then decreases to 0 once the Dsi crosses
´ 1
i Njdj for the second time. This
example shows that even minor irregularities in the distribution of productivities can make the
interior allocation not implementable.
3.3.3 Optimal bunching
Whenever the interior formal income schedule is decreasing for some types, the interior allocation is
not incentive-compatible and hence is not optimal. Ebert (1992) and Boadway, Cu↵, and Marchand
(2000) applied the optimal control theory to overcome this problem. In contrast to these papers,
we derive the optimal bunching condition with the intuitive variational argument and express it
in the spirit of the Diamond (1998) optimal tax formula. What we are going to do is essentially
“ironing” the formal income schedule whenever it is locally decreasing (see Figure 6). The ironing
was originally introduced by Mussa and Rosen (1978) in a solution to the monopolistic pricing
problem when the monotonicity condition is binding.
Suppose that the interior formal income schedule y¯f is decreasing on some set of types, beginning
with a¯. Decreasing formal income is incompatible with the incentive-compatibility. We can regain
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Figure 5: A failure of the interior allocation due to non-monotone ratio of productivity growth
rates (Example 2).
(a) (b)
incentive-compatibility by lifting the schedule such that it becomes overall non-decreasing and flat in
the interval
⇥
a¯, b¯
⇤
(see Figure 6). Since types
⇥
a¯, b¯
⇤
have the same formal income, they are bunched
and cannot be di↵erentiated by the planner. Such bunching is implemented by a discontinuous
jump of the marginal tax rate.
The flattened schedule is incentive-compatible. However, generally it is not optimal. By marginally
decreasing formal income of type a¯ the planner relaxes the binding monotonicity constraint and can
marginally decrease the formal income of all types in the interval
 
a¯, b¯
 
. This perturbation closes
the gap between the actual formal income and its interior value for the positive measure of types.
On the other hand, the cost of perturbation is infinitesimal: it is a distortion of one type a¯. This
perturbation is clearly welfare-improving, starting from the flattened interior schedule. Below we
find the optimal bunching condition by making sure that the perturbation is not beneficial at the
optimal income schedule.
Suppose that an interval of agents [a, b] is bunched. Let’s marginally decrease the formal income
of agents [a, b) and adjust their total tax paid such that the utility of type a is unchanged. In this
way we preserve the continuity of the utility schedule. However, since the other bunched agents
have a di↵erent marginal rate of substitution between consumption and income, this perturbation
will decrease their utility. We normalize the perturbation such that we obtain a unit change of the
utility of the highest type in the bunch. The total cost of this perturbation is given by
Da,b ⌘ (ta + E { MRSi!i| b > i   a}) Mb  Ma
tb+   ta  , (34)
where  MRSi =
v0 (na)
wfa
  v
0 (ni)
wfi
.
The expression within the brackets is an average impact of a unit perturbation of the formal income.
The brackets contain two components: a fiscal and a welfare loss. The fiscal loss from reducing the
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Figure 6: Ironing the formal income schedule
formal income of each bunched agent is the marginal tax rate below the kink. The welfare loss is
an average marginal welfare weight in the bunch corrected by a discrepancy of the marginal rate
of substitution of a given type from type a. The larger  MRSj is, the more type j su↵ers from
the perturbation. Note that  MRSb is just equal tb+   ta  .15 Hence, in order to normalize the
perturbation to have a unit impact on utility of type b, we divide the brackets by tb+   ta  . We
aggregate this average e↵ect by multiplying it by the mass of bunched types.
The benefit of this perturbation comes from the reduced utility of types above b and is the same
as in the interior case. The optimality requires that
min
⇢ˆ 1
b
Njdj  Da,b, yfa
 
= 0. (35)
Note that the optimality condition involves a corner solution when yfa = 0. It corresponds to the
situation in which the bunched workers don’t work formally at all.
The optimality condition (35) is influenced by the shadow economy again through the cost of
distortion. If some worker i in the bunch [a, b) supplies shadow labor, then the di↵erence in the
marginal rate of substitution for this worker is given by  MRSi =
v0(na)
wfa
  wsi
wfi
.
Theorem 2 combines all the optimality conditions.
15The marginal tax rate discontinuously increases at the kink. By ta  we denote the tax rate below the kink and
by tb+ the tax rate above the kink.
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Theorem 2. Under Assumption 1, the optimal allocation satisfies (33) and at each level of formal
income one of the three mutually exclusive alternatives hold:
• there is no type that reports such formal income,
• there is a unique type whose allocation satisfies the interior optimality conditions (30)-(32),
• there is a bunch of types whose allocation satisfy the optimal bunching condition (35).
Although we managed to characterize the full set of optimality conditions, the interior conditions are
generally easier to use. Below we show that the interior allocation, even if not incentive-compatible,
are a good predictor of which agents optimally work in the shadow economy.
Assumption 4. (i) G is a concave function. (ii) ⇢fi , ⇢
s
i , µi and  i are continuous in type.
Proposition 11. Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 4, all the types that supply shadow labor in the
interior allocation remain the shadow workers in the optimum.
3.4 Summary of results
Which agents should work in the shadow economy?
Corollary 2. Suppose that v0 (0) = 0. Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 4 type i optimally works in
the shadow economy if
E {1  !j | j > i}   w
f
i   wsi
wfi
 
  d
di
 
wsi
wfi
!! 1
µi
1 Mi . (36)
This condition is both necessary and su cient if the interior allocation is incentive-compatible.
The inequality (36) compares the gains from e cient taxation of all types above i with the cost of
distorting type i, when this type is at the edge of joining the shadow economy. A type i is likely
to optimally work in the shadow economy if the planner on average puts a low marginal welfare
weights on the types above i, the relative productivity loss from moving to informal employment is
low and the density of distorted types is low in comparison to the fraction of types above. Finally,
the shadow employment is more likely if the comparative advantage of working in the shadow sector
wsi
wfi
is quickly decreasing with type. It means that higher types have less incentives to follow type i
into the shadow economy. We assume v0 (0) = 0 so that we do not have to worry about some types
not supplying any labor at all.
Note that with the Rawlsian planner the inequality (36) is just a continuous equivalent of the
condition (10) from the simple model.
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The optimal tax rates. Let’s focus on agents that supply some formal labor and are not bunched
at the kinks of the tax schedule. These types never supply informal labor. The optimal tax formula
is
ti
1  ti = min
(
wfi   wsi
wsi
, ⇢fi
✓
1 +
1
⇣i
◆
1 M i
µi
E (1  !j | j > i)
)
. (37)
The shadow economy imposes an upper bound on the marginal tax rate. The bound (the left term
in the min operator of (37)) is such that the tax rate equalizes the return from formal and informal
labor - it is the highest tax rate consistent with agents working in the formal sector.
If the bound is not constraining the planner, then the tax rate should be set according to Diamond
(1998) formula (the right term in the min operator of (37)). The expectations describe the average
social preferences towards all types above i. In general, the less the planner cares about increasing
utility of the types above i, the higher ti will be. If the Pareto weights increase with type or G is
a strictly convex function, this term may become negative, leading to negative marginal tax rates,
as explained by Chone´ and Laroque (2010). Since the sign of the tax rate is ambiguous, below
we describe how the other terms influence its absolute value. The optimal tax rate increases in
absolute value when the growth rate of formal productivity with respect to type is high. If the
planner is redistributive and types above i are much more productive than types below, it is optimal
to set a high tax rate. The tax rate decreases with elasticity of labor supply ⇣i, as it makes workers
more responsive to the tax changes. The ratio 1 Miµi tells us how many agents will be taxed in a
non-distortionary manner relative to the density of distorted agents. If this ratio is high, the gain
from increasing tax rates relative to the cost will be high as well.
Optimal bunching. Bunching may arise at the bottom of the formal income distribution, re-
sulting in de facto exclusion from the formal labor market. Bunching may also appear at a positive
level of formal income, which implies a kink in a tax schedule. All workers who supply shadow labor
are subject to bunching, though not necessarily at the same tax kink. Some workers supplying only
formal labor can be found at the kinks as well. The formal income schedule at which the kink is
located is determined by
ta 
tb+   ta  =
1 Mb
Mb  MaE {1  !j | j   b}  E
⇢
 MRSi
 MRSb
wi
     b > i   a  , (38)
where a and b are respectively the lowest and the highest type bunched at the kink. Note that
both ta  and tb+ , the tax rates below and above the kink, are set according to (37). The location
of the kink is determined by the trade-o↵ between tax and welfare losses from the bunched agents
and the tax revenue gains from the e cient taxation of agents above the kink.
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4 Measuring shadow and formal productivities
To assess the practical relevance of our theoretical results we proceed to look at the empirical
counterparts of the building blocks of our theory. We focus on a developing economy with a large
shadow sector: Colombia.16 In this section we empirically estimate the three key objects of the
model: the formal productivity (wfi ), the informal productivity (w
s
i ) and the distribution of types
(µi). In section 5 we use our estimates to analyze how the existence of the shadow economy shapes
the optimal tax scheme in Colombia.
Colombia is a case that suits itself very well to take our theory to the data, because the shadow
economy is large and we can actually observe the total income of individuals, both if formal or
shadow, through survey data. Household surveys reveal information about shadow income without
making it usable by the authorities to levy taxes.17 Furthermore, Colombian regulation makes it
easy to infer shadow and formal income from questions about total income, and from the type of
a liation of the worker to the social security system.
In the model, wfi and w
s
i correspond to the pre-tax (real) income for one unit of labour for individ-
ual of type i in each sector, and µi is the density of such type. Therefore, we have one-dimensional
heterogeneity across individuals. Our empirical strategy is to replicate such one-dimensional het-
erogeneity by using a factor that comprises information of the worker and job characteristics, such
as the education level and the task done on the job. The identification assumptions is that the
pre-tax hourly wage recorded on the surveys is a noisy signal of the productivities in each sector
and that the productivites themselves are a linear function of the factor we employ.
The weights that are used to construct the factor and the parameters that map productivities to
wages are jointly estimated to maximize the explanatory content of the factor over wages. Indeed,
the factor we obtain can explain most of the variability of wages in both sectors. Nevertheless, the
factor cannot account for the income dispersion of the top earners and the gap with respect to the
rest of the population. We extend our identification strategy by estimating a Pareto distribution
for the wages of top earners in the formal sector.
We find that both productivity estimates are increasing in type (the factor) and that the single-
crossing property is satisfied. Specifically, the wedge between the productivity levels of each sector
is almost zero for the least productive agents and increases rapidly as the formal productivity
increases. The main novelty of this section is that we assess the di↵erences between the formal and
the shadow economy at the worker level, controlling for the sorting of workers. Productivity as
measured in La Porta and Shleifer (2008) can come also from the worker characteristics and not
only from the type of firms or jobs in each sector. With our approach we are able to discuss the
wage di↵erential across sectors for a given worker and job. On the other hand, the mapping of our
estimates to productivity levels depends on the structure of the labor and goods market, because
we rely on data on wages rather than quantities produced or profits of the firm; as those other
1658% of the workers are part of the shadow economy according to our estimates.
17Households are explicitly guaranteed that their answers have no legal implications and cannot be used against
them by any government agency.
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studies do. For the purposes of this paper this is not important since our object of interest is the
income of the worker in each sector. Our results can shed light on the productive structure of the
two sectors once the link between wages and productivity is specified.18
The remaining of this section is organized as follows: first, we present the data and show how we
identify informal workers. Second, the empirical specification is presented and last, the results are
shown and discussed.
4.1 Data
Our source of information is the household survey (ECH by the Spanish acronym) collected on a
monthly basis by the o cial statistical agency in Colombia (DANE). Our sample is for the year
2013 and comprises 170.000 observations of workers. The sample includes personal information such
as age, gender, years of education and also labor market related variables including hours worked,
number of jobs, type of job, income sources and social security a liation. All of the information is
self-reported by the worker.
The variables we use from the survey can be grouped into 4 categories: worker characteristics, job
characteristics, worker-firm relationship and social security status. A linear combination of the
variables in the first three categories is used to construct a factor that captures the variability of
wages. The fourth category is used to classify individuals as formal or informal workers. Below we
provide a brief description of the variables included in each category, for more detailed information
see Appendix B.
Worker characteristics capture the type of worker. They include: age, gender, education level
and work experience in previous jobs.
Job characteristics describe the type of job and task that the worker does. The variables included
are: number of workers in the firm (size), industry to which the firm belongs, geographical
location of the firm and the task the worker has to do.
Worker-firm relationship involves the information about the type of contract and the wage
determination. The variables included here are: The wage of the worker, number of working
hours, the length of the match, whether the worker is hired through an intermediary firm and
whether the worker belongs to a union.
Social security status determines whether the worker is a liated to social security in its di↵erent
dimensions, and the type of a liation. The variables included are: a liation to the health
system, the pension system and the labor accidents insurance, as well as who pays for the
a liation to each component.
18For example, if is assumed that there is perfect competition on the labor market, then our measure corresponds
directly to the worker’s marginal productivity. With the additional assumption of a production function with constant
returns to scale, our measure also reflects the average productivity of the worker.
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Classification of workers into formal and shadow workers
Colombian regulation provides for labour tax payments (payroll taxes) and the a liation to social
security to be done jointly. Therefore, the a liation status to the social security system reveals
whether the worker’s income is taxed and observed by the government, or shadow. We identify
a formal worker as a worker a liated through his own job to all three main components of labor
protection: the health security system, the pension system and the accidents insurance policy. With
this criteria we estimate that around 58% of the Colombian workers operate in the shadow sector.
When identifying the sector to which the worker belongs we can incur in type I and type II errors,
which are respectively: to classify a worker as shadow when he is formal; and to classify a worker
as formal when he is shadow. The type I error is not relevant as the a liation to the social
security system is itself a tax on workers, so any worker not a liated to the system is by definition
avoiding labor taxes. On the other hand, there could be shadow workers that decide to register to
social security and pay the corresponding contributions, since the a liation through the alternative
subsidized system is mean-tested19 and they might be not eligible. The incentive for a shadow
worker to register and pay is therefore being covered by the health insurance. On the other hand,
what induces these workers to remain shadow and misreport their income is paying a lower social
contribution and a consequently lower payroll and income tax. We find that by applying the more
stringent criterion that requires a liation not only to the health but also to the pension system
and the accidents insurance policy we are able to mitigate the possibility of identifying a shadow
worker that registers to social security as a formal worker, as observations with large deviations
between the statutory contributions and the actual contributions tend to be for workers that were
only a liated to one or two of the social security provisions (primarily health) but typically not to
the accidents insurance.
Finally we could also face the case of a formal worker paying all contributions to the social security
system (and being thus classified as formal) but hiding from the government part of his income.
This type of worker does pay taxes, but pays less than the amount imposed by the statutory tax
imposes. In the case of employees this possibility is mitigated, due to the fact that the firm or the
employer are third parties reporting the worker’s income and paying the corresponding taxes to the
government.20 The self-employed workers active in the formal sector are also constrained in their
income misreporting, since their contractors are the third party in charge to pay the honorary tax
to tax authorities belong to the formal sector. In conclusion, we believe that these features of the
Colombian employment reality allow us to follow the structure of the model by defining tax evasion
as working in the shadow economy, while setting aside the aspect of hiding fractions of formal labor
income.
19The housing quality of the recipient is also considered as a criterion to be enrolled of the subsidized system
20See for example Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez (2015) for an exploration of the agency role of firms for the imple-
mentation of labor taxes and a discussion of the greater tax enforcement when there is third party reporting.
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Colombian labor tax scheme
The main components of the Colombian tax/transfers scheme associated with formal labor income
are income taxes, social insurance (payroll) taxes and transfers. First we describe the individual
income tax, then the payroll taxes and then the transfers and subsidies. Using this tax scheme we
proceed to compute the pre-tax income from the reported income by households and consequently
the e↵ective tax rates.
The individual income tax is a progressive tax payable once per year over the total income of one
calendar year. The tax is determined by income brackets, and within each of them a fixed amount
is payed. The first bracket on which the tax is di↵erent from zero starts at 22, 219 dollars (annual
income in 2013 dollars). The tax rate is increasing across brackets and at the last bracket it reaches
27%.
The social insurance taxes are the payroll tax and the health system contribution. For the case of
employees these taxes are payed jointly with the employer; each of the two parties paying a specified
fraction. The sum of both (irrespective of who is in charge of making the payment) corresponds to
a flat tax rate of 22%.
Finally, the bulk of welfare transfers and subsidies in Colombia are granted according to a centralized
system that assigns to each household registered in the system a certain score on an index which
evaluates needs, life standards, and economic status. The index ranges from 0 to 100, and a series
of di↵erent welfare programs use it to assign subsidies and transfers, each one according to its own
threshold. Part of the questionnaire used to compile the index refers to income of the household.
Households have the incentives to misreport income, shadow workers can potentially misreport
income while formal workers can be spotted by the system as the reports are crosschecked with
the government tax agency. We take an average household that belongs to the subsidized system
(meaning the index score is low) (SISBEN) and compute the total transfers it is entitled on that
year by the main social programs available. We calculate that those transfers for a household with
no formal income could be as large as 2000 dollars per year and reduce to zero for an average
household with a full time formal job.
Figure 7 presents the tax scheme decomposed in the three elements discussed and the pre-tax
income distribution recovered from reported income and the tax scheme. We see that transfers are
an important source of income for the poorer households and that the income tax a↵ects a small
fraction of total households.
We have focused on the taxes directly associated with labor income. We do not consider, as they
are not part of the instruments we consider in the model, the excise taxes and the corporate
income taxes (or taxes over capital gains). If we take that excise taxes are only charged over goods
produced in the formal sector and that firms in the formal and shadow economy compete for the
same markets then we have that the tax will completely fall on the worker of the formal economy.
We leave for further research the possibility of using excise taxes in a setup where the link between
goods taxation and labor income has more structure to be analyzed. With our approach we focus
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Figure 7: The Colombian Labor Tax Scheme
exclusively on the taxes and transfers that have a direct link with labor income.
Measuring Income and Wages
Our analysis assumes that all payroll taxes and social security contributions irrespectively of who
is administratively charged for the tax are a burden on the worker income. A labor tax that has to
be paid by the employer is assumed to be translated in a lower wage for the worker.21 The workers
report their monthly income and the hours worked. To this reported income we input payments
that formal workers are entitled to but which are done in a di↵erent frequency and are not recorded
for the month the survey was conducted. Furthermore, note that we do not include the pension
and unemployment insurance contributions as part of the tax burden but we do include them as
part of the total income of the worker.
The hourly wage is computed then as the total income divided by the numbers of hours worked. If
the worker is a shadow worker we denote it by w˜si and if it is formal then is denoted by w˜
f
i . These
is the key variable that we are going to map to the productivity levels wsi and w
f
i described in the
model.
21This is a standard assumption for pretax income computations. The Congressional Budget O ce in the US uses
the same assumption to compute the e↵ective tax rates.
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4.2 Empirical specification
The logarithm of both productivities (wfi and w
s
i ) can be written as a function of a single factor
Fi as follows
log
⇣
wfi
⌘
=  f0 +  
f
1Fi (39)
log (wsi ) =  
s
0 +  
s
1Fi (40)
where  j0,  
j
1 characterize the linear function in sector j 2 {f, s}. We set  f1 = 1 without loss of
generality, given that this will just rescale the factor. The factor is a linear combination of a set of
n variables contained in vector Xi with weights given by the vector  . Then we have that
Fi =  Xi (41)
The proxy we have for the model productivities are the wages of workers w˜ji in each sector j, then
we have that22
log
⇣
w˜fi
⌘
= log
⇣
wfi
⌘
+ ufi (42)
log (w˜si ) = log (w
s
i ) + u
s
i (43)
where ufi and u
s
i are random variables with mean zero. Wages are drawn from a probability
distribution where the key location parameters are wfi and w
s
i , the theoretical concepts in our
analysis. In the theoretical analysis we abstract from the underlying variance of the distribution
and focus on the limit when it tends to zero. The model is a static economy so we are not concerned
with short term variations of wages but rather on the distribution of the location parameters across
the population.
Combining equations (39) to (43) we get the specification of the empirical model that corresponds
to
log (w˜i) =  
f
0 + Ii
⇣
 s0    f0
⌘
+ (1 + Ii ( 
s
1   1)) Xi + ui (44)
where Ii is an indicator function that takes the value of 1 if type i works in the shadow economy
and ui = Iiusi + u
f
i . We estimate (44) by non-linear least squares.
Ordering of agents and estimated productivities
Note the estimate of parameter a as aˆ. We proceed to order the individuals in our sample with
indexes i 2 [0, 1] such that i < i0 ()  ˆXi <  ˆXi0 . We compute the index of each individual
22Note that, as discussed earlier, wji is only observed if type i works in sector j.
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using the following formula
i =
 ˆXi  mini0{ ˆXi0}
maxi0{ ˆXi0}
that is just rescaling the factor using the minimum and the maximum values it takes in the sample.
The estimated productivities of each type i then correspond to
wˆfi = exp
n
 ˆf0 +  ˆXi
o
(45)
wˆsi = exp
n
 ˆs0 +  ˆ
s
1 ˆXi
o
. (46)
Single-crossing condition
The single-crossing condition states that the ratio wfi /w
s
i is increasing in type. Using (45) and (46)
this ratio can be written as
wˆfi
wˆsi
= exp
n
 ˆf0    ˆs0
o
exp
n
(1   ˆs1)  ˆXi
o
Then, if  ˆs1 < 1 holds, the single-crossing condition is satisfied. Recall that we standardized to
1 the marginal (percentile) increase of formal productivity to a marginal increase in the factor.
Therefore, this condition states that a marginal increase in the factor has to imply a lower marginal
increase in shadow than in formal productivity.
Top income earners
We standardized the time available for labor in a year equal to 1 and therefore we can interpret w˜ji
as the income of worker i for full time work at sector j, then wˆfi corresponds (on average) to the
maximum income that type i can achieve. Nevertheless, some income observations are above the
maximum value implied by the factor for the most productive worker working full time. That is,
there could be labor income observations yi that satisfy
yi > maxi0{wˆfi0} = wˆf1 (47)
We classify the individuals that satisfy this criterion as top earners. These are individuals with a
very large wage premium that cannot be accounted for with our benchmark specification and for
which the wage does not seem to have the same relationship with the factor as for the rest of the
population.
To characterize with more accuracy this behavior at the top of the income distribution we estimate
the upper tail of the productivity distribution by fitting a Type I Pareto distribution for the gross
wage w˜ of top earners. The support of the distribution is given by
h
wˆf1 ,1
⌘
and the shape parameter
is estimated by maximum likelihood.
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A final adjustment has to be made to the index of agents. To fit the top earners in the type space
[0, 1] we compress the indexes on non-top earners to the interval [0, k] and top earners are assigned
to [k, 1] and ordered by their gross wage.
Distribution of types
The assignment of indexes for each observation and their corresponding sampling weights implies a
discrete distribution of workers (non-top earners). The continuous distribution of types is obtained
by a kernel density estimation with a linear interpolation at the evaluation points. The estimated
kernel distribution gives us the distribution of types in the interval [0, k].
For top earners we have a Pareto distribution for productivities with the support [maxi0{wˆf i0},1)
but this distribution can be replicated by di↵erent types distributions in [k, 1] at the types space,
provided that the formal productivities wfi for i 2 [k, 1] are adjusted accordingly. This phenomenon
does not occur with non-top earners because their productivity profiles are given by our parametric
model.
There are two requirements that the distribution of types and productivity profiles of top earners
satisfy always: the total mass of the distribution has to coincide with the mass of top earners and
that limi!1 w
f
i =1.
4.3 Estimation results
Here we discuss the results of the estimation of the formal productivity (wfi ), the informal pro-
ductivity (wsi ) and the distribution of types (µi). Parameter estimates for   and the detailed
description of the variables included in Xi are presented in Appendix B.
Figure 8 presents the estimated productivities and the types distribution for non-top earners. The
estimated values of  f0 and  
s
0 are almost identical with  ˆ
s
0 slightly greater so type 0 is slightly more
productive in the shadow economy. The single-crossing condition is supported by the data since
the hypothesis  s1 < 1 is not rejected at a 1% confidence level. The most productive individual
among non-top earners is almost three times more productive in the formal economy than in the
shadow economy.
Top earners are assigned to the set [0.98, 1], the estimated value of the shape parameter of the
Pareto distribution is 1.81 and comprise a mass of about 1% of the total population (details of
the estimation are presented in Appendix B). The shaded region in Figure 8 corresponds to the
top earners. We do not plot their productivity profiles and density. Recall that what is identified
is the distribution of formal productivities at the top with support [maxi0{wˆf i0},1) and this
can be matched with many di↵erent combinations of formal productivity and probability density
specifications in the types space; all of them equivalent for the optimal taxation problem that solves
the planner. We assume that the relation between the shadow and the formal productivity from
the main part of the distribution of types holds also for the top earners.
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Figure 8: Estimated productivities and types distributions
5 Calibrated exercise
Given the productivity schedules estimated in the previous section, we calibrate the utility function
and derive the optimal allocations for Colombia.
5.1 Calibration of the utility function
We assume that the agents’ utility function is
U (c, n) = log
 
c   n
1+ 1⇣
1 + 1⇣
!
, n 2 [0, 1] . (48)
The parameter ⇣ is the elasticity of labor supply. Since we consider a permanent tax reform, the
relevant notion is the steady-state intensive margin elasticity. We fix ⇣ at di↵erent values and
find   which minimizes the deviation of selected K model moments
 
mmodelk (⇣, )
 K
k=1
from the
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corresponding data moments
 
mdatak
 K
k=1
according to the loss function
L (⇣, ) =
KX
k=1
✓
mmodelk (⇣, ) mdatak
mdatak
◆2
. (49)
We use three moments: the share of shadow workers in total employment, the share of shadow
income in total income and the average total income. The first two moments capture the relative
size of the shadow economy, while the third one controls for the total production of Colombia.
Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber (2011) recommend using the steady-state intensive elasticity
of 0.33, which we treat as a benchmark. However, the estimates behind this number implicitly
incorporate responses on multiple margins, possibly also shifting labor to the shadow economy.
Since we model this response explicitly, the correct value of elasticity could lower. Hence, we
consider also the values of 0.2 and 0.1. Table 1 shows the matched moments for di↵erent values of
the elasticity of labor supply.
Table 1
Moments Actual economy Model economy for di↵erent values of elasticity ⇣
⇣ = 0.33 ⇣ = 0.2 ⇣ = 0.1
share of
57.99% 64.51% 62.12% 60.53%
shadow workers
share of
30.94% 23.25% 25.24% 26.64%
shadow income
mean total
7166 6673 6659 6677
income [USD]
The model replicates well the magnitude of the shadow economy for a range of elasticities of labor
supply. We conclude that the empirical distribution of productivities and the actual tax schedule
can explain the high level of informality in Colombia.
5.2 Optimal allocations
We find the optimum for the two social welfare functions. First, we use the Rawlsian welfare
criterion, which puts all the weight on the individual with the lowest utility level. Since both
formal and shadow productivities are increasing with type, the Rawlsian planner cares only about
the lowest type. Second, we derive the Utilitarian optimum with the planner that maximizes the
average utility level in the economy. In each case we require that the planner obtains the same net
tax revenue as the actual tax schedule.
The optimal allocations are described in Table 2. The Rawlsian planner would displace close to
22% of the workforce to informality. The share of shadow income falls even more, since only the
least productive workers end up in the shadow economy. The Utilitarian planner would cut the
size of the informal sector even more, to less than 1%. The Utilitarian planner cares mainly about
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workers in the middle of the distribution, where the density of types is high. Hence, this planner
is not willing to set high marginal tax rates at the bottom, as it would reduce the utility of the
workers in the middle. As the tax rate at the bottom is low, few workers are displaced to the
shadow economy.
The welfare gains from implementing the optimum are large. The Rawlsian planner manages to
increase the transfers to the workers with no formal income by 85% in comparison to the actual
tax and transfer system. It translates into welfare gains of 40% to 50% in consumption equivalent
terms. The Utilitarian planner takes into consideration the welfare cost of increased taxation of the
high types and expands the redistribution less. Nevertheless, the transfers received by the bottom
types increase by more than 55% in comparison to the actual tax system in Colombia and welfare
gains are close to of 20% in terms of consumption. In order to make sure that the welfare gains
are not driven by a thick Pareto tail at the top, we recompute the optima without the top tail (see
the last row of Table 2).23 The welfare gains are naturally smaller, since the top earners constitute
a sizable source of tax revenue. However, it is clear that most of the welfare gains come from the
e cient taxation of the ordinary workers and not from the very rich.
Table 2
Moments Actual Optimal Rawlsian allocation Optimal Utilitarian allocation
economy ⇣ = 0.33 ⇣ = 0.2 ⇣ = 0.1 ⇣ = 0.33 ⇣ = 0.2 ⇣ = 0.1
share of
57.99% 21.68% 21.68% 21.68% 0.17% 0.18% 0.19%
shadow workers
share of
30.94% 5.59% 6.33% 6.98% 0.02% 0.03% 0.03%
shadow income
mean total
7165 6671 6967 7112 6825 7086 7245
income [USD]
welfare
100% 151.8% 147.8% 142% 121.3% 120.9% 119.7%
(cons. equiv.)
welfare w/o top tail
100% 136.5% 135% 133.6% 116.8% 117% 117.4%
(cons. equiv.)
Figure 9 demonstrates how the optimal tax schedule is determined. Recall that the shadow economy
imposes an upper bound on the tax rate. If the tax rate of type i exceeds 1   wsi /wfi , the return
to shadow labor is strictly greater than the return to formal labor. No agent of type i would be
willing to supply formal labor at such terms. As is evident from the figure, all bottom types face
tax rate above the upper bound. Hence, they are bunched together at the zero formal income.
From equation (37) we know that workers who are not bunched face the marginal tax rate that is
a minimum of the two expressions: the standard Mirrleesian tax rate given by a Diamond (1998)
and the upper bound 1 wsi /wfi . In all our calibrations the upper bound plays a dominant role (see
Figure 9). For the Utilitarian planner with elasticity of 0.33 the standard Mirrleesian tax rate dives
under the upper bound just for some high types. For the Rawlsian planner, as well as in the cases of
lower elasticity of labor supply, the Mirrleesian tax rate does not intercept the upper bound below
23In this case the distribution of types has finite support. The mass of the excluded tail is 0.0045.
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the upper tail and hence does not influence the optimal tax in the main part of distribution. In
contrast, in all our calibrations some of the upper tail workers are taxed according to the Diamond
(1998) formula (the upper tail is not represented on Figure 9). We conclude that the optimal
tax schedule of workers below the upper tail is predominantly determined by the shadow economy
considerations. However, the usual labor supply responses are important for taxing very productive
workers.
Figure 9: The role of the upper bound
(a) Rawlsian planner (⇣ = 0.33)
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(b) Utilitarian planner (⇣ = 0.33)
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Figure 9 informs us also what would happen if the shadow economy was neglected and the standard
Mirrleesian tax was implemented. All the types for which the tax rate exceeds the upper bound
would be displaced to the shadow economy. Moreover, many types for which the Mirrleesian tax rate
is below the upper bound are likely to move to the shadows as well.24 Hence, the implementation
of the usual tax formula which does not account for the shadow economy would lead to a dramatic
fall in tax revenue.
How does the optimal tax schedule compares with the one implemented at the time in Colombia?
The actual tax schedule involves high 45% marginal rate at low levels of income, implied by phasing-
out of transfers (see Figure 10). As income increases the rate drops to 22% and remains flat - workers
with this income pay only the flat payroll tax. The progressive income tax starts at the high income
level and gradually increases the marginal tax, reaching 49% for the top earners (at income levels
not represented at Figure 10)).25 In comparison to the actual tax rate, the optimal tax rates are
lower at low levels of income and much higher elsewhere. Lower marginal rates at the bottom mean
transfers are phased-out more slowly, so less productive workers have less incentives to move to the
informal sector. Higher marginal tax rates elsewhere imply that the richest agents pay much higher
total tax than in the actual economy, which allows the planner to finance the generous transfer
24The tax burden accumulated at the low income levels is likely to outweigh the gain from higher return to formal
labor at the high income levels.
25The progressive tax is a step function with more than 80 steps of varying width and Figure 10 (a) shows its
smoothly approximation. The true tax involves 0 rate at the interior of each step and an unbounded rate between
steps, hence it cannot be represented on such graph.
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(Figure 10 (b)). The tax rates at lower elasticities have very similar shape, as they are determined
by the upper bound.
Figure 10: The optimal tax schedule
(a) Marginal tax rates (⇣ = 0.33)
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(b) Total tax (⇣ = 0.33)
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6 Conclusions
A large fraction of the economic activity in most countries is informal. This paper incorporates this
fact into the optimal income tax theory. We find that the shadow economy puts severe restrictions
on the taxes the government can levy, often leading to a welfare loss. However, in some cases
the shadow economy can raise welfare by improving both redistribution and e ciency. If the
informal sector suppresses productivity di↵erences between workers, the government can tax high
earners more when the low productivity workers are employed informally. Furthermore, the shadow
economy shelters poor workers from distortions implied by the taxation of the rich, allowing for
more e cient allocation of labor.
The mechanism proposed has a quantitatively sizable e↵ect. In the case of Colombia, the govern-
ment that cares only about the poor would optimally choose to have 22% of workers in the shadow
economy. Nevertheless, the observed levels of informality are much higher than that. According
to our model, the large size of the Colombian shadow economy is explained by high marginal tax
rates at low levels of income. The optimal tax schedule features lower rates at the bottom, leading
to a smaller informal sector, and higher rates above, raising more revenue from top earners.
This paper suggests that allowing less productive people to collect welfare benefits and simulta-
neously work in the shadow economy could be desirable. Moreover, policies designed to deter the
creation of informal jobs should focus on the jobs taken by the workers with the potential for high
formal earnings. It is important to stress that the way the shadow economy is modeled in this
paper abstracts from many issues, such as competition between formal and informal firms, lack of
regulation and law enforcement, as well as potential negative externalities caused by the informal
111
activity. All those phenomena are likely to reduce the potential welfare gains from exploiting the
shadow economy.
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A Proofs from Section 2
Proof of Proposition 1. Omitted. ⇤
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Proof of Proposition 2. Note that the first-best allocation is consistent with the additional con-
straint (5), hence it is the solution to the planner’s problem. Essentially, conditional on truthfully
revealing type, incentives of the agent and the planner regarding the shadow labor are perfectly
aligned. If a given type pays taxes according to the true type, choosing shadow labor in order to
maximize utility cannot hurt the social welfare. ⇤
Proof of Proposition 3. In the first-best, U (cL, nL)   U (cH , nH) . By assumption of v0 (0) = 0,
we know that nfL > 0. Then the utility of H mimicking L is U
⇣
cL,
wfL
wfH
nfL
⌘
> U
⇣
cL, n
f
L
⌘
 
U (cH , nH) , which violates ICH,L. Hence, the optimum is not the first-best.
Suppose that at the optimum ICH,L does not bind. First, let’s consider the case in which
U (cH , nH) > U (cL, nL) . Since ICH,L is slack, the planner may increase transfers from H to
L, which raises welfare, so it could not be the optimum in the first place. Second, suppose that
U (cL, nL)   U (cH , nH) . It can happen only if nsL > 0. Otherwise, as we have shown above, ICH,L
is violated. If nsL > 0 and ICH,L is slack, the planner can marginally decrease n
s
L and increase n
f
L,
which generates free resources. Hence, at the optimum ICH,L has to bind.
Suppose that ICL,H binds. If the resource constraint is satisfied as equality, it may happen only
if L type is paying a positive tax, while H type receives a transfer. Then the planner can improve
welfare by canceling the redistribution altogether and reverting to laissez-fare, where none of the
incentive constraints bind. ⇤
Lemma A.1. At the optimum either U (cL, nL) = U (cH , nH) and nsL > 0, or the following opti-
mality condition holds
min
(
v0 (nL)
wfL
 
 
µL + µH
v0 (nH,L)
wfH
!
, nfL
)
= 0, (50)
where ni, i =
wf i
wfi
nf i+n
s
i
✓
wf i
wfi
nf i
◆
is the total labor supply of type i pretending to be of type  i.
Suppose that v00 is nondecreasing. If w
f
H
wfL
g (wsH)   g (wsL) then this optimality condition is su cient
for the optimum.
Proof of Lemma A.1. If U (cL, nL) = U (cH , nH) and nsL = 0, then such allocation is not
incentive compatible. The proof is identical as the proof of the claim that the first-best is not
incentive compatible in Proposition 3. Hence, if U (cL, nL) = U (cH , nH), then nsL > 0.
Let’s consider the case in which U (cH , nH) is always greater than U (cL, nL) . ICH,L has to bind,
otherwise the planner could equalize utilities of both types. Consider changing nfL by a small
amount and adjusting TL such that ICH,L is satisfied as equality. It means that
dTL
dnfL
= wfLµH
 
1  v
0 (nH,L)
wfH
!
.
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This perturbation a↵ects social welfare by
dU (cL, nL)
dnfL
= wfL  
@TL
@nfL
  v0 (nL) = wfL
 
µL + µH
v0 (nH,L)
wfH
!
  v0 (nL) .
Optimum requires that either dU(cL,nL)
dnfL
= 0 or dU(cL,nL)
dnfL
< 0 and nfL = 0, which results in
(50). Su ciency of this first order condition depends on the second order derivative of welfare
with respect to the perturbation. In order to have the second derivative well behaved, we are
going to assume that v00 is nondecreasing. Then, we need to consider two cases (see Table 3). If
wfH
wfL
g (wsH)   g (wsL) holds, then dU(cL,nL)dnfL is non-increasing in n
f
L. It means that the optimality
condition (50) is su cient. If
wfH
wfL
g (wsH) < g (w
s
L) , then
dU(cL,nL)
dnfL
is not monotone in nfL and it
may be the case that (50) points at either local maximum which is not a global maximum, or at
the local minimum.
Table 3: Second order derivative of welfare with respect to the perturbation
The case of
wfH
wfL
g (wsH)   g (wsL)
nfL < g (w
s
L) g (w
s
L) < n
f
L <
wfH
wfL
g (wsH)
wfH
wfL
g (wsH) < n
f
L
d2U(cL,nL)
dnf2L
= 0  v00
⇣
nfL
⌘
< 0 µH
⇣
wfL
wfH
⌘2
v00
⇣
wfL
wfH
nfL
⌘
  v00
⇣
nfL
⌘
< 0
The case of
wfH
wfL
g (wsH) < g (w
s
L)
nfL <
wfH
wfL
g (wsH)
wfH
wfL
g (wsH) < n
f
L < g (w
s
L) g (w
s
L) < n
f
L
d2U(cL,nL)
dnf2L
= 0 µH
⇣
wfL
wfH
⌘2
v00
⇣
wfL
wfH
nfL
⌘
> 0 µH
⇣
wfL
wfH
⌘2
v00
⇣
wfL
wfH
nfL
⌘
  v00
⇣
nfL
⌘
< 0
Figure 11 shows these two cases. In the first panel
wfH
wfL
g (wsH)   g (wsL) holds and the optimality
condition (50) always points at the optimum (in this case, the value of nfL where
dU(cL,nL)
dnfL
= 0).
In the second panel
wfH
wfL
g (wsH) < g (w
s
L) holds and the optimality condition is not su cient. There
are three points that satisfy condition (50): local maximum at nfL = 0, local minimum with
nfL 2
⇣
wfH
wfL
g (wsH) , g (w
s
L)
⌘
and the other local maximum with nfL > g (w
s
L) . ⇤
Proof of Proposition 4. In the proof of Lemma A.1 above we described the impact of changing
formal labor of L on the social welfare, dU(cL,nL)
dnfL
. The condition (10) describes situations when the
impact of the perturbation is non-positive at nfL = 0. From Figure 11 it is clear that if it is not the
case, type L will never optimally work in the shadow economy.
Suppose that
wfH
wfL
g (wsH)   g (wsL) . Condition (10) implies that dU(cL,nL)dnfL is always non-positive, so
it is optimal to reduce nfL as long as U (cH , nH) > U (cL, nL) . From Lemma A.1 we know also that
U (cH , nH) > U (cL, nL) if L works only formally, so it is optimal to place type L in the shadow
economy.
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Figure 11: Su ciency of the optimality condition
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The optimality condition is necessary, but not sufficient
Now suppose that
wfH
wfL
g (wsH) < g (w
s
L) . Condition (11) means that the maximum of
dU(cL,nL)
dnfL
attained at nfL = g (w
s
L) (see Figure 11) is non-positive. Therefore, it is optimal to reduce n
f
L until
utilities of both types are equalized, which can happen only when L works in the shadow economy.
Condition (11) is su cient, but not necessary for L to work in the shadow economy, because the
social welfare changes in a non-monotone way with nfL. If (11) is not satisfied, marginally increasing
nsL from 0 is bad for welfare, but increasing it further may eventually lead to welfare gains, and the
total e↵ect on welfare is ambiguous. ⇤
Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose that optimally nsL > 0. From Figure 11 it is clear that in such
situation it is in the best interest of type L to work exclusively in the shadow economy. However,
if wsL > w
s
H and n
f
L = 0, the incentive compatibility constraint of the type H implies that
U (cL, nL) = U (w
s
Ln
s
L   TL, nsL) > U
 
wsHn
s
H,L   TL, nsH,L
 
= U (cH , nH) .
Since the planner is Rawlsian, such allocation is not desirable. The planner will rather stop de-
creasing nfL at the point where utilities of both types are equal. On the other hand, if w
s
L  wsH
then
U (cL, nL) = U (w
s
Ln
s
L   TL, nsL)  U
 
wsHn
s
H,L   TL, nsH,L
 
= U (cH , nH) ,
so the planner will optimally decrease nfL to zero. ⇤
Proof of Proposition 6. In order to examine when the optimum welfare is strictly higher than
in the standard Mirrlees model, we will compare utility of type L in the standard Mirrlees model 
U
 
cML , n
M
L
  
and in the shadow economy model, when L is working only in the shadow economy
116
 
U
 
cSEL , n
SE
L
  
. Clearly, when the second scenario yields higher utility, the existence of the shadow
economy is welfare improving.
In the standard Mirrlees model, the binding constraint is U
⇣
wfHn
M
H , n
M
H
⌘
 TMH = U
⇣
wfLn
M
L ,
wfL
wfH
nML
⌘
 
TML . Together with the resource constraint it means that T
M
L = µH
⇣
U
⇣
wfLn
M
L ,
wfL
wfH
nML
⌘
  U
⇣
wfHn
M
H , n
M
H
⌘⌘
.
Now, the utility of type L is
U
 
cML , n
M
L
 
= U
⇣
wfLn
M
L , n
M
L
⌘
 TL = U
⇣
wfLn
M
L , n
M
L
⌘
 µH
 
U
 
wfLn
M
L ,
wfL
wfH
nML
!
  U
⇣
wfHn
M
H , n
M
H
⌘!
.
Using the same steps, we can express the utility of type L working only in the shadow economy as
U
 
cSEL , n
SE
L
 
= U
 
wsLn
SE
L , n
SE
L
   µH ⇣U  wsHnSEH,L, nSEH,L   U ⇣wfHnSEH , nSEH ⌘⌘ .
Since there are no distortions at the top and no wealth e↵ects, nMH = n
SE
H . The shadow economy is
welfare improving, U
 
cSEL , n
SE
L
   U  cML , nML   > 0, i↵
U
 
wsLn
SE
L , n
SE
L
   U ⇣wfLnML , nML ⌘+ µH
 
U
 
wfLn
M
L ,
wfL
wfH
nML
!
  U  wsHnSEH,L, nSEH,L 
!
> 0.
The first di↵erence (the e ciency gain) is positive if wsL > w¯
s
L. The second di↵erence (the redistri-
bution gain) is positive when wsH < w¯
s
H . Hence, when both inequalities hold weakly and at least one
holds strictly, the existence of the shadow economy improves welfare in comparison to the standard
Mirrlees model.
Now we will show that when the inequalities hold in the other direction, the shadow economy hurts
welfare. Suppose that wsL = w¯
s
L and w
s
H = w¯
s
H . We will prove that allocation
SE is a unique
optimum at this point. First we will show that when the redistribution gain is non-positive, it is
true that nSEH >
wfL
wfH
nML . Suppose on the contrary that n
SE
H  w
f
L
wfH
nML . Then we can write the
following sequence of inequalities
U
 
wfLn
M
L ,
wfL
wfH
nML
!
  U
⇣
wfHn
SE
H , n
SE
H
⌘
> U
 
wsHn
SE
H , n
SE
H
 
.
The first inequality comes from the fact that
wfL
wfH
nML is below the e cient level of labor supply of
type H, so lowering the labor of this type even further to nSEH will decrease the utility. The second
inequality is simply implied by our assumption wfH > w
s
H . This sequence of inequalities implies
that the redistribution gain is strictly positive. Hence, if the redistribution gain is non-positive,
nSEH >
wfL
wfH
nML holds.
Note that nSEH >
wfL
wfH
nML means that the optimal allocation of the standard Mirrlees model is not
incentive-compatible with the shadow economy - deviating type H would supply some additional
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shadow labor. Hence, any allocation which yields the social welfare equal or higher than U
 
cML , n
M
L
 
has to involve type L working in the shadow economy.
Let’s go back to the optimal allocation with the shadow economy, when wsL = w¯
s
L and w
s
H = w¯
s
H .
From the considerations above we know that the optimum involves some shadow labor. If we sum
the e ciency gain and the redistribution gain divided by µH and rearrange the terms, we get 
U
 
wfLn
M
L ,
wfL
wfH
nML
!
  U
⇣
wfLn
M
L , n
M
L
⌘!
   U  wsHnSEH , nSEH    U  wsLnSEL , nSEL    = 0.
The expression in the first brackets is positive. Hence, the second brackets are positive as well,
which means that wsH > w
s
L. By Proposition 5 type L will work exclusively in the shadow economy.
To sum up, we know that at (wsL, w
s
H) = (w¯
s
L, w¯
s
H) the optimum of the shadow economy model is
unique and involves type L working entirely in the shadow economy. Consequently, a decrease in
the shadow productivity of type L or an increase in the shadow productivity of type H leads to
a strict welfare loss, since it either decreases the e↵ective productivity of type L or decreases the
transfer type L receives. ⇤
Proof of Proposition 7. Suppose that  i    i. In this case the ICi, i may bind (it will if the
inequality is strict), while IC i,i is always slack. The planner will not distort the allocation of type
i. Without distortions, this type will never work in the shadow economy.
Suppose that  i >   i, so that IC i,i binds. Perturb n
f
i and adjust Ti such that IC i,i holds as
equality:
dTi
dnfi
= wfi µ i
 
1  v
0 (n i,i)
wf i
!
.
This perturbation a↵ects social welfare by
dW
dnfi
=  iµi
⇣
wfi   @Ti@nfi   v
0 (ni)
⌘
+   iµ i µiµ i
@Ti
@nfi
=  iµiw
f
i
✓⇣
1  v0(ni)
wfi
⌘
+
⇣
  i
 i
  1
⌘
µ i
✓
1  v0(n i,i)
wf i
◆◆ (51)
Suppose that
ws i
wf i
  wsi
wfi
and nfi  g (wsi ), which means that v0 (ni) = wsi . Note that v
0(n i,i)
wf i
 
ws i
wf i
  wsi
wfi
. Hence
1  w
s
i
wfi
  1  v
0 (n i,i)
wf i
>
✓
1    i
 i
◆
µ i
 
1  v
0 (n i,i)
wf i
!
,
which means that dW
dnfi
> 0. Therefore, it is never optimal to decrease nfi so much that type i works
in the shadow economy. ⇤
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Proof of Proposition 8. First we will show how to obtain (16). The e ciency gain is straight-
forward. In order to obtain the redistribution gain, note that there are no distortions imposed on
type  i, hence
µ i  i
 
U
 
cSE i , n
SE
 i
   U  cM i, nM i   = µ i  i  TM i   TSE i   =  µi  i  TMi   TSEi   .
Summing up the terms results in (16). In order to derive thresholds, recall that H (ws) =
U (wsg (ws) , g (ws)). The e ciency gain is given by
µi i
⇣
H (wsi )  U
⇣
wfi n
M
i , n
M
i
⌘⌘
,
it is strictly increasing in wsi and positive for w
s
i > w¯
s
i. Note that by (51) nMi will always be
distorted (downwards if i = l, upwards if i = h). Hence, U
⇣
wfi n
M
i , n
M
i
⌘
< H
⇣
wfi
⌘
and the
threshold w¯si is strictly lower than w
f
i .
Using the binding IC i,i constraint, we can express the redistribution gain as
µiµ i ( i     i)
 
U
 
wfi n
M
i ,
wfi
wf i
nMi
!
 H  ws i 
!
.
It is strictly decreasing in ws i and is positive for ws i < w¯s i. Since
wfi
wf i
nMi 6= g
⇣
wf i
⌘
, it is true
that U
✓
wfi n
M
i ,
wfi
wf i
nMi
◆
< H
⇣
wf i
⌘
and the threshold w¯s i is strictly lower than w
f
 i. ⇤
A Proofs from Section 3
Proof of Lemma 1. The single-crossing requires that ddi
✓
@Vi(yf ,T)/@yf
@Vi(yf ,T )/@T
◆
< 0. Suppose that
v0
⇣
yf
 i
⌘
<  i. Then the agent supplies no informal labor and the indirect utility function V is just
the utility function U evaluated at the formal allocation. Since v0 is increasing, the single crossing
holds in this case. When v0
⇣
yf
 i
⌘
   i, then the optimal provision of informal labor means that
v0 (ni) = w
f
i , which implies
@Vi(yf ,T)/@yf
@Vi(yf ,T )/@T
= w
s
i
wfi
. Therefore the single crossing condition requires
that ddi
⇣
wsi
wfi
⌘
< 0. ⇤
Proof of Proposition 9. First note that the incentive compatibility requires that if ddjVi
⇣
yfj , Tj
⌘   
j=i
exists, it is equal to 0. Otherwise type i can improve welfare by changing income marginally, so the
allocation is not incentive compatible. Hence, if ddiVi
⇣
yfi , Ti
⌘
= ddjVi
⇣
yfj , Tj
⌘   
j=i
+ ddiVi
⇣
yfj , Tj
⌘   
j=i
exists, it is equal to ddiVi
⇣
yfj , Tj
⌘   
j=i
=
⇣
w˙fi
wfi
nfi +
w˙si
wsi
nsi
⌘
v0 (ni) . We call this derivative a marginal
information rent and denote it simply by V˙i.
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By Milgrom and Segal (2002) (see their 10th footnote and Theorem 2), we can represent the utility
schedule for any i < 1 as an integral of marginal information rents
Vi
⇣
yfi , Ti
⌘
= V0
⇣
yf0 , T0
⌘
+
ˆ i
0
V˙jdj,
Moreover, the utility schedule Vi is continuous everywhere and di↵erentiable almost everywhere.
Now we will show that the allocation is not incentive compatible if the formal income is decreasing
in type. Suppose that the allocation is incentive-compatible and that there are two types a < b
such that yfa > y
f
b . By the incentive compatibility, we have
Va
 
yfa , Ta
    Va ⇣yfb , Tb⌘ . (52)
d
diVi
 
yf , T
 
is increasing in yf . To see it, note that
d
di
Vi
 
yf , T
 
=
 
⇢fi
yf
wf i
+ ⇢si max
(
g (wsi ) 
yf
wfi
, 0
)!
v0 (ni) ,
where g is the inverse function of v0. The single-crossing implies that ⇢fi > ⇢
s
i , so the right hand
side is increasing in yf .
Since yfa > y
f
b , for each type i it is true that
d
diVi
 
yfa , Ta
 
> ddiVi
⇣
yfb , Tb
⌘
. It implies
Vb
 
yfa , Ta
   Va  yfa , Ta  = ˆ b
a
d
di
Vi
 
yfa , Ta
 
di >
ˆ b
a
d
di
Vi
⇣
yfb , Tb
⌘
di = Vb
⇣
yfb , Tb
⌘
  Va
⇣
yfb , Tb
⌘
.
(53)
Summing (52) and (53) results in
Vb
 
yfa , Ta
 
> Vb
⇣
yfb , Tb
⌘
,
which contradicts the incentive-compatibility. Therefore, a nondecreasing formal income schedule
is necessary for incentive compatibility. Conversely, suppose that the local incentive constraints
hold and the formal income schedule is nondecreasing. Then for any two types a < b < 1
Vb
⇣
yfb , Tb
⌘
  Va
 
yfa , Ta
 
=
ˆ b
a
d
di
Vi
⇣
yfi , Ti
⌘
di  
ˆ b
a
d
di
Vi
 
yfa , Ta
 
di = Vb
 
yfa , Ta
   Va  yfa , Ta  ,
(54)
which implies
Vb
⇣
yfb , Tb
⌘
  Vb
 
yfa , Ta
 
.
We can use the same reasoning, but bound the utility di↵erence on the left hand side of (54) from
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above by
´ b
a
d
diVi
⇣
yfb , Tb
⌘
di to get
Va
 
yfa , Ta
    Va ⇣yfb , Tb⌘ .
We cannot use this argument when b = 1 and wf1 is unbounded, but then by continuity of Vi we
have limb!1
n
Vb
⇣
yfb , Tb
⌘
  Vb
 
yfa , Ta
 o   0. ⇤
Proof of Theorem 1. First we will derive Dfi and D
s
i term. Then we will show that conditions
from the theorem are necessary. Finally we will prove su ciency.
Suppose that i 2 F . A perturbation of formal income changes the marginal information rent of
type i by
@V˙i
@yfi
= (1  ti) ⇢fi
✓
1 +
1
⇣i
◆
. (55)
where ⇣i =
v0(ni)
niv00(ni) is the elasticity of labor supply. This change of income a↵ects the utility level
of type i by dVi
dyfi
= 1   v0(ni)
wfi
. By Proposition 9 the utility schedule has to be continuous, so we
have to introduce additional change in tax Ti in order to keep the utility level of type i constant.
We adjusts the total tax paid by an agent of type i by dTi = 1  v
0(ni)
wfi
. Note that dTi is just equal
the marginal tax rate ti. This perturbation influences the tax revenue as if we were decreasing the
formal income of type i while keeping the marginal tax rate fixed. Since we are interested in the
tax revenue impact of the unit perturbation of the marginal information rent, we normalize dTi by
@V˙i
@y . In order to capture the tax revenue impact of perturbation of all agents of type i, we multiply
this expression by µi and get
Dfi = dTi
 
@V˙i
@yfi
! 1
µi =
ti
1  ti
✓
⇢fi
✓
1 +
1
⇣i
◆◆ 1
µi.
Suppose that i 2 S. Shadow labor is supplied according to v0 (ni) = wsi =) ni = g (wsi ) . The
marginal information rent can be expressed as
V˙i =
0B@ w˙fi⇣
wfi
⌘2 yfi + w˙iswsi
 
g (wsi ) 
yfi
wfi
!1CAwsi . (56)
We marginally perturb yfi . The impact of the perturbation of the marginal information rent is
dV˙i
dyfi
=
⇣
⇢fi   ⇢si
⌘ wsi
wfi
.
As in the formal workers’ case, the perturbation of yfi alone changes the utility level of type i. In
order to keep the utility schedule continuous at i, we need to adjust the tax Ti such that the utility
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of this type is unchanged. The required change of the tax is dTi = 1  v
0(ni)
wfi
, which for the shadow
worker equals
wfi  wsi
wfi
. By multiplying the tax revenue change with µi and normalizing it with
dV˙i
dyf ,
we obtain the tax revenue cost of decreasing the marginal information rent of type i:
Dsi = dTi
 
@V˙i
@yfi
! 1
µi =
wfi   wsi
wsi
⇣
⇢fi   ⇢si
⌘ 1
µi.
If the interior formal income is nondecreasing, the interior allocation implied is incentive-compatible.
The necessity of the conditions (30)-(33) was demonstrated in the main text. If these conditions
do not hold, there exists a beneficial perturbation.
The conditions (30)-(33) are su cient when they pin down the unique interior allocation. This
happens when the cost of distortions is decreasing in the formal income of each type. Then the
government’s problem of choosing formal income of each type is concave. For formal workers it
requires that ⇣i is non-increasing in the labor supply, as then increasing the marginal tax rate ti
leads to an increase in Dfi . For the marginal workers we need D
s
i > D
f
i , which is guaranteed by
⇢si
⇢fi
> ⇣ 1i . See the footnote 11 for the comment regarding the uniqueness of allocation for types for
which Dsi =
´ 1
i Njdj holds. ⇤
Proof of Proposition 10. We will examine the monotonicity of an interior formal income sched-
ule separately for the formal, marginal and shadow workers.
The single-crossing condition implies that if the marginal tax rate is non-increasing in type, the
formal income of workers in F is increasing. By (30) the marginal tax rate satisfies
ti
1  ti = ⇢
f
i
✓
1 +
1
⇣i
◆
1 M i
µi
E (1  !j | j > i) . (57)
Assumption 3(i) means that E (1  !j | j > i) = E
⇣
1   j⌘
    j > i⌘ is non-increasing in i. Assump-
tions 3(ii) and 3(iii) imply that the rest of the right hand side of (57) is non-increasing in i. Hence,
ti is non-increasing and the interior formal income schedule is increasing in F .
For any marginal worker i the formal income is fixed at wfi g (w
s
i ) . The derivative of formal income
with respect to type is
y˙fi =
dwfi g (w
s
i )
di
= w˙fi g
⇣
wfi
⌘
+ wfi w˙
s
i g
0 (wsi ) = w
f
i g (w
s
i )
✓
⇢fi + ⇢
s
i
wsi g
0 (wsi )
g (wsi )
◆
.
Notice that w
s
i g
0(wsi )
g(wsi )
= v
0(ni)
niv00(ni) = ⇣i. Hence, for any marginal worker y˙
f
i   0 if and only if
⇢fi + ⇢
s
i ⇣i   0, ⇢
s
i
⇢fi
   ⇣ 1i .
In the interior allocation all shadow workers have zero formal income. Hence, the formal income
schedule is non-decreasing only if shadow workers are present exclusively at the bottom of the type
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space. According to (32), a worker i belongs to S in an interior allocation if and only if
wfi   wsi
wsi
 ⇢fi
1 Mi
µi
 
1  ⇢
s
i
⇢fi
!
E (1  !j | j > i) .
The left hand side is increasing in i by the single-crossing assumption. The right hand side is
non-increasing by assumptions 3(i), 3(ii) and 3(iv).⇤
Proof of Proposition 2. We will show that under the assumptions made the interior allocation
is such that bottom types do not work in the shadow economy, while some types above them do.
This leads to the income schedule locally decreasing in type.
Let’s compute the term
´ 1
i Njdj. By (33) we know that ⌘ = E { i} = 1. Hence
´ 1
i Njdj =´ 1
i (1   j) dj and the derivative of this term is
@
´ 1
i Njdj
@i =  i   1.
The term Dsi is
Dsi =
 
wf0
ws0
e(⇢
f ⇢s)i   1
! 
⇢f   ⇢s  1 .
By (32) any type i is a shadow worker in the interior allocation if and only if
´ 1
i Njdj   Dsi . We
can rewrite this inequality as
ws0  
e(⇢
f ⇢s)i
1 + (⇢f   ⇢s) ´ 1i Njdj
wf0 .
Denote the right hand side by Xi. Note that X0 = 1, which together with w
f
0 > w
s
0 implies that
the bottom types do not work in the shadow economy and by the Assumption 1(iii) have a positive
formal income.
We define the threshold w¯s0 as mini2[0,1]Xi. In order to see that w¯s0 < w
f
0 , let’s compute the
derivative of Xi :
X˙i =
 
⇢f   ⇢s  e(⇢f ⇢s)i✓2   i +  ⇢f   ⇢s  ˆ 1
i
Njdj
◆
.
Note that X˙0 =
 
⇢f   ⇢s  (2   i) < 0, so Xi is decreasing at the bottom type and mini2[0,1]Xi <
X0 = w
f
0 . Therefore, whenever w
f
0 > w
s
0 > w¯
s
0, the bottom types have a positive formal income,
while some types above them work in the shadow economy and have no formal income. ⇤
Proof of Theorem 2.
Proof. There are three cases we should consider, depending on whether the interior formal income
is increasing, locally decreasing, or increasing but not strictly. In the first case (strictly increasing
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schedule) by Theorem 1 the interior allocation is optimal. In the second case (locally decreasing
schedule) by Theorem 2 we need to use the optimal bunching condition (35). Below we derive this
condition formally. In the third case the interior income schedule is non-decreasing with flat parts.
By Theorem 1 the interior allocation is optimal. However, Theorem 2 says that the flat parts of
the income schedule should be consistent with the optimal bunching condition (35). We will show
that those two approaches are equivalent.
Suppose that the formal income schedule yf is constant at the segment of types [a, b] . Let’s
marginally decrease the formal income of types [a, b). Since we don’t change the allocation of
types below a, we have to make sure that Va is unchanged - otherwise the utility schedule becomes
discontinuous. Together with the cut of the formal income, we have to introduce a change in the
total tax paid at this income level dTa = 1  v
0(ni)
wfi
= ta  . Since all types [a, b) are a↵ected, the tax
revenue loss is equal to
ta (Mb  Ma) . (58)
Although this perturbation does not a↵ect the utility of type a, it does a↵ect the utility of all
other bunched types. The utility impact of the perturbation of some type i 2 (a, b) equals dUi =
1  v0(ni)
wfi
  dTa = v
0(na)
 a
  v0(ni) i . The welfare loss of bunched agents due to this utility change is
ˆ b
a
 MRSi!idµ, (59)
where  MRSi =
v0(na)
 a
  v0(ni) i . Having the fiscal and welfare loss at the kink, we can add them
into a cost of increasing distortions at the bunch [a, b). We normalize the sum by tb+   ta  , which
makes sure that the perturbation results in the unit change of the utility of type b, and we obtain
(34). As the perturbation results in a uniform utility change of agents above the bunch, we can use
the standard term (27) in order to obtain the optimal bunching condition (35).
Suppose that the interior formal income schedule is flat on the segment [a, b] . We will prove the
equivalence of the interior optimality conditions and the optimal bunching condition. Let’s consider
the following sequence of perturbations. First, decrease the marginal information rent of agent a
such that the formal income of this type falls by a unit. Take a marginally higher type and again
perturb the marginal information rent such that the formal income of this agents is decreased by
a unit as well. Do it until you reach type b. Note that incentive compatibility is preserved at
each stage, since the formal income is always non-decreasing. The aggregate welfare impact of this
sequence of perturbations is
Winterior =
ˆ b
a
@V˙i
@y
✓
Di  
ˆ 1
i
Njdj
◆
di,
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where Di ⌘
8<:D
f
i if i2 F
Dsi if i2 S
.We do not need to consider the marginal workers, because their formal
income is increasing (see the proof of Proposition 10), hence they cannot be bunched. We can
decompose Winterior into three components
Winterior =
ˆ b
a
@V˙i
@y
Didi| {z }  
ˆ b
a
@V˙i
@y
ˆ b
i
Njdjdi| {z }  
ˆ b
a
@V˙i
@y
ˆ 1
b
Njdjdi| {z } .
X1 X2 X3
Note thatDi =
1 MRSi
@V˙i
@y
µi, henceX1 =
´ c
a (1 MRSi)µidi.We observe that @V˙i@y = @
2Vi
@i@y =   ˙MRSi
and we integrate X2 by parts
X2 =  
ˆ b
a
˙MRSi
ˆ b
i
Njdjdi =  
0@"MRSi ˆ b
i
Njdj
#b
a
+
ˆ b
a
MRSiNidi
1A =   ˆ b
a
(MRSi  MRSa)Nidi.
We simply integrate X3
X3 =  
ˆ b
a
˙MRSi
ˆ 1
b
Njdjdi =   (MRSb  MRSa)
ˆ 1
b
Njdj.
Now by summing and rearranging the terms we get
Winterior = X1  X2  X3
=
´ b
a (1 MRSi) dµ+
´ b
a (MRSi  MRSa) (1  !i) dµ+ (MRSb  MRSa)
´ 1
b Njdj
=
´ b
a (1 MRSa) dµ+
´ b
a (MRSa  MRSi)!idµ+ (MRSb  MRSa)
´ 1
b Njdj
= ta  (Mb  Ma) +
´ b
a  MRSi!idµ+ (ta    tb+)
´ 1
b Njdj = (tb+   ta )
⇣
Da,b  
´ 1
b Njdj
⌘
.
Since tb+   ta  = v
0(na)
 a
  v0(nb) b > 0, the sequence of interior optimality conditions is equivalent to
the optimal bunching condition (35).
Proof of Proposition 11. If the interior allocation is incentive-compatible, the claim holds.
Suppose that it is not the case, i.e. there is a kink in the tax schedule. In this case incentive
compatibility constrains the government from reducing the utility of agents above kink as much as
in the interior case. Since G is concave, it means that Nj terms for j above the kink is weakly higher
and the government’s will to impose distortions does not decrease. If there are shadow workers at
the bottom and the curve
´ 1
i Njdj shifts upwards, then even more types will be bunched at zero
formal income at the bottom.
Let’s think about shadow workers which are not at the bottom of the type space. The continuity
assumptions guarantee that Dsi and
´ 1
i Njdj terms are continuous in type. It implies that before
any set of shadow workers that are not at the bottom of the type space is a marginal worker.
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Consider an interior allocation with a bunch of shadow workers at some positive formal income
level. If we flatten the interior formal income schedule in order to make it non-decreasing (as in
Figure 6), the first type in the bunch (type a¯) will be a marginal worker (
v0
✓
ya¯
w
f
a¯
◆
wsa¯
= 1), while all
the other types with this level of formal income will be shadow workers (
v0
✓
ya¯
w
f
i
◆
wsi
< 1, i > a¯). To see
this, note that @@i
0@ v0✓ ya¯wfi ◆
wsi
1A is negative by ⇢si
⇢fs
>  ⇣ 1. So far we discussed what happens at the
flattened income schedule. The optimal income schedule involves no less distortions, so the shadow
workers will not cease to supply shadow labor. ⇤
Proof of Corollary 2. It is just an interior optimality condition for the shadow worker (32). By
Lemma 11, all the shadow workers from the interior allocation are shadow workers in the optimum.
⇤
B The estimation of the factor Fi and top earners Pareto
distribution.
Here we present the variables included in the vector Xi and the parameter estimates of   and  
obtained from the specification given by (44). Table 4 lists the variables included in Xi with its
corresponding description and associated category. The parameter estimates are presented in Table
5. Finally, table 6 presents the estimate of the Pareto distribution for top earners.
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Table 4: Variables included in Xi
Variable Description Values
Worker characteristics
Gender Dummy variable equal to 1 for women 0-1
Age Age of the worker 16-90
Age2 Age squared
Ed years Number of education years 0-26
Degree Highest degree achieved
1-5
1 - no degree
5 - postgraduate degree
Y work Number of months worked in the last year 1-12
Experience Number of months worked in the last job 0-720
First job Dummy for the first job (1 if it is the first job) 0-1
Production unit (firm) characteristics
Sector Man Dummy for the manufacturing sector 0-1
Sector Fin Dummy for financial intermediation 0-1
Sector ret Dummy for the sales and retailers sector 0-1
Big city Dummy for a firm in one of the two largest cities 0-1
Size Categories for the number of workers
1-9
1 - One worker
9 - More than 101 workers
Production unit (Type of job) characteristics
Lib Dummy for a liberal occupation 0-1
Admin Dummy for an administrative task 0-1
Seller Dummy for sellers and related 0-1
Services Dummy for a service task (bartender ..) 0-1
Worker-firm relationship
Union Dummy for labor union a liation (1 if yes) 0-1
Agency Dummy for agency hiring (1 if yes) 0-1
Seniority Number of months of the worker in the firm 0-720
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Table 5: Estimation results
Parameter Point estimate std. error t-statistic 95% conf. interval
 f0 6.859 0.033 211.9 6.89 7.02
 s0    f0 0.102 0.032 -3.2 -0.16 -0.04
 s1 0.682 0.037 12.6 0.648 0.716
 -Gender -0.077 0.005 -11.6 -0.06 -0.04
 -Age 0.025 0.001 13.1 0.01 0.02
 -Age2 0.000 0.000 -8.8 0.00 0.00
 -Ed years 0.037 0.002 15.4 0.02 0.03
 -Degree 0.156 0.005 21.1 0.10 0.12
 -Sector Man -0.098 0.006 -11.9 -0.08 -0.06
 -Sector Fin 0.156 0.015 6.9 0.08 0.14
 -Sector ret -0.150 0.006 -16.9 -0.11 -0.09
 -Big city 0.010 0.007 1.0 -0.01 0.02
 -Size 0.032 0.001 18.7 0.02 0.02
 -Union 0.126 0.010 8.3 0.07 0.11
 -Agency -0.144 0.005 -18.3 -0.11 -0.09
 -Seniority 0.001 0.000 17.9 0.00 0.00
 -Y work 0.029 0.001 18.4 0.02 0.02
 -First job -0.053 0.008 -4.7 -0.05 -0.02
 -Experience 0.000 0.000 5.3 0.00 0.00
 -Lib 0.074 0.013 3.9 0.03 0.08
 -Admin -0.272 0.009 -19.9 -0.20 -0.17
 -Seller -0.186 0.014 -9.2 -0.15 -0.10
 -Services -0.267 0.009 -19.3 -0.20 -0.16
Table 6: Pareto distribution estimates
Parameter Point estimate std. error z-statistic 95% conf. interval
Shape parameter 1.81 0.0018 953.34 1.806 1.833
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